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STATE COURT STANDARDS OF REVIEW FOR
THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS
David B. Kopel* & Clayton Cramer**
After the United States Supreme Court's decision in
District of Columbia v. Heller,1 federal courts must consider
which standard of review and other analytical tools to
evaluate claims about the Second Amendment right to keep
and bear arms. The Court in McDonald v. City of Chicago,2
argued March 2, 2010, may use the Fourteenth Amendment
to require that state and local governments respect the
Second Amendment right. If this occurs, many more cases
*Adjunct Professor of Advanced Constitutional Law, Denver University, Sturm
College of Law. Research Director, Independence Institute, Golden, Colorado.
Associate Policy Analyst, Cato Institute, Washington, D.C. Kopel is the author
of thirteen books and over seventy scholarly journal articles, including three
articles on the state constitution right to arms provisions: The Licensing of
Concealed Handguns for Lawful Protection: Support from Five State Supreme
Courts, 68 ALB. L. REV 305 (2005) (cited in Wisconsin v. Fischer, 714 N.W.2d
495, 511 n.6 (Wis. 2006) (Crooks, J., dissenting)); What State Constitutions
Teach About the Second Amendment, 29 N. KY. L. REv 845 (2002) (cited in
Mosby v. Devine, 851 A.2d 1031, 1040 (R.I. 2004); State v. Hamdan, 665 N.W.2d
785, 802 n.23 (Wis. 2003)); A Tale of Three Cities: The Right to Bear Arms in
State Courts, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1177 (1995) (co-authored with Clayton Cramer
and Scott Hattrup) (cited in State v. Mendoza, 920 P.2d 357, 360 n.4 (Haw.
1996); State v. Schelin, 5 P.3d 632, 645 (Wash. 2002) (Sanders, J., dissenting)).
Kopel's website is at http'J/www.davekopel.org.
We would like to thank Robert Dowlut, Trevor Burrus, and Che Kates.
**Adjunct History Faculty, College of Western Idaho. Cramer is author of the
only book examining all right to arms decisions in state courts: For the Defense
of Themselves and the State (1994). Some of the material in this article is taken
from that book. Cramer is also the author of Concealed Weapon Laws of the
Early Republic: Dueling, Southern Violence, and Moral Reform (1999) and
Armed America: The Remarkable Story of How and Why Guns Became as
American as Apple Pie (2006), as well as co-author of, among other articles,
Clayton E. Cramer & Joseph Edward Olson, What Did "Bear Arms" Mean in the
Second Amendment?, 6 GEO. J.L. & PuB. POVY 511 (2008) (cited by Justice
Scalia in District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2795 (2008)). Cramer's
website is httpJ/www.claytoncramer.org.
1. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
2. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 1037 (2009).
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may be expected in federal courts. While federal courts have
relatively little experience in Second Amendment cases,
nearly two centuries of state court cases interpreting state
right to arms guarantees provide useful guidance. Starting
with the 1822 Kentucky case of Bliss v. Commonwealth,3
state courts have used a variety of analytical techniques to
decide whether a particular law or practice violates the right.
These decisions vary greatly in both analysis and result.
Some are flatly contrary to the standards set by the Heller
Court, and are of no use to a court in deciding a Second
Amendment case. Other state cases, however, can be quite
helpful.
In this article, we survey state constitution right-to-arms
cases from 1822 to the present, and explicate some analytical
techniques for federal courts addressing Second Amendment
cases. Of course, the courts of prior generations did not write
in precisely the same constitutional idiom as we do today, but
while the terms of art may have been different, many of the
analytical tools are the same.
As we will show, the most important tool has been what
today we call "categoricalism." That is, the court decides
whether something is inside or outside the right.4 If it is
inside, it may not be prohibited; if it is outside, it may be
banned. In twenty-first century constitutional law, we are
most familiar with categoricalism in a First Amendment
context. For example, the works of William Shakespeare, as
well as anonymous political leaflets, are "inside" the First
Amendment and may not ordinarily be banned.' Meanwhile,
obscenity, libel, and conspiracies in the restraint of trade are
3. Bliss v. Commonwealth, 12 Ky. (2 Litt.) 90 (1822).
4. Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second
Amendment Analysis, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375, 381-83 (2009).
5. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 341 (1995)
(holding that banning anonymous election pamphleteering is unconstitutional);
Giovani Carandola, Ltd. v. Bason, 303 F.3d 507, 516, 518 (4th Cir. 2002) ("[The
plain language of the restrictions prohibits on licensed premises any
entertainment that 'simulates' sexual behavior, even if performers are fully
clothed or covered, and even if the conduct is integral to the production-for
example, a political satire, a Shakespeare play depicting young love, or a drama
depicting the horrors of rape.... In fact, in recent years, the Supreme Court
has strongly reaffirmed its refusal to allow even a most compelling state
interest-protecting children from pornography-to justify broadly drawn
regulations that sweep beyond their legitimate reach to restrict the availability
of art that adults have a constitutional right to view.").
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"outside," and may be prohibited. 6
State courts have long used a similar type of
categoricalism in right to arms analyses to decide whether a
particular type of arm (e.g., handguns or bowie knives),
person (e.g., a free black or a legal alien), or activity (e.g.,
carrying a concealed handgun) is inside or outside the right.7
Similarly, the Heller Court applied categoricalism: possession
of handguns within the home; self-defense with rifles,
shotguns, or handguns; and the carrying of guns within one's
home are all "inside"8 the Second Amendment, and therefore
could not be banned.
The results of the categorical cases vary from state to
state, due in part to differences in the texts of the state
constitutional guarantees. We do not necessarily expect that
twenty-first century cases on the Second Amendment would
always reach the same results as the earlier state
categoricalism cases. First of all, the Second Amendment text
differs from most of the state texts. Some state constitutional
guarantees articulate only a "common defence" purpose for
the right to arms, and the courts of some of those states
narrowly construed the arms right as including only arms
Under Heller,
that were useful for militia purposes. 9
however, the right of personal self-defense lies at the core of
the Second Amendment. 10
Second, Heller provides a restrictive standard for what
types of arms may be banned--only those "not typically
possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes, such as
short-barreled shotguns.""' Many state court decisions have
been consistent with the Heller standard, but as this article
will detail, some have not.
Several scholars have suggested that the well-developed
analytic tools originally created for the First Amendment can
6. Various boundary-setting rules help ensure that obscenity or libel laws
apply only to hard-core obscenity or libel. The boundary rules aim to ensure
that other, protected, speech is not harmed by laws against libel or obscenity.
See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15 (1973).
7. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 63-99, 118-30, 134-35.
See generally Joseph Blocher,
8. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2817-18.
Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second Amendment Analysis, 84
N.Y.U. L. REV. 375 (2009).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 91-96.
10. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2801.
11. Id. at 2815-16.
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also be applied to the Second Amendment. 12 State courts
have applied various techniques of strict scrutiny to the right
to arms, including "narrow tailoring," "overbreadth," and "less
13
restrictive alternative."
Courts also use narrow construction as another technique
of constitutional adjudication, in order to avoid potential
constitutional conflicts.' 4 This is a venerable technique for
state right-to-arms cases. For example, one court construed a
common law crime of gun carrying narrowly, so as to prohibit
only carrying for nefarious purposes. 15 Another court avoided
constitutional conflict when it held that possessing a gun in
the glove compartment of a car did not constitute "carrying"
16
under a Florida statute that outlawed concealed carrying.
Some state cases are unhelpful to rigorous modern
federal courts. For example, some courts have analyzed gun
laws in vague terms such as "reasonable" or "balancing test,"
without providing any standards for what makes something
reasonable, or how to balance.' 7 Likewise, a few state courts
have asserted that a gun control law is constitutional if it is
within the "police power," which these courts interpreted
broadly to mean that the legislative body sought to protect
8
public safety. 1
12. See generally Gary E. Barnett, Note, Reasonable Regulation of the Right
to Keep and Bear Arms, 6 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POLY 607, 622-28 (2008);
Christopher Chrisman, ConstitutionalStructure and the Second Amendment: A
Defense of the Individual Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 439,
448-49 (2001); Kenneth A. Klukowski, Citizen Gun Rights: Incorporatingthe
Second Amendment Through the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 39 N.M. L.
REV. 195, 235-37 (2009); Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and
Originalism, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 923 (2009). Cf Edward Lee, Guns and Speech
Technologies: How the Right to Bear Arms Affects Copyright Regulations of
Speech Technologies, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1037, 1049-67 (2009) ("The
right to bear arms and the freedom of the press presented the exact same type
of question for the Framers: can there ever be a natural right to a man-made
device? In the case of arms and presses, the Framers believed so."). The Lee
article demonstrates that the Founders and the early U.S. constitutions
considered firearms and presses to be very similar, constitutionally speakingand that both rights had a similar historical development, and that Heller relies
on First Amendment analogies).
13. See, e.g., cases discussed at notes 265-66, 450-55, 483, 523-30.
14. E.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 917-18 (2010) (noting "our
willingness to construe ambiguous statutes to avoid constitutional problems").
15. See infra note 119 and accompanying text.
16. Watson v. Stone, 4 So. 2d 700, 702-03 (Fla. 1941). The case is discussed
in detail infra.
17. See infra notes 214, 315, 326.
18. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 506-22, 546-55.
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If this seems like a plausible argument, then apply the
same reasoning to a city ordinance banning adult bookstores
in the interest of reducing rape. In the same way that
legislators might genuinely, but mistakenly, believe that
sales of sexually oriented material cause a small fraction of
lustful customers to commit rape, legislators might genuinely
but mistakenly believe that sales of firearms lead a small
fraction of buyers to commit murder. Such beliefs might
qualify as having a rational basis without being statistically
valid. Yet few judges would consider a sincere legislative
belief sufficient reason for an adult bookstore ban-and, as
we will see later, 19 more than a few judges have concluded
that sincere (or even purported) legislative belief alone is
sufficient to justify certain gun control laws.
Lastly, one court stated in dicta that gun control laws
were constitutional so long as the right to arms was not
destroyed." ° Some extreme cases from the Southern and
border states during the Jim Crow era came close to
destroying the right to own and carry handguns.
We know from Heller that these deferential standards of
review are not applicable to the Second Amendment. The
Heller majority specifically rejected the "interest balancing"
approach that Justice Breyer proposed in his dissent.2 '
Justice Breyer's interest balancing test is more rigorous than
mere "reasonableness," but the Heller majority found interest
balancing to be inappropriate for the core of the Second
Amendment right because such balancing is inappropriate for
the core of any enumerated right.22
Further, the District of Columbia's handgun ban was
within the "police power" of the D.C. City Council; the ban
was supported by formal findings of fact about the purported

19.
1994).
20.
21.
22.

See, e.g., Robertson v. City and County of Denver, 874 P.2d 325 (Colo.

See notes 100-04 and accompanying text.
District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2821 (2008).
Justice Scalia wrote for the majority:
We know of no other enumerated constitutional right whose core
protection has been subjected to a freestanding "interest-balancing"
approach. The very enumeration of the right takes out of the hands
of government-even the Third Branch of Government-the power to
decide on a case-by-case basis whether the right is really worth
insisting upon.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
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public safety dangers of handguns.2 3 But merely being within
the police power did not make the handgun ban
constitutional. Handguns constitute about a third of the total
American gun supply,2 4 so a ban on handguns does not
obliterate the right to arms. Yet a handgun ban was still
invalid.
Hundreds of state courts cases have interpreted and
constructed the right to arms.2 5 This article does not attempt
to discuss them all; it includes the cases in which a law was
held unconstitutional because such cases are necessarily
among the most important, and because those cases are the
ones in which a court is especially likely to produce an
opinion explaining how to determine which kind of gun
control laws are constitutional and which are not.
Because no law review has ever published an in-depth
analysis of the full scope of state cases, this article fills some
of the gap. Part II studies the antebellum cases, Part III the
post-bellum nineteenth century cases, Part IV the early
twentieth century cases, and Part V the cases since World
War II. But first, in Part I, we offer some broad analysis of
standards of review, and discuss Adam Winkler's Michigan
23. Id. at 2860 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
24. See GARY KLECK, TARGETING GuNs: FIREARMS AND THEIR CONTROL

(1997).
25. For an analysis of almost all cases from the Founding to the late
twentieth century, see CLAYTON CRAMER, FOR THE DEFENSE OF THEMSELVES
AND THE STATE (Greenwood Publishing 1994).

Interpretation is determining the linguistic meaning of terms. Determining
whether the Second Amendment protects the people, or only militias, is a
matter of "interpretation." In a more trivial sense, so is determining that
Second Amendment "arms" means "some, but not all, weapons" rather than
'limbs."
In contrast, "construction" involves judicial creation of rules to
implement a constitutional provision. Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment
tells us that individuals have a right not to be searched except when certain
conditions are satisfied. The Exclusionary Rule is the product of constitutional
"construction," through which courts determined that barring certain evidence
from court is an appropriate means to effectuate that right.
In the First Amendment context, interpretation tells us that people have a
right to speak and assemble. Construction tells us that "time, place, and
manner" regulations for speech/assembly in public places are not a violation of
those rights. In the Second Amendment context, construction is needed to
determine what constitutes an infringement. Heller's list of permissible gun
controls is most plausibly understood as a form of constitutional constructionthat is, something which is not the result of "interpretation" of original meaning
or understanding, but rather as part of a necessarily continuous, on-going
process of detailing the legal content of the Constitution. See Solum, supra note
12, at 973.
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Law Review article that proposed "reasonableness" as the
Second Amendment standard of review.
I. HELLER, STRICT SCRUTINY, AND THE END OF ADAM
WINKLER'S "REASONABLENESS" THEORY

Before Heller, Adam Winkler penned an influential
Michigan Law Review article which urged the application of
"reasonableness," the weakest standard of review from state
cases, to Second Amendment cases.2 6 Winkler and Erwin
Chemerinsky wrote an amicus brief to the same effect in
Heller.2 7 In McDonald v. Chicago, the amicus brief for the
Brady Center (America's leading anti-gun organization)
likewise extolled the weakest state cases, and urged that
their minimalist approach be adopted.28 Heller rejected mere
reasonableness and other weak standards. 29 Thus, unless the
Supreme Court modifies Heller, the approach simply is not
viable in Second Amendment cases.
Winkler wrote that "[nio state's courts apply strict
scrutiny or any other type of heightened review to gun
laws."30 This claim is incorrect. As we will detail, some state
courts have used narrow tailoring, overbreadth, and the "less
restrictive alternative" test to evaluate gun control laws. 31 As
Winkler acknowledged, these are the tools of strict scrutiny.3 2
Winkler also argued that "[u]nder the standard uniformly
applied by the states, any law that is a 'reasonable regulation'
of the arms right is constitutionally permissible. ' 33 This too is
not accurate. As this article will detail, there are indeed
many cases that follow the approach Winkler described-but
there are also many that do not. There is a long record of
cases in which courts ponder whether a particular activity
(e.g., a certain method of carrying arms) or a particular item
26. Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second Amendment, 105 MICH. L. REV.
683, 683 (2007).
27. Brief of Law Professors Erwin Chemerinsky and Adam Winkler, as
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct.
2783 (2008) (No. 07-290), 2008 WL 157186.
28. Brief for Amici Curiae Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence, et al. in
Support of Neither Party, McDonald v. City of Chicago, No. 08-1521, 2009 WL
4099514 (7th Cir. Nov. 23, 2009).
29. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2818 (2008).
30. Winkler, supra note 26, at 686-87.

31. See infra Part V.J.
32. Winkler, supra note 26, at 728.
33. Id. at 687.
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(e.g., a handgun or bowie knife) is within the scope of the
right to arms; if it is within the scope, then the restriction or
ban is unconstitutional-period. These courts conducted no
further analysis of "reasonableness," and did not apply a
"balancing test."3 4
After Heller, we know that at least one state
constitutional case was "wrongly" decided, in the sense that it
stands for the opposite of Heller. In the 1984 case Kalodimos
v. Morton Grove,35 a divided Illinois Supreme Court upheld a
The Kalodimos court was
suburb's handgun ban.
not the federal Second
the
Illinois
Constitution,
interpreting
Amendment. But to the extent that state constitution cases
can provide guidance for Second Amendment interpretation,
Kalodimos is a perfect case-perfect in that had it been a
Second Amendment case, we know that it would be exactly
wrong. Kalodimos says that handgun bans are permissible,36
and Heller says that they are not.
We can look at Kalodimos and study precisely the kind of
reasoning Heller shows to be incorrect as applied to the
Second Amendment. As we will detail infra,3 7 Kalodimos
makes two central mistakes. First, it says that any gun
control law is valid if enacted pursuant to the "police power."
Under Kalodimos and its progeny in other states, this simply
means that the legislature or city council said that the law
would reduce crime.
Second, Kalodimos declared (to Winkler's apparent
approval) that the right to arms could be subject to
"substantial infringement" so long as it was not eliminated.3"
Since Morton Grove residents could still own rifles or
shotguns, the right was not eliminated and handguns could
be outlawed.
Heller teaches that Kalodimos and every case employing
similar reasoning (that invocation of the police power is
sufficient justification, or that the right may be infringed as
long as it is not destroyed) are incorrect as Second

34. See infra text accompanying notes 63-99, 118-30, 134-35, 252-57, 43133,467-500.
1984).
35. Kalodimos v. Vill. of Morton Grove, 470 N.E.2d 266 (IM.
36. Id. at 273.
37. See infra note 506 and accompanying text.
38. Winkler, supra note 26, at 718-19 (citing Kalodimos, 470 N.E.2d at
278).
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Amendment guides. Indeed, Heller teaches the opposite of
Kalodimos and similar cases; under Heller, merely writing
the magic words "police power" is not enough to justify gun
control." 9 Rights infringements may be invalid even if the
right is not destroyed.
Winkler cited many cases, but when one removes those
that, post-Heller, are plainly invalid as Second Amendment
guides, the support for his "reasonableness" standard begins
to look thin.4"
Even pre-Heller, Winkler's thesis was somewhat
For example, he wrote that in the early
overstated.
nineteenth century, "Georgia and Tennessee criminalized the
sale of certain weapons that were easily concealed." 41 He
does not appear to be aware that the Georgia law, which
banned most handguns, was declared unconstitutional as a
violation of the Second Amendment in Nunn v. State.42 More
significantly, Winkler overlooked the fact that Lakewood v.
Pillow, a leading Colorado case that has been followed in
several other states, explicitly uses the tools of strict scrutiny:
less-restrictive
overbreadth, and
narrow
tailoring,
alternative.4 3
Before and after Heller, scholars have written useful
articles detailing how a meaningful standard of review might
be adopted for the Second Amendment. Calvin Massey
A comment by Andrew
proposes "semi-strict scrutiny."'
Gould, which Larry Solum's "Legal Theory Blog" lauded as
"[a] very interesting student note" suggests that "deferential
strict scrutiny" is the implicit standard in Heller.45 A key
39. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2821-22 (2008).
40. The invalid cases include not only Kalodimos v. Morton Grove, which
upheld a handgun ban, but also every other case that fits Winkler's paradigm of
using "reasonable" to mean that any law which does not destroy the right will
be upheld, if the law can pass a rational basis test.
41. Winkler, supra note 26, at 710.
42. See infra text accompanying notes 125-30.
43. See Winkler, supra note 26, at 724 (recognizing "broadness" as part of
the "reasonable regulation" standard); see also infra text accompanying notes
449-51.
44. Calvin Massey, Guns, Extremism, and the Constitution, 57 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 1095, 1133 (2000).
45. Andrew R. Gould, Comment, The Hidden Second Amendment
Framework Within District of Columbia v. Heller, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1535 (2009).
The note argues that Heller's implicit standard of review is not conventional
strict scrutiny, because Heller's list of "presumptively" valid gun controls would
not pass the test. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2817-18
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element of deferential strict scrutiny is that the court does
not blindly accept a legislative assertion that a law is
necessary to protect public safety.46 Rather, the court may
review empirical evidence to see if the law really is narrowly
tailored.4"
Other writers have proposed applying strict
scrutiny for certain gun controls (especially bans on firearms),
while applying intermediate scrutiny for others.4" One of the
reasons that strict scrutiny has been applied to racial
classifications is the significant possibility that they may
have "invidious" motives."4 9 Certainly, there is a similar risk
for many extant anti-gun laws. Groups that are openly
determined to eradicate the right recognized in Heller, such
as the National Coalition to Ban Handguns, have lobbied for
and influenced these laws.5 °
Furthermore, six states have no right to arms in their
constitution,"' and in two others the right was judicially
nullified. 2 In these eight states, it is possible legislators may
have enacted gun control laws without paying the slightest
attention to whether those laws infringed the right to keep

(2008). Nor is intermediate scrutiny the standard, because intermediate
scrutiny does not apply to fundamental rights, and Heller strongly suggests that
the Second Amendment is fundamental. Id. at 2798. Therefore, Gould
concludes that the implicit standard of Heller is "deferential strict scrutiny,"
which the majority used in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003), and
what Justices Scalia and Thomas endorsed in a dissent in a different case.
Gould, supra note 45, at 1570-73.
46. Gould, supra note 45, at 1570-73.
47. Id.
48. Barnett, supra note 12, at 623; Klukowski, supra note 12, at 235-36.
49. See Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505-06 (2005); Richmond v.
J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535, 541 (1942); cf Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role
of Government Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413,
453-54 (1996) (arguing that First Amendment strict scrutiny is also used to
search for invidious motives).
50. In 1989, the group changed its name to the Coalition to Stop Gun
Violence. "Assault weapon" prohibition had become a major national issue, and
the group became involved in public campaign to ban some rifles and shotguns,
as well as all handguns.
51. The six states are California, Iowa, Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey,
and New York.
52. Kansas and Massachusetts have judicially nullified the right to arms.
For Kansas, see infra text accompanying notes 259-65, which also point out
that the nullification was partially undone in 1979. For Massachusetts, see
Commonwealth v. Davis, 343 N.E.2d 847 (Mass. 1976). For a critique of the
nullification cases, see David B. Kopel, The Right to Arms in the Living
Constitution, 2010 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 99.
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and bear arms. If the Supreme Court in McDonald applies
the Second Amendment to the states, courts should be
particularly vigilant in their review of Second Amendment
claims because there is no reason to believe these laws were
intended to be consistent with Second Amendment rights.
Winkler suggested that gun control laws are never
53
invidious because their motive "is to enhance public safety."
But Winkler could not have known the motivations of the
tens of thousands of legislators over many decades who have
voted for the thousands of gun controls in force today. The
mere declaration that a statute is enacted for the purpose of
public safety is hardly proof that there was no invidious
motive. Racial classification laws provide an analogy. These
laws-from Virginia's 1680," 4 1723,11 and 173856 statutes
barring free blacks from possessing firearms, through Jim
Crow and up to the present-have usually been accompanied
by claims that the racist laws protect public safety or serve
some other public purpose.57
Courts employing heightened scrutiny can and often do
examine the motivations behind a particular statute, and
sometimes courts employing rational basis scrutiny also
examine motives carefully. 8 Legislators have sometimes
53. Winkler, supra note 26, at 701.
54.

2

WILLIAM

WALLER

HENING,

THE

STATUTES

AT

LARGE

481-82

(University Press of Virginia 1969) (1619).
55. 4 WILLIAM WALLER HENING, THE STATUTES AT LARGE 131 (University
Press of'Virginia 1969) (1619).
56.

5 WILLIAM WALLER HENING, THE STATUTES AT LARGE 17 (University

Press of Virginia 1969). A complete collection of racially and religiously
discriminatory colonial gun control statutes may be found at Primary History
Sources. See Primary History Sources, http://www.claytoncramer.com/primary/
primary.html#RaceGunControlStatutes (last visited Mar. 28, 2010).
57. See, e.g., New FirearmsLaw Effective on August 7, S.F. CHRON., July 15,
1923, at 3 (featuring an advisor to California Governor Richardson, who argues
that while the ban on resident aliens owning handguns might be
constitutionally problematic, if the law were sustained by the courts, it would
have "salutary effect in checking tong wars among the Chinese and vendettas
among our people who are of latin descent"). Parts of this statute remain in
effect today, as California's discretionary concealed weapon permit issuance
law. See id.
58. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56-57 (1985)(using Lemon to
examine whether law regarding school prayer had a secular purpose); Romer v.
Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631-32 (1996) (finding that a state constitutional
amendment barring laws against discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation did not have a rational relation to its states objectives, and therefore
must have been motivated by animus) ; Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473
U.S. 432, 450 (1985) (rational basis review found that government decision was
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frankly stated in official records of debates that their
objective was to suppress gun ownership or gun culture, or to
prevent people from using or carrying firearms for selfdefense. 59 To recognize that some gun control laws have
invidious purposes is not to say that all or even most of them
do. Heightened scrutiny is the right tool for identifying the
ones that are invidious.
There is no reason to believe that Winkler has any
animus towards gun owners. But it would be fair to say that
his argument for weak scrutiny is not founded on strong
respect for Second Amendment rights. In support of weak
scrutiny, he analogized legislators enacting gun control laws
to prison administrators controlling the inmates.'o With all
due respect, free citizens cannot be analogized to prison
inmates, and legislators cannot be analogized to prison
wardens.
II. ANTEBELLUM CASES
Before the Civil War, gun control was primarily a
Southern phenomenon, at least in terms of laws strict enough
to provoke a judicial test. The only non-Southern state to
produce an antebellum case was Indiana, and even Indiana
based on "irrational prejudice").
59. See, e.g., Nordyke v. King, 563 F.3d 439, 443 (9th Cir. 2009), reh'g en
banc granted 575 F.3d 890 (9th Cir. 2009) (sponsor of county ordinance against
gun shows complained about "spineless people hiding behind the constitution,"
and said that gun shows "provide a place for people to display guns for worship
as deities for the collectors who treat them as icons of patriotism."); Daniel
Greene, The Case for Owning a Gun, THE WASHINGTONIAN, Mar. 1985 (David
Clarke, the chairman of the D.C. City Council committee that created the
District's handgun ban, stated: "I don't intend to run this government around
the moment of survival,").
60. In Turner v. Safley, the Supreme Court wrote that "[s]ubjecting the dayto-day judgments of prison officials to an inflexible strict scrutiny analysis
would seriously hamper their ability to anticipate security problems and to
adopt innovative solutions to the intractable problems of prison administration."
Winkler, supra note 26, at 714 (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)).
After this quote, Winkler wrote:
Substitute 'legislators' for 'prison officials' and 'gun safety' for 'prison
administration,' and the logic of Turner's deference retains its
persuasive force. Weapons require some degree of regulation, but the
problems of gun violence and crime have proven enormously difficult to
solve even with legislative flexibility and room to experiment. Second
Amendment heightened review, if applied aggressively, could make
finding those solutions even more difficult.
Id. at 714.
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had, in its southern portion, a notable border state
character. 61 By far the leading controversy during the
antebellum era involved laws prohibiting concealed carrying
of weapons. Historical analysis suggests these laws were
considered essential to the suppression of dueling.6 2
A. Kentucky (1822)
state
decision, Bliss v.
antebellum
The first
68
The Kentucky
Commonwealth, was a categorical one.
Constitution stated: "That the rights of the citizens to bear
arms in defence of themselves and the State shall not be
The defendant in Bliss had been carrying a
questioned."'
sword-cane, a small sword which fit into the hollow space
inside a walking stick.65 He thus violated a legislative ban on
the carrying of concealed weapons and was fined.66 The
Kentucky Supreme Court held that the law was invalid
because the right pre-dated the Constitution: "The right
existed at the adoption of the constitution; it had then no
limits short of the moral power of the citizens to exercise it,
and it in fact consisted in nothing else but in the liberty of the
citizens to bear arms."6 7
The court reasoned that there was "no difference between
a law prohibiting the wearing of concealed arms, and a law
forbidding the wearing such as are exposed."68 Since the
latter is obviously within the scope of the right "to bear arms"
for "defence of themselves" (this would include self-defense),
then the former is equally protected.6 9
B. Indiana (1833)
In State v. Mitchell, the Indiana Supreme Court upheld
61. See, e.g., KEVIN P. PHILLIPS, THE COUSINS' WARS: RELIGION, POLITICS,
AND THE TRIUMPH OF ANGLO-AMERICA 367 (1999) (stating that as of 1860, "the
southern portions of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois were border state in character").
62. See CLAYTON E. CRAMER, CONCEALED WEAPON LAWS OF THE EARLY
REPUBLIC:

DUELING,

SOUTHERN

VIOLENCE,

AND

MORAL

REFORM

139-40

(Greenwood Publishing 1999).
63. Bliss v. Commonwealth, 12 Ky. (2 Litt.) 90 (1822).
64. KY. CONST. of 1792, art. X, cl. 23 (amended 1799) (adding "That" in
1799).
65. Bliss, 12 Ky. (2 Litt.) 90.
66. Id. at 90.
67. Id. at 92.
68. Id.

69. Id. at 90.
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an 1831 ban on the concealed carrying of deadly weapons, but
The entire decisionarticulated no theory whatsoever.7
really, just a refusal to hear an appeal-reads: "It was held in
this case, that the statute of 1831, prohibiting all persons,
except travelers, from wearing or carrying concealed
weapons, is not unconstitutional." 7' The decision contains no
rationale at all, yet other state courts repeatedly cited this
decision as precedent.
Given the absence of reasoning, Mitchell is not much use
to modern courts. For legal history purposes, however, it does
foreshadow later nineteenth century cases that used
categoricalism to place the concealed carry outside the scope
of the right to bear arms.
C. Tennessee (1833-1840)
In an 1833 Tennessee case, the court employed what is
known today as "overbreadth" to find a common law crime
unconstitutional. 72
An 1840 case used categoricalism to
exclude certain arms from the state constitutional right, to
allow restrictions on carrying, and to affirm an "absolute"
right to "keep" weapons that were within the scope of the

arms right. 13
In 1833, the Tennessee Constitution stated: "That the
freemen of this State have a right to Keep and to bear Arms
for their common defence." 74 This is a common formulation of
early American state constitutions. Some courts have read
the "common defense" language restrictively, in order to allow
bans on some arms and restrictions on carrying arms.7 5
While the right was for "the common defense," the right
belonged to all citizens, not only to militiamen. 76
An old English statute restricted going armed in public.77
70. State v. Mitchell, 3 Blackf. 229 (Ind.1833).
71. Id. This decision was so brief that it was necessary to find even the
language of the challenged statute from a later decision, State v. Reid, infra.
72. For a discussion of modem overbreadth doctrine, see John F. Decker,
OverbreadthOutside the FirstAmendment, 34 N.M. L. REV. 53 (2004).
73. See text accompanying notes 86 & 90.
74. TENN. CONST. of 1796, art. XI, § 26.
75. See infra text accompanying note 94.
76. See infra text accompanying notes 77, 86 & 90. One 1842 Arkansas
judge, however, viewed the language as negating an individual right; the 1976
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts found the same. State v. Buzzard, 4
Ark. 18 (1842); Commonwealth v. Davis, 343 N.E.2d 847 (Mass. 1976).
77. "[The statute of the 2d Edward III, which enacts, that no man, great
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As construed by the English courts, the statute applied only
to arms carrying with the specific intent of terrorizing the
public.78 A related but separate criminal charge was affray,
which occurs when two persons fight in a public place "to the
The 1833 Tennessee
terror of his majesty's subjects." 79
Supreme Court, in Simpson v. State, dismissed an indictment
charging the common law crime of affray. 0 As expressed in
the indictment, the terms of the offense were potentially
broad enough to criminalize gun carrying for innocent
purposes. 81 Therefore, the offense violated the constitutional
right to bear arms. 2
Five years later, the Tennessee legislature enacted a
statute to ban carrying Bowie knives and Arkansas
toothpicks 3 -two particularly large and deadly knives said to
nor small, of what condition soever he be, except the king's servants, etc., shall
go or ride armed by night or by day, etc." Simpson v. State, 13 Tenn. (5 Yer.)
356, 356 (1833).
78. Sir John Knight's Case (1686), 87 Eng. Rep. 75 (K.B.); JOYCE LEE
MALCOLM, To KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: THE ORIGINS OF AN ANGLO-AMERICAN
RIGHT 104-05 (1994) (explaining that the result in Knight's Case comported
with previous standards of enforcement, until the time of James II, who was
deposed in the Glorious Revolution partly because of his attempts to limit gun
rights). William Blackstone's Commentaries articulates (but does not clarify)
that to "go about with unusual weapons or attendance, to the terror of the
people" is a public wrong. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *254
79. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *144-45.
80. Simpson, 13 Tenn. (5 Yer.) at 357.
81. The indictment stated:
[W]ith force and arms ... being arrayed in a warlike manner, then and
there in a certain public street and highway situate, unlawfully, and to
the great terror and disturbance of divers good citizens of the said
state, then and there being, an affray did make, in contempt of the laws
of the land, to the evil example of all others in the like case offending,
and against the peace and dignity of the state.
Id. at 356.
82. The indictment further stated:
By this clause of the constitution, an express power is given and
secured to all the free citizens of the state to keep and bear arms for
their defence, without any qualification whatever as to their kind or
nature; and it is conceived, that it would be going much too far, to
impair by construction or abridgment a constitutional privilege which
is so declared; neither, after so solemn an instrument hath said the
people may carry arms, can we be permitted to impute to the acts thus
licensed such a necessarily consequent operation as terror to the people
to be incurred thereby; we must attribute to the framers of it the
absence of such a view.
Id. at 359-60.
83. ACTS PASSED AT THE FIRST SESSION OF THE TWENTY-SECOND GENERAL
ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF TENNESSEE: 1837-8, at 200-01 (1838).
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be used mainly by ruffians and brawlers.
The state
constitutional arms provision was narrowed in 1834
(following Nat Turner's Rebellion, an 1831 slave uprising in
Virginia) to limit it to "free white men;"" it was one of a very
few state
provisions which defined the right as belonging to
"85
"men.
From the start, the Tennessee provision had
specified only one purpose: "common defence."
Aymette v. State, decided in 1840, was one of the most
influential state cases; it held that the right "to bear arms for
their common defence" meant only bearing arms in a
militia. 86 Its militia-centric holding cannot be transposed to
the Second Amendment. The Second Amendment protects
"the people," not just "free white men."8 7 Further, the U.S.
Senate rejected a proposal to revise the Second Amendment
to limit it to "the common defence."88 Heller, of course, held
that the Second Amendment right is not connected to service
in a well-regulated militia. 9
While Aymette's holdings concerning the purpose of the
right to bear arms are not useful for interpreting the Second
Amendment in the twenty-first century, the Aymette
decision's categoricalism is useful. The facts of the case are
as follows:
Aymette, during the sitting of the circuit court in June
1839, at Pulaski, Giles county, had fallen out with one
Some experts argue that the terms "Bowie knife" and "Arkansas toothpick"
are too vague to be legally enforceable. They derive from a famous 1827 melee
in which Jim Bowie participated, but historians are still uncertain as to what
his knife looked like. See AKTI Approved Knife Definitions, NEWS & UPDATE
(Am. Knife & Tool Inst., Cody, Wyo.), 2005, at 3, available at
http'/www.akti.orgPDFS/AKTIDefinitions.pdf.
84. "That the free white men of this State have a right to keep and to bear
arms for their common defence." TENN. CONST. of 1834, art. I, § 26. The 1796
Tennessee provision said "freemen," but this term was perhaps easier to
construe inclusively for both sexes (just as "mankind" includes males and
females) than was "free white men."
For a thoughtful analysis of the Tennessee constitutional right to arms, see
generally Glenn Harlan Reynolds, The Right to Keep and Bear Arms Under the
Tennessee Constitution, 61 TENN. L. REV. 647 (1994).
85. From 1836-1838, the Arkansas right was for "free white men," as was
the Florida right from 1838-1865. See Eugene Volokh, State Constitutional
Rights to Keep and Bear Arms, 11 TEX. L. REV. & POL. 191, 195 (2006).
86. Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154 (1840).
87. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
88. JOURNAL OF THE FIRST SESSION OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA 77 (1820).
89. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 2814 (2008).
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Hamilton, and at about ten o'clock, p.m., he went in search
of him to a hotel, swearing he would have his heart's
blood. He had a bowie-knife concealed under his vest and
suspended to the waistband of his breeches, which he took
out occasionally and brandished in his hand. He was put
out of the hotel, and proceeded from place to place in
search of Hamilton, and occasionally exhibited his knife. 90
Today, Aymette might be indicted for brandishing a
deadly weapon. Criminalizing Aymette's conduct would not
violate the Second Amendment. The Tennessee Supreme
Court, though, had to decide whether he could be punished
for violating a simple ban on concealed carry of Bowie knives.
The answer was "yes."
First, the Tennessee court held that the right "to bear
arms for their common defence" meant only bearing arms in a
militia.9 To carry or wear guns for other purposes, such as
hunting, was not to "bear."9 2
This was not an absurd
interpretation of the Tennessee provision, considering the
provision's particular language.
The "civilized warfare" test, a rule first articulated in
Aymette, became popular in some (especially Southern) state
courts in the nineteenth century. Under the test, only those
types of arms that would be useful in a militia were included
in the right to arms. 93 Rifles and swords were included, while
Bowie knives and Arkansas toothpicks were not. The test did
not state that only militiamen could have guns, but it did
state that the right to own weapons was only for militia-type
weapons. 94

According to the Tennessee court, citizens had an
"unqualified" right to keep militia type arms:
The citizens have the unqualified right to keep the
weapon, it being of the character before described as being
intended by this provision. But the right to bear arms is
not of that unqualified character. The citizens may bear
them for the common defence; but it does not follow that
they may be borne by an individual, merely to95terrify the
people or for purposes of private assassination.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Aymette, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) at 155.
Id. at 158.
Id.
Id. at 158-59.
Id. at 159-60.
Id. at 160.
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Although Aymette spoke broadly about the meaning of "bear,"
the preceding quote suggests that the right to bear simply
excluded carrying "to terrify the people or for purposes of
private assassinations."9 6
By 1871, the Tennessee court
would more explicitly state that the right to bear included the
97
right to carry for ordinary, peaceful purposes.
Like the previous state decisions, Aymette's civilized
warfare test is inapplicable to the modern Second
Amendment. Otherwise, the M-16 automatic rifle would be
at the core of the Second Amendment.
Heller plainly
indicates the contrary.9"
Accordingly, the modern test of
which arms are protected is whether such arms are in
common use for self-defense and other lawful purposes. 99
Aymette is useful for modern courts not because of its
particular
results,
but
because
it
demonstrates
categoricalism.
D. Alabama (1840)
State v. Reid is the first case to admit that special
circumstances might dictate differing levels of regulation of
the right to bear arms.'° In Reid, a sheriff challenged the
state's ban on carrying concealed weapons. 10 1 The Alabama
Supreme Court wrote that the state's constitutional language
"in defence of himself and the State" necessarily implied
legislative "authority to adopt such regulations of police, as
may be dictated by the safety of the people and the advancement of public morals." 102
The court then stated that regulation would be
impermissible if it destroyed the right to carry arms for selfdefense: "A statute which, under the pretence of regulating,
amounts to a destruction of the right, or which requires arms
to be so borne as to render them wholly useless for the
purpose of defence, would be clearly unconstitutional."' 3 Put
another way, the right may be regulated up to the point that

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154, 160 (1840).
See Andrews v. State, 50 Tenn. (3 Heisk.) 165 (1871).
District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2817 (2008).
Id. at 2818.
State v. Reid, 1 Ala. 612 (1840).
Id. at 621.
Id. at 616.
Id. at 616-17.
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the ability to exercise the right was not destroyed or rendered
useless. So long as people could carry guns for self-defense,
the legislature could ban one method of carrying. The result
is the same as in Nunn v. State, discussed infra,' °4 but the
rationale is entirely different. Under Nunn, concealed carry
is categorically not part of the right; in Reid, all forms of
carry are within the right, but one form of carrying can be

outlawed. 105
The fact that the defendant in Reid was the Sheriff of
Montgomery County probably influenced the court's decision.
The court pointed out factual reasons why the Sheriff in
particular had no need for concealed carry. 106 The court left
itself open to persuasion should a different person actually
need to carry concealed rather than openly. 107
E. Arkansas (1842)
In State v. Buzzard, the Arkansas Supreme Court
produced a 1-1-1 split decision,' with a concurring opinion
that said the right was militia-only. 10 9 This eccentric theory
did not appear again in Arkansas decisions, nor in any other
case in the nineteenth century." 0 The dissenting opinion,
however, argued that the Arkansas concealed carry ban
violated the state constitution right to arms."
104. Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243, 251 (1846); see infra text accompanying notes
125-30.
105. Nunn, 1 Ga. at 251; Reid, 1 Ala. at 616-17.
106. The court noted the defendant's official authority as Sheriff, which
included his ability to apprehend and commit to prison all lawbreakers, his
responsibility for the custody and safekeeping of the county jail, and his ability
to invoke "posse comitatus," or power of the county. Reid, 1 Ala. at 621 (1840).
107. The court stated:
We will not undertake to say, that if in any case it should appear to be
indispensable to the right of defense that arms should be carried
concealed about the person, the act "to suppress the evil practice of
carrying weapons secretly," should be so construed, as to operate a
prohibition in such case. But in the present case, no such necessity
seems to have existed; and we cannot conceive of its existence under
any supposable circumstances.
Id. at 622.
108. State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18 (1842).
109. Id. at 32-33 (Dickinson, J., concurring.)
110. David B. Kopel, The Second Amendment in the Nineteenth Century, 1998
BYU L. REV. 1359, 1424-25. The militia-only theory began to gain judicial
respect following the Kansas Supreme Court's 1905 decision in Salina v.
Blaksley. See infra text accompanying notes 259-63.
111. Buzzard, 4 Ark. at 40-41 (Lacy, J., dissenting).
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The holding of the court, to the extent there was a clear
one, was written by Chief Justice Ringo. He argued that the
very nature of a social compact is that rights are not absolute,
but are subject to some regulations that are "necessary" to
prevent harm to the rights of others or to the community. 112
Chief Justice Ringo's general principle is in the mainstream
today, but is contrary to the view of some eminent jurists
(such as Justice Hugo Black) who argue that constitutional
rights are absolute.' 1 3
In support of the theory that the right to arms is not
absolute, Ringo pointed out that individuals who are accused
of a crime-but still presumed innocent, and not yet
convicted-are disarmed.1 4 Today, the federal Gun Control
112. Chief Justice Ringo wrote:
Among the objects for which all free governments are instituted,
may be enumerated the increase of security afforded to the individual
members thereof for the enjoyment of their private rights, the
preservation of peace and domestic tranquility, the administration of
justice by public authority, and the advancement of the general
interests or welfare of the whole community. In addition to which, it is
designed that adequate security shall be provided by law for the most
perfect enjoyment of these blessings.
Also, the natural right of speech must remain without
restraint, if it were not surrendered and subjected to legal control upon
the institution of government; yet every one is aware that such
limitations as have been found necessary to protect the character and
secure the rights of others, as well as to preserve good order and the
public peace, have been imposed upon it by law, without any question
as to the power of the government to enforce such restrictions. So the
liberty of the press, which is based upon the right of speech, is to the
like extent subject to legal control. So the right of migration and
transmigration, or of every individual to pass from place to place,
according to his own free will and pleasure, when and where he chose,
acknowledged no restraint until surrendered upon the institution of
government, when it became subject to such regulations as might be
found necessary to prevents its exercise from operating prejudicially
upon the private rights of others, or to the general interests of the
community.
Id. at 19-21.
113. Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 865, 873, 874 (1960)
("Although the Supreme Court has held [the Second] Amendment to include
only arms necessary to a well-regulated militia, as so construed, its prohibition
is absolute ....
Neither as offered nor as adopted is the language of this [First]
Amendment anything less than absolute.").
114. Chief Justice Ringo stated:
Suppose the constitutional existence of such immunity in favor of
the right to keep and bear arms as is urged by the appellee be
admitted. By what legal right can a person accused of crime be
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Act of 1968 prohibits arms sales to persons under felony
indictment, but does not forbid them from possessing
firearms already owned." 5
Ringo also argued that "arms" would include large
quantities of gunpowder stored at home, and could even
include quantities so large as to be hazardous to the
neighbors; hence, the right to arms must not be absolute, but
only relative to the rights of others. 116 Likewise, Ringo
reasoned that because speech can constitute the criminal
offense of treason, the right of free speech is not absolute." 7
The above analysis is fine, but proving that a particular
right is not absolute is merely the first step in determining
whether a particular regulation of that right is permissible.
As the dissent pointed out, Ringo's opinion never took this
necessary step. The fact that some speech can be punished as
treason does not prove that the works of Shakespeare can be
outlawed. Accordingly, Buzzard is of no use to modern courts
in evaluating gun control laws.
F. North Carolina(1843-1844)
Like the Tennessee Supreme Court in Simpson, the
North Carolina Supreme Court had to decide whether a
common law crime was contrary to the state constitutional
right to bear arms. The court used narrow construction to
prevent the common law from conflicting with the
8
constitution. "
The crime was "riding or going armed with unusual and
dangerous weapons to the terror of the people." n 9 The court
disarmed? Does the simple accusation, while the law regards the
accused as innocent, operate as a forfeiture of the right? If so, what
law attaches to it this consequence? Persons accused of crime, upon
their arrest, have constantly been divested of their arms, without the
legality of the act having ever been questioned. Yet, upon the
hypothesis assumed in the argument for the appellee, the act of
disarming them must have been illegal, and those concerned in it
trespassers, the Constitution not limiting the right to such only as are
free from such accusation. Nor could the argument of necessity or
expediency justify one person in depriving another of the full
enjoyment of a right reserved and secured to him by the Constitution.
Buzzard, 4 Ark. at 21.
115. 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(1), (g) (2006).
116. Buzzard, 4 Ark. at 22.
117. Id. at 20.
118. State v. Huntly, 25 N.C. (3 Ired.) 418 (1843)
119. Id. For analysis of the North Carolina right, see generally Stephen P.
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construed the crime narrowly, so that it applied only to
someone whose specific purpose was to terrify the public:
[I]t is to be remembered that the carrying of a gun per se
constitutes no offence. For any lawful purpose-either of
business or amusement-the citizen is at perfect liberty to
carry his gun.
It is the wicked purpose-and the
mischievous result-which essentially constitute the
crime. He shall not carry about this or any other weapon
of death to terrify and alarm, and in such manner as
naturally will terrify and alarm, a peaceful people.' 2
A North Carolina statute at issue in State v. Newsom
required free blacks, but not whites, to obtain a license to
carry a shotgun.121 There, the North Carolina Supreme Court
acknowledged that the license would be unconstitutional for
whites, but upheld licensing for blacks on the grounds of
originalism. The court's version of originalism was, however,
a mere conjecture about what the North Carolina framers
must have meant, 122 and did not recognize that sentiment
concerning the issue of race had become much more antiblack in the half-century between the constitution's adoption
23
and this decision. 1
Halbrook, The Right to Bear Arms in the First State Bills of Rights:
Pennsylvania, North Carolina,Vermont, and Massachusetts, 10 VT. L. REV. 255
(1985) and Carl W. Thurman, III, Note, State v. Fennell" The North Carolina
Tradition of Reasonable Regulation of the Right to Bear Arms, 68 N.C. L. REV.
1078 (1990).
120. Huntly, 25 N.C. (3 Ired.) at 422-23.
121. State v. Newsom, 27 N.C. (5 Ired.) 250 (1844).
122. The court wrote:
Self preservation is the first law of nations, as it is of individuals. And,
while we acknowledge the solemn obligations to obey the constitution,
as well in spirit as in letter, we at the same time hold, that nothing
should be interpolated into that instrument, which the people did not
will. We are not at liberty to give an artificial and constrained
interpretation to the language used, beyond its ordinary, popular and
obvious meaning. Before, and at the time our constitution was framed,
there was among us this class of people, and they were subjected to
various disabilities, from which the white population was exempt. It is
impossible to suppose, that the framers of the Bill of Rights did not
have an eye to the existing state of things, and did not act with a full
knowledge of the mixed population, for whom they were legislating.
They must have felt the absolute necessity of the existence of a power
somewhere, to adopt such rules and regulations, as the safety of the
community might, from time to time, require.
Id. at 254.
123. See CLAYTON E. CRAMER, BLACK DEMOGRAPHiC DATA, 1790-1860: A

SOURCEBOOK 28-29 (Greenwood Publishing 1997).
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G. Georgia (1846)
An 1837 Georgia statute banned the possession and
carrying of most handguns, as well as Arkansas toothpicks
and Bowie knives. 124
While the Georgia Constitution
provided no right to arms, Nunn v. State held that the bans
violated the Second Amendment. 125 Nunn was part of a
contingent of state supreme court decisions that viewed
Barron v. Baltimore as merely constraining federal courts
from applying the Bill of Rights to the states. 126 The Nunn
opinion echoed Justice Chase's opinion in Calder v. Bull,
which held that certain laws could not be enacted by a free
government, even if the constitution contained no specific
27
prohibition on such laws. 1
Chief Justice Lumpkin's oft-quoted opinion for the
unanimous Georgia court was categorical: the concealed carry
ban was constitutional because concealed carry was not
protected as a Second Amendment right. 1 28 The possession
and open carry of handguns were within the right, and
whatever was within the right could not be infringed in the
124. ACTS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA PASSED IN
MILLEDGEVILLE AT AN ANNUAL SESSION IN NOVEMBER AND DECEMBER, 1837,
90-91 (1838).
125. Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243 (1846).
126. See AKHIL AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION
145-56 (1998); Jason Mazzone, The Bill of Rights in Early State Courts, 92
MINN. L. REV. 1, 24-25 (2007) (observing that post-Barron, many state courts
still felt free to apply the Bill of Rights to state laws, and several did with the
Second Amendment).
127. Justice Chase wrote:
There are acts which the Federal, or State, Legislature cannot do,
without exceeding their authority. There are certain vital principles in
our free Republican governments, which will determine and over-rule
an apparent and flagrant abuse of legislative power; as to authorize
manifest injustice by positive law; or to take away that security for
personal liberty, or private property, for the protection whereof of the
government was established. An ACT of the Legislature (for I cannot
call it a law) contrary to the great first principles of the social compact,
cannot be considered a rightful exercise of legislative authority. The
obligation of a law in governments established on express compact, and
on republican principles, must be determined by the nature of the
power, on which it is founded.
Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 388 (1798). For a modern analysis suggesting that
gun ownership would be protected as an unenumerated right, even if there were
no Second Amendment, see generally Nicholas J. Johnson, Beyond the Second
Amendment: An Individual Right to Arms Viewed Through the Ninth
Amendment, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 1 (1992).
128. Nunn, 1 Ga. at 251.
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smallest degree. 129
Chief Justice Lumpkin proclaimed:
The right of the whole people, old and young, men, women
and boys, and not militia only, to keep and bear arms of
every description, and not such merely as are used by the
militia, shall not be infringed, curtailed, or broken in
upon, in the smallest degree; and all of this for the
important end to be attained: the rearing up and
qualifying a well-regulated militia, so vitally necessary to
the security of a free State. Our opinion is, that any law,
State or Federal, is repugnant to the Constitution, and
void, which contravenes this right, originally belonging to
our forefathers, trampled under foot by Charles I. and his
two wicked sons and successors, reestablished by the
revolution of 1688, conveyed to this land of liberty by the
colonists, and finally incorporated conspicuously in our
own Magna Charta!"
H. Louisiana (1850-1856)
The Louisiana Supreme Court in State v. Chandler also
relied on the Second Amendment, because a right to arms did
not exist in the state constitution.' 3 ' Similar to State v. Reid
in Alabama, Chandler treated concealed carry as part of the
right to arms, but stated that it can be banned because
concealed carry was so harmful, and open carry was still
allowed:
This law became absolutely necessary to counteract a
vicious state of society, growing out of the habit of carrying
concealed weapons, and to prevent bloodshed and
assassinations committed upon unsuspecting persons. It
interfered with no man's right to carry arms (to use its own
words), "in full open view," which places men upon an
equality. This is the right guaranteed by the Constitution of
the United States, and which is calculated to incite men to a
manly and noble defence of themselves, if necessary, and of
their country, without any tendency to secret advantages and
unmanly assassination.'3 2 Unlike in Reid, the court did not
include dicta suggesting that expansive regulation was

129.
130.
131.
132.

Id.
Id.
State v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann. 489 (1850).
Id. at 489-90.
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permissible as a general rule. Two subsequent Louisiana
decisions affirmed the Second Amendment's applicability to
33
state law, but did not provide significant new reasoning. 1
I. Texas (1859)
The last of the antebellum decisions, Cockrum v. State,
also took a categorical view of the right. In 1859, the Texas
Supreme Court affirmed a sentence enhancement for use of a
Bowie knife, while still acknowledging that the Texas
Constitution's arms guarantee-and apparently the Second
34
Amendment-protected a right to carry such a weapon.
The sentence enhancement was justified based on the
exceptional deadliness of the Bowie knife. 135 The right to
arms, obviously, did not include the use of arms in violent
crimes.

III. POSTBELLUM CASES
As in the antebellum period, postbellum gun control
remained primarily a Southern practice. Almost as soon as
slavery was abolished, Southern states began re-enacting the
antebellum Slave Codes as Black Codes, to keep former slaves
in a condition of servitude. Among the features of the Black
Codes were special restrictions on firearms possession or
36
carrying by the freedmen. 1
133. State v. Jumel, 13 La. Ann. 399 (1858); Smith v. State, 11 La. Ann. 633,
634 (1856).
134. "The right to carry a bowie-knife for lawful defence is secured, and must
be admitted." Cockrum v. State, 24 Tex. 394, 402 (1859). For analysis of all the
right to arms cases in Texas, see generally Stephen Halbrook, The Right to Bear
Arms in Texas: The Intent of the Framers of the Bill of Rights, 41 BAYLOR L.
REV. 629 (1989).
135. The court wrote:
It is an exceeding destructive weapon. It is difficult to defend against it,
by any degree of bravery, or any amount of skill. The gun or pistol may
miss its aim, and when discharged, its dangerous character is lost, or
diminished at least. The sword may be parried. With these weapons
men fight for the sake of the combat, to satisfy the laws of honor, not
necessarily with the intention to kill, or with a certainty of killing,
when the intention exists. The bowie-knife differs from these in its
device and design; it is the instrument of almost certain death. He who
carries such a weapon, for lawful defence, as he may, makes himself
more dangerous to the rights of others, considering the frailties of
human nature, than if he carried a less dangerous weapon.
Cockrum, 24 Tex. at 402-03.
136. See Richard L. Aynes, On MisreadingJohn Bingham and the Fourteenth
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Outraged, Congress responded with the Freedmen's
Bureau Bill, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the Fourteenth
Amendment, and the Civil Rights Act of 1870-every one of
them aimed at racial subordination in general, and racist gun
control laws in particular. 137 In effect, the South abandoned
explicitly racial laws and replaced them with facially neutral
laws designed to disarm freedmen. Some laws prohibited
inexpensive firearms, while protecting more expensive
138
military guns owned by the ex-Confederate soldiers.
Meanwhile, other laws imposed licensing systems or carry
restrictions.
As a Florida Supreme Court Justice later
acknowledged, these laws were "never intended to be applied
1 39
to the white population."
Southern courts generally upheld the laws. While these
decisions have not been formally overruled, they are a core
element of Jim Crow jurisprudence, and played a substantial
role in maintaining racial supremacy through unofficial,
government-tolerated
violence
against
free
blacks.
Accordingly, one might question their precedential value in a
twenty-first century regime of legal equality-many of the
gun controls to which the Southern courts showed such
deference were racist, hostile to constitutional rights, and
invidious. 140
Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 57 (1993); Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond,
The Second Amendment: Toward an Afro-Americanist Reconsideration, 80 GEO.
L.J. 309, 344-47 (1991); Clayton E. Cramer, The Racist Roots of Gun Control, 4
KAN. J.L. & PuB. POLY 17 (1995); Clayton E. Cramer, Nicholas J. Johnson &
George Mocsary, "This Right is Not Allowed by Governments That Are Afraid of
the People": The Public Meaning of the Second Amendment When the Fourteenth
Amendment Was Ratified, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 823, 853-54 (2010); Stephen

P. Halbrook, Congress Interprets the Second Amendment: Declarationsby a CoEqual Branch on the IndividualRight to Keep and Bear Arms, 62 TENN. L. REV.
597, 598-99 (1995); Stephen P. Halbrook, PersonalSecurity, Personal Liberty,
and "The Constitutional Right to Bear Arms": Visions of the Framers of the
FourteenthAmendment, 5 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 341, 347-54 (1995).
137. See supra note 136.
138. See infra text accompanying notes 152, 173, 178.
139. Watson v. Stone, 4 So. 2d 700, 703 (Fla. 1941).
140. See generally Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, "Never Intended
to Be Applied to the White Population": Firearms Regulation And Racial
Disparity-theRedeemed South's Legacy to a National Jurisprudence?,70 CHI.KENT L. REV. 1307 (1995). See also Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 136; cf
Leroy G. Schultz, Why the Negro Carries Weapons, 53 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 476, 480 (1962) ("The generalized mistrust, suspicion, and
exaggerated ideas of personal rights of the Negro are very well documented in
the literature."); Editorial Comment, Carrying Concealed Weapons, 15 VA. L.
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A. Tennessee (1866-1881)
The Confederate government of Tennessee passed a law
that authorized the Governor to seize firearms from the
public, for use by the Confederate military. A victim of the
gun confiscation sued and won in trial court. The year after
the war ended, the Tennessee Supreme Court observed that
the state's constitutional right to arms "was utterly
disregarded" by the confiscation act, which was "the first
attempt, in the history of the Anglo-Saxon race, of which we
are apprised, to disarm the people by legislation."' 4 ' Since
the post-war state constitutional convention had repudiated
the act as unconstitutional and void ab initio all acts of the
Confederate state government, the seizure of the gun was
illegal and the official who had seized the gun was personally
liable for trespass.'
In 1870, the Tennessee Legislature prohibited the
carrying of "a dirk, sword-cane, Spanish stiletto, belt or
pocket pistol or revolver," either openly or concealed."
According to the Tennessee Supreme Court in Andrews v.
State, the law could not constitutionally be applied to some
handguns: "[Tihe pistol known as the repeater is a soldier's
weapon-skill in the use of which will add to the efficiency of
the soldier. If such is the character of the weapon here
designated, then the prohibition of the statute is too broad to
be allowed to stand ... "144
The Andrews Court added that people had a right to buy
guns and ammunition, to take guns to gunsmiths, and to5
carry guns and ammunition for purposes of sale and repair. 14
REG. 391, 391-92 (1909) (complaining that Negroes with whiskey and handguns
inevitably get into fights on trains).
141. Smith v. Ishenhour, 43 Tenn. (3 Cold.) 214, 217 (1866).
142. Id.
143. Andrews v. State, 50 Tenn. (3 Heisk.) 165, 171 (1871).
144. Id. at 187.
145. The court wrote:
The right and use are guaranteed to the citizen, to be exercised and
enjoyed in time of peace, in subordination to the general ends of civil
society; but, as a right, to be maintained in all its fulness.
The right to keep arms, necessarily involves the right to purchase
them, to keep them in a state of efficiency for use, and to purchase and
provide ammunition suitable for such arms, and to keep them in
repair. And clearly for this purpose, a man would have the right to
carry them to and from his home, and no one could claim that the
Legislature had the right to punish him for it, without violating this
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The First Amendment includes the right to buy books in
bookstores, and the right to use repair or improvement
services for First Amendment equipment, such as restoration
services for old books, and typewriter and computer repair
services. 1 46 The right to arms necessarily includes parallel
rights. 147 The Tennessee court stated that the carrying of
arms on one's own property was an absolute right. 14 8
However, carrying in public of some types of arms could be
regulated for the general safety of the public.'4 9
After the Andrews decision, the legislature prohibitedwith the acquiescence of the Tennessee Supreme Court-the
carrying of any handgun "other than an army pistol, or such
as are commonly carried and used in the United States army,
and in no case shall it be lawful for any person to carry such
clause of the Constitution.
Id. at 178.
146. Id. at 187.
147. Id.
148. The court wrote:
So we may say, with reference to such arms, as we have held, he may
keep and use in the ordinary mode known to the country, no law can
punish him for so doing, while he uses such arms at home or on his own
premises; he may do with his own as he will, while doing no wrong to
others.
Id. at 185-86.
149. Andrews v. State, 50 Tenn. (3 Heisk.) 165, 178-79 (1871)
(acknowledging the right to use arms "for all the ordinary purposes, and in all
the ordinary modes usual in the country, and to which arms are adapted,
limited by the duties of a good citizen in times of peace"). The court noted:
It is insisted by the Attorney General, as we understand his argument,
that this clause confers power on the Legislature to prohibit absolutely
the wearing of all and every kind of arms, under all circumstances. To
this we can not give our assent. The power to regulate, does not fairly
mean the power to prohibit; on the contrary, to regulate, necessarily
involves the existence of the thing or act to be regulated.... Adopt the
view of the Attorney General, and the Legislature may, if it chooses,
arbitrarily prohibit the carrying of all manner of arms, and then, there
be no act of the citizen to regulate.
Id. at 180-81. The Tennessee Attorney General, Joseph B. Heiskell, was also
the reporter for Tennessee Supreme Court decisions; Heiskell took advantage of
this opportunity to get the last word by footnoting this portion of the opinion
and asserting that this was not his argument:
Yet, when he carries his property abroad, goes among the people to
public assemblages where others are to be affected by his conduct, then
brings himself within the pale of public regulation, and must submit to
such restrictions on the mode of using or carrying his property as the
people through their Legislature, shall see fit to impose for the general
good.
Id. at 185-86.
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his person in any other
army pistol publicly or privately about
150
manner than openly in his hands."
The law was absurd. Read literally, it violated Andrews's
affirmation of the right to buy any type of handgun in a store
and carry it home. The law still allowed any model of
handgun to be taken home, but the buyer would have to put
the gun in a cart or wagon, rather than carry it. While the
law allowed the carrying (for any purpose, and in public) of
army model handguns, the requirement that the gun be
carried "in his hands" was likely to provoke fear and almost
certain to cause accidents. In effect, the law went as far as
possible to outlaw all handgun carrying, while maintaining a
pretense of not obliterating the right to bear arms.
Demonstrating the repressive spirit of the time, the
Tennessee court upheld the ban and at no point asked
whether the law exceeded the Andrews standard. 151
In 1879, the legislature banned the sale of all handguns
"except army or navy pistols." The Tennessee Supreme Court
upheld the prohibition on the grounds that "[tlhe law under
consideration is in aid of the law prohibiting the wearing of
pistols. The latter has repeatedly been holden by this court to
be constitutional." 152 Racism aside, one legitimate reason for
the Tennessee courts' extraordinary deference is the
particular language of the state constitution. Tennessee is
one of the few states in which "the common defence" was the
only expressed reason for the right. As noted supra,153 the
U.S. Senate rejected a proposal to add "for the common
defence" to the Second Amendment. 5 4 Thus, the Tennessee
cases, while important for American history, are of little
value in interpreting the Second Amendment.
B. Arkansas (1876-1882)
Arkansas followed the same path as Tennessee; its early
decisions upheld broad gun controls while still respecting core
rights, but later Arkansas degenerated into near-nullification.
The Arkansas constitutional arms guarantee, like that of
Tennessee, referred only to "common defence." In 1876, the
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

State v. Wilburn, 66 Tenn. 57, 61 (1872).
Id. at 62-63.
State v. Burgoyne, 75 Tenn. 173 (1881).
See supra text accompanying note 88.
See supra text accompanying note 88.
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Arkansas Supreme Court in Fife v. State held that a ban on
open or concealed carry of pistols was too broad. 155 The Fife
Court relied on the Tennessee Supreme Court's opinion in
Andrews v. State, and held that only militia-type arms were
protected. While the right belonged to all people (not just
militiamen), the right protected:
Not every thing that may be useful for offense or defense,
but what may properly be included or understood under
the title of "arms," taken in connection with the fact that
the citizen is to keep them, as a citizen. Such, then, as are
found to make up the usual arms of the citizen of the
country, and the use of which will properly train and
render him efficient in defense of his own liberties, as well
as of the State. Under this head, with a knowledge of the
habits of our people, and of the arms in the use of which a
soldier should be trained, we hold that the rifle, of all
descriptions, the shot gun, the musket and repeater, are
such arms, and that, under the Constitution, the right to
cannot be infringed or forbidden by the
keep such arms
56
legislature. 1

The Fife Court recognized that large handguns ("repeaters")
were protected, but it held that the "arms" in the state
constitution "did not mean pocket revolver."1 57

This was

because the pocket revolver was not "effective as a weapon of
58

war." 1

Thus, Fife is a categorical decision. "[Tihe rifle, of all
descriptions, the shot gun, the musket and repeater" are
within the right, while the "pocket revolver" is not.' 59 Fife's
pocket pistol was not a repeater (in the sense that the
Arkansas court used the term), so he had no constitutional
right to carry it concealed. 160

By 1876, multishot, high-powered repeating rifles were
common for both military and civil uses. 161 These were
among "the rifle, of all descriptions" that Fife found to be
155. Fife v. State, 31 Ark. 455 (1876).
156. Id. at 460.
157. Id. at 460-61.
158. Id. at 461.
159. Id. at 460.
160. Id. at 462.
161. David B. Kopel, Clayton E. Cramer & Scott G. Hattrup, A Tale of Three
Cities: The Right to Bear Arms in State Supreme Courts, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1177,
1207 (1995).
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Repeating pistols had been
constitutionally protected.
common since the 1830s, when Samuel Colt introduced
them. 162 Fife therefore fits comfortably into the "civilized
warfare" standard of nineteenth century state cases. 163 That
test, however, is not valid for the Second Amendment postHeller, because Heller appears to exclude the standard
military arms (machine guns) and Heller's definition of
protected arms encompasses all arms commonly used for
legitimate civil purposes."M Fife's pocket pistol was not a
term),
repeater (in the sense that the Arkansas court used the
165
so he had no constitutional right to carry it concealed.
Two subsequent decisions by the Arkansas Supreme
Court, Wilson v. State6 6 and Holland v. State,'6 7 applied Fife
and struck down convictions for carrying army pistols-both
cases involved concealed carrying. Wilson was the more
detailed of the decisions, and makes it clear that carrying
handguns in the course of one's6 8daily activities, in public
places, was a constitutional right. 1
The Wilson Court recognized something like Heller's
"sensitive places" rule: "No doubt in time of peace, persons
might be prohibited from wearing war arms to places of
public worship, or elections, etc." 169 A general ban on
carrying guns, though, was unconstitutional:
But to prohibit the citizen from wearing or carrying a
war arm, except upon his own premises or when on a

162. See MARK

Q.

SUTTON AND BROOKE S. ARKUSH, ARCHAEOLOGICAL

LABORATORY METHODS: AN INTRODUCTION 171-72 (2002); David B. Kopel,
Samuel Colt, in 1 GREAT LIVES FROM HISTORY: INVENTORS & INVENTIONS 213

(Alvin K. Benson ed., 2010) (discussing the invention of the Colt revolvers).
163. See supra text accompanying notes 90-96 for a discussion of the
civilized warfare test.
164. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2816 (2008).
165. Fife v. State, 31 Ark. 455, 456 (1876). The statute made it illegal to
"wear or carry any pistol of any kind whatever." Id. The court did not address
the statute broadly, but simply upheld it as applied to Fife. Id. at 461-62. That
Fife was a bully, threatening people with a pocket pistol, perhaps explains the
eagerness of the court to uphold the conviction, and to avoid discussing the
problem with the underlying statute.
166. Wilson v. State, 33 Ark. 557 (1878).
167. Holland v. State, 33 Ark. 560 (1878).
168. Wilson, 33 Ark. at 560.
169. Id. (citing Andrews v. State, 50 Tenn. (3 Heisk.) 165 (1871)). Heller
noted that the Second Amendment does not bar "laws forbidding the carrying of
firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings." Heller,
128 S. Ct. at 2817.
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journey traveling through the country with baggage, or
when acting as or in aid of an officer, is an unwarranted
restriction upon his constitutional right to keep and bear
arms.

If cowardly and dishonorable men sometimes shoot
unarmed men with army pistols or guns, the evil must be
not by a
prevented by the penitentiary and gallows, and
17 0
general deprivation of a constitutional privilege.
Pursuant to Wilson, Holland reversed a conviction for
carrying a concealed army pistol. 171 Taking a leaf from
Tennessee, the 1881 Arkansas legislature prohibited "the
12
carrying of army pistols except uncovered and in the hand."
In Haile v. State, Haile was convicted of carrying
"uncovered, and buckled around his waist . . a large
revolving pistol, known as the Colts army pistol, and such as
is used in the army and navy of the United States."' 73 The
Arkansas Supreme Court stated that the legislature could
reasonably regulate the right but not "nullify" it, or
"materially embarrass its exercise."' 7 4
After explaining that the arms guarantee in question
(which the state constitution said was "for the common
defense") was not for "private broils" but to restrain
tyrannical government tendencies, the Haile Court wrote that
the constitution did not protect carrying guns for self-defense:
It would be a perversion of its object, to make it a
protection to the citizen, in going, with convenience to
himself, and after his own fashion, prepared at all times to
inflict death upon his fellow-citizens, upon the occasion of
any real or imaginary wrong. The "common defense" of
the citizens does not require that. The consequent terror
to timid citizens, with the counter violence which would be
would be worse than
incited amongst the more fearless,
75
the evil intended to be remedied. 1
The court acknowledged that the purpose of the "in the
hand" requirement was to discourage people from carrying

170. Wilson, 33 Ark. at 560.
171. Holland, 33 Ark. at 561.
172. ACTS AND RESOLUTIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF
ARKANSAS 192 (1881).

173. Haile v. State, 38 Ark. 564 (1882).
174. Id. at 565-66.
175. Id. at 566.
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If the wearing of holstered guns supposedly
guns. 116
terrorized "timid citizens," how would requiring those guns to
The law was
be carried in the hand reduce the fear?
apparently intended to make the carrying of guns for
defensive purposes so inconvenient, and so likely to provoke
an accidental shooting, as to make it impractical to carry a
gun. 177

Haile marked an abrupt shift in Arkansas jurisprudence,
and was contrary to the three cases decided just a few years
In essence, the court had now agreed with the
before.
legislature that the right to bear arms was a bad idea.
Rather than force the legislature to seek a constitutional
amendment, the court accepted the legislature's practical
nullification of the right to bear arms by requiring that
bearing be done in the most inconvenient and dangerous
manner possible.
Another 1881 statute prohibited the sale of any pistol
other than those "used in the army or navy of the United
States and known as the navy pistol."'7 8 The Arkansas
Supreme Court upheld the ban in Dabbs v. State.179 Dabbs's
attorney pointed to Nunn v. State, the 1846 Georgia case that
80
had found a similar ban violated the Second Amendment.
He attempted to distinguish Fife v. State, arguing that State
v. Buzzard'"' and Wilson v. State18 2 supported his client.' 3
176. The court wrote:
The Legislature, by the law in question, has sought to steer between
such a condition of things, and an infringement of constitutional rights,
by conceding the right to keep such arms, and to bear or use them at
will, upon one's own premises, and restricting the right to wear them
elsewhere in public, unless they be carried uncovered in the hand. It
must be confessed that this is a very inconvenient mode of carrying
them habitually, but the habitual carrying of them does not seem
essential to "common defense." The inconvenience is a slight matter
compared with the danger to the whole community, which would result
from the common practice of going about with pistols in a belt, ready to
be used on every outbreak of ungovernable passion. It is a police
regulation, adjusted as wisely as the Legislature thought possible, with
all essential constitutional rights.

Id.
177. See id.
178. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.

179. Dabbs v. State, 39 Ark. 353 (1882).
180. See supra text accompanying notes 125-30.
181. See supra text accompanying notes 108-17.
182. See supra text accompanying notes 168-70.

183. Dabbs, 39 Ark. at 354.
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Attorney General Moore, defending the law, claimed,
"[tihe right to 'keep and bear arms' may be absolutely
prohibited," and pointed to Buzzard and Fife as precedents. 184
While this accurately described the concurrence in Buzzard,
Fife said no such thing. The Arkansas Supreme Court
nonetheless relied on Fife (holding militia-type arms,
including "the repeater" handgun are protected while "the
pocket pistol" is not) to uphold the ban. Since handguns other
than the Army and Navy models were not "useful in warfare,"
185
they could be outlawed.
C. Texas (1872-1878)
The first of the postbellum Texas Supreme Court
decisions took place in a time of political turmoil and violence.
In English v. State, the court upheld a near-complete ban on
the carrying of handguns (openly or concealed)."8 6 English
was not an impressive decision; it repeatedly mis-cited the
1859 Texas Cockrum decision as Cochrane."7 Astonishingly,
the court denigrated the Texas Constitution's right to keep
and bear arms because it supposedly derived from Spanish
rather than Anglo-American law:
A portion of our system of laws, as well as our public
morality, is derived from a people the most peculiar
perhaps of any other in the history and derivation of its
own system. Spain, at different periods of the world, was
dominated over by the Carthagenians, the Romans, the
Vandals, the Snovi, the Allani, the Visigoths, and Arabs;
and to this day there are found in the Spanish codes traces
of the laws and customs of each of these nations blended
together in a system by no means to be compared with the
88
sound philosophy and pure morality of the common law. 1
The court's assertion was bizarre.

It is true that the

184. Id. at 355.
185. The Arkansas Supreme Court wrote:
The law was enacted as a measure of precaution for the prevention of
crimes and calamities. It is leveled at the pernicious habit of wearing
such dangerous or deadly weapons as are easily concealed about the
person. It does not abridge the constitutional right of citizens to keep
and bear arms for the common defense; for it in no wise restrains the
use or sale of such arms as are useful in warfare.
Id. at 356-57 (citing Fife v. State, 31 Ark. 455 (1876)).
186. English v. State, 35 Tex. 473 (1872).
187. Id. at 476.
188. Id. at 480.
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Romans, Visigoths, Arabs, and Spanish recognized the right
of self-defense and a right to use arms for self-defense. 18 9
Mexico's 1857 Constitution also recognized these rights. 9 °
But the Republic of Texas's 1836 Constitution recognized a
right to arms nearly identical to the right in Alabama's 1819
Constitution and Connecticut's 1818 Constitution.' 9' The
1824 Constitution of Mexico did not guarantee a right to
The source of the Texas constitutional right is
arms.
obviously the American legal tradition, not the Spanish one.
The postbellum Texas constitutional right to arms
declared: "Every person shall have the right to keep and bear
arms in the lawful defense of himself or the state, under such
regulations as the legislature may prescribe." 192 Yet the
English Court asserted that only arms "such as are useful
and proper to an armed militia" were protected. 93 Such a
claim was plausible for state constitutions in which "the
common defense" or a similar term was the only explicit
reason for the right. In Texas, however, the right included
"lawful defense of himself." Because self-defense was equal to
common defense under the Texas constitution, the English
Court could not offer any good reason why only militia-type
arms should be protected. The English Court upheld the
statute for reasons unclear.
Three years later, the Texas Supreme Court provided a
bit more guidance, acknowledging that shotguns, rifles, "and
such pistols at least as are not adapted to being carried
concealed" were protected arms.19 4 The court also found that
because the statute "respected the right to carry a pistol
openly when needed for self-defense or in the public service,
and the right to have one at the home or place of business,"

189. David B. Kopel, Paul Gallant & Joanne D. Eisen, The Human Right of
Self-Defense, 22 BYU J. PUB. L. 43, 108-19, 122-24 (2008).
190. Article 10 of the Mexico Constitution of 1857 guaranteed all men a right
"to possess and carry arms for their security and self-defense." WILFRID HARDY
CALLCOrr, CHURCH AND STATE IN MEXICO: 1822-1857, at 287 (Octagon Books
1965) (1926).
191. 6 FRANCIS NEWTON THORPE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS,
COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES,
AND COLONIES Now OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 3543 (Government Printing Office 1909).

192. English, 35 Tex. at 478.
193. Id. at 474.
194. State v. Duke, 42 Tex. 455, 458-59 (1875).
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the regulation had not exceeded the state's power. 195 The
problem with the self-defense exception in the statute is that
it applied only when the carrying was for actual, imminent
self-defense. The exception, therefore, would be of use to
someone who knew about a specific threat (e.g., a stalker) but
not to someone who wanted to carry for general protection.
Another three years later, in 1878, the intermediate court
of appeals ruled that it was unconstitutional to require
forfeiture of a firearm for the misdemeanor of concealed
carry:
The Legislature has the power by law to regulate the
wearing of arms, with a view to prevent crime, but it has
not the power to enact a law the violation of which will
work a forfeiture of defendant's arms. While it has the
power to regulate the wearing of arms, it has not the
power by legislation to take a citizen's arms away from
him. One of his most sacred rights is that of having arms
for his own defence and that of the State. This right is one
96
of the surest safeguards of liberty and self-preservation. 1
Still, in 1912, an intermediate court upheld a fifty percent
gross receipts tax on the sale of handguns. The court
reasoned that handguns, like alcohol, are socially harmful
and therefore may be taxed severely. The court added that
prohibiting the sale of handguns would not violate the state
constitution. 19
To the twenty-first century reader, the notion that the
Texas legislature would enact a huge tax to discourage
handgun ownership, or that a Texas court would suggest that
handguns could be banned, may seem astounding. But the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were the nadir
for many American rights, including the First Amendment, 198
and of course, Equal Protection.
D. Georgia (1874)
In Nunn v. State, the George Supreme Court had relied
on the Second Amendment to strike laws that outlawed most

195. Id. at 459.
196. Jennings v. State, 5 Tex. Ct. App. 298, 300-01 (1878).
197. Caswell & Smith v. State, 148 S.W. 1159, 1160-61 (Tex. Civ. App.,
1912).
198. See generally DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN

YEARS, 1870-1920 (1999).
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handguns (except for large "horse pistols") or banned the
carrying of handguns. 199 Like all the defeated Confederate
states, Georgia was forced to draft a new constitution to
better protect human rights. The 1868 Georgia Constitution
declared: "A well regulated militia being necessary to the
security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and
bear arms shall not be infringed; but the general assembly
shall have power to prescribe the manner in which arms may
be borne."2 °°
Shortly thereafter, Miles Hill was indicted for carrying a
pistol to a court of justice.20 ' Upholding the indictment, the
Georgia Supreme Court created an antecedent of Heller's
"sensitive places" rule.20 2 Justice McCay explained that gun
carrying in courthouses could be barred because such
carrying might interfere with the right of free access to the
courts.

203

The rest of the opinion offered dicta stating that the right
to bear arms "must include the right to load them and shoot
20 4
them and use them as such things are ordinarily used."
The legislature could use its power to prescribe how arms are
borne to impose time and place restrictions, or to require that
carry be concealed or unconcealed. Manner restrictions could
probably even specify the exact mode of carry, such as "borne
20 5
strapped or fastened upon the back."
199. Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243, 251 (1846).
200. GA. CONST. of 1868 art. I, § 14.
201. Hill v. State, 53 Ga. 472 (1874).
202. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2817 (2008). For an
explanation of Heller's "sensitive places" rule, see supra text accompanying note
169.
203. Justice McCay wrote:
One guarantee is not to swallow up all others, but each is to be
construed reasonably in reference to its plain intent, and other rights
guaranteed to the people. The right to go into a court-house and
peacefully and safely seek its privileges, is just as sacred as the right to
carry arms, and if the temple of justice is turned into a barracks, and a
visitor to it is compelled to mingle in a crowd of men loaded down with
pistols and Bowie-knives, or bristling with guns and bayonets, his right
of free access to the courts is just as much restricted as is the right to
bear arms infringed by prohibiting the practice before courts of justice.
Hill, 53 Ga. at 477-78.
204. Id. at 480.
205. The court wrote:
The right to "tote" them, as our colored people say, would be a bootless
privilege, fitting one, perhaps, for playing soldier upon a drill ground,
but offering no aid in that knowledge which makes an effective, to-wit:
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E. Pennsylvania (1875)
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania's decision in Wright
v. Commonwealth was an odd one. Defendant Jonathan
Wright was charged under a county ordinance with carrying a
concealed pistol "with intent, with the pistol aforesaid,
unlawfully and maliciously, to do bodily harm to some other
person, to the inquest unknown." 20 6 The jury rendered a7
20
verdict of "[n]ot guilty, the defendant to pay the costs."
Wright appealed, arguing that he could not be charged court
costs because he was found not guilty. He also challenged the
constitutionality of the concealed weapon ordinance.20 8
The court asserted that concealed carry of a pistol was
not protected by the state constitution: "Such an unlawful act
and malicious intent as this has no protection under the 21st
section of the Bill of Rights, saving the right of the citizens to
bear arms in defense of themselves and the state."20 9 Nothing
in the decision, however, explained the court's reasoning,
a shooting soldier. To acquire this skill and this familiarity, the words
"bear arms" must include the right to load them and shoot them and
use them as such things are ordinarily used, so that the "people" will be
fitted for defending the state when its needs demand; and when the
constitution grants to the general assembly the right to prescribe the
manner in which arms may be borne, it grants the power to regulate
the whole subject of using arms, provided the regulation does not infringe that use of them which is necessary to fit the owner of them for a
ready and skillful use of them as a militiaman. Any restriction which
interferes with this is void, whether it relates to the carrying of them
about the person, or to the place or time of bearing them.
The manner of bearing arms includes not only the particular way
they may be carried upon the person, that is openly or secretly, on the
shoulder or in the hand, loaded or unloaded, cocked or uncocked,
capped or uncapped, but it includes, also, the time when, and the place
where, they may be borne. It is no reply to this view of the subject to
say that if the legislature may do this, they may, in effect, prohibit the
carrying them altogether. The same reply may be made to the
admitted right to prescribe the manner of carrying arms upon the
person. If the legislature were to say arms shall not be borne on the
shoulder, nor in the hands, or on the arms, but they shall only be borne
strapped or fastened upon the back, this would be prescribing only the
manner, and yet, it would, in effect, be a denial of the right to bear
arms altogether. The main clause and the limitation to it are both to
be construed reasonably, and in view of the declared object of the
provision.
Id. at 479-81.
206. Wright v. Commonwealth, 77 Pa. 470,470 (1875).
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 471.
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other than an unexplained assumption that concealed carry
was in itself malicious.
Debates at the 1873 Pennsylvania Constitutional
Convention strongly suggested that existing laws prohibiting
concealed carry required evidence of criminal intent-and
that carrying concealed weapons for self-defense was
210
lawful.
F. Illinois, Massachusetts,and Missouri:Armed Parades
1. Illinois (1879)
Dunne v. Illinois was an astonishing case that challenged
the right to hold mass armed parades.2 1' The case
theoretically addressed a refusal to perform jury duty, but
really involved the struggle between corporation and labor
unionists in Chicago, where union members paraded armed
through the streets.
The Illinois Supreme Court fiercely rejected the assertion
that the Second Amendment included a right to mass armed
parades.212 The court opined that "[wlhether bodies of men,
with military organizations or otherwise, under no discipline
or command by the United States or the State, shall be
permitted to 'parade with arms' in populous communities, is a
matter within the regulation and subject to the police power
of the state."2 3 For good measure, Dunne added an ode to the
state's police power.2 14 It could be said that Dunne and his
210. 7 PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, DEBATES OF THE
CONVENTION TO AMEND THE CONSTITUTION OF PENNSYLVANIA 258-60 (1873).

211. Dunne v. Illinois, 94 Ill. 120, 140-41 (1879).

212. Id.
213. Id.
214. The court wrote:
In matters pertaining to the internal peace and well-being of the State,
its police powers are plenary and inalienable. It is a power co-extensive
with self-protection, and is sometimes termed, and not inaptly, the "law
of overruling necessity." Every necessary act for the protection, safety
and best interests of the people of the State may be done under this
power. Persons and property may be subjected to all reasonable
restraints and burdens for the common good. Where mere property
interests are involved, this power, like other powers of government, is
subject to constitutional limitations; but where the internal peace and
health of the people of the State are concerned, the limitations that are
said to be upon the exercise of this power are, that such "regulations
must have reference to the comfort, safety and welfare of society." It is
within the power of the General Assembly to enact laws for the
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fellow labor unionists were not arguing for an individual right
to bear arms, but rather a right to do so collectively in
response to intimidation by strike-breaking forces.2 15 The
U.S. Supreme Court, in Presser v. Illinois, later came to a
conclusion similar to that of the Illinois Supreme Court,
holding that the Second Amendment did not protect mass
armed parades.2 16
The backdrop to Dunne and Presserwas dlite panic about
labor unrest. 217 The issue began to bring gun control out of
its Southern base, and led the Supreme Court to begin to
interpret The Slaughter-House Cases as forbidding the
application of all the Bill of Rights to the states.218
2. Massachusetts (1896)
In 1896, the right to hold mass armed parades was
similarly challenged in the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court case Commonwealth v. Murphy.1 9 Murphy and a
number of associates comprised the Sarsfield Guards, an
independent militia company with a long history of valuable
service to the public and the state. 22° They and another
independent militia company had been prohibited from
marching in parades even with inoperative rifles, apparently

suppression of that which may endanger the public peace, and impose
penalties for the infraction of such laws. What will endanger the public
security must, as a general rule, be left to the wisdom of the legislative
department of the government.
Id. at 141.
215. Sanford Levinson, The EmbarrassingSecond Amendment, 99 YALE L.J.
637, 652-53 (1989).
216. Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252,264-65 (1886).
217. Stephen P. Halbrook, The Right of Workers to Assemble and to Bear
Arms: Presser v. Illinois, One of the Last Holdouts Against Application of the
Bill of Rights to the States, 76 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 943, 945-46 (1999);
Levinson, supra note 215, at 652-53; Gerard N. Magliocca, Why Did the
Incorporation of the Bill of Rights Fail in the Late Nineteenth Century?, 94
MINN. L. REV. 102, 124-38 (2009).
218. In earlier post-Slaughter-House decisions, the Court had construed the
case as merely applying to procedural or unenumerated rights. Magliocca,
supra note 217, at 136-38.
219. Commonwealth v. Murphy, 44 N.E. 138, 138 (Mass. 1896).
220. 4 OLIVER AYER ROBERTS, HISTORY OF THE MILITARY COMPANY OF THE
MASSACHUSETTS Now CALLED THE ANCIENT AND HONORABLE ARTILLERY
COMPANY OF MASSACHUSETTS, 1637-1888, at 403 (Alfred Mudge & Son,
Printers 1901). See also OSCAR HANDLIN, BOSTON'S IMMIGRANTS, 1790-1880: A
STUDY IN ACCULTURATION 157 (Harvard University Press 1941) (1991).
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because they were Irish-American organizations.2 2 1 Murphy
argued that the statute he had violated was "in contravention
of the seventeenth article of the Massachusetts Declaration of
Rights, which declares that 'the people have a right to keep
222
and bear arms for the common defence.'"
The court disagreed, citing Dunne and Presser for the
principle that the right to arms did not include the right to
mass armed parades.2 23 The Murphy court also cited a litany
of state cases that allowed bans on concealed carry, and
characterized them as standing for the principle of legislative
power to regulate the mode of carrying.22 4
3. Missouri (1881-1886)
Like many states, Missouri adopted a constitution that
guaranteed the right to keep and bear arms, and explicitly
excluded the concealed carrying of arms. 225 Accordingly, in
1881, the Missouri Supreme Court, in State v. Wilforth, no
difficulty upholding a ban on concealed carry of deadly
weapons.22 6 Because Wilforth had been carrying concealed,
221. See BOSTON CITY COUNCIL, REPORTS OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE CITY

COUNCIL OF BOSTON FOR THE YEAR COMMENCING MONDAY, JANUARY 7, 1895,
AND ENDING MONDAY, JANUARY 4, 1896, 535 (1896).
222. Murphy, 44 N.E. at 138. Murphy recognized a right to arms, subject to
regulation. Eighty years later, the Massachusetts court would deny the
existence of a right to arms. See Commonwealth v. Davis, 343 N.E.2d 847
(Mass. 1976).
223. The court wrote:
The right to keep and bear arms for the common defense does not
include the right to associate together as a military organization, or to
drill and parade with arms in cities and towns, unless authorized to do
so by law. This is a matter affecting the public security, quiet, and good
order, and it is within the police powers of the Legislature to regulate
the bearing of arms so as to forbid such unauthorized drills and
parades.
Murphy, 44 N.E. at 138. (citing Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 264, 265 (1886);
Dunne v. People, 94 Ill. 120 (1879)).
224. Id.
225. MO. CONST. of 1875 art. II, § 17.
226. The Missouri Supreme Court wrote:
Following the weight of authority as indicated by the state courts, and
in the light of section 17, article 2 of the constitution of this State,
which declares "that the right of no citizen to keep and bear arms in
defense of his home, person or property, or in aid of the civil power,
when thereto legally summoned, shall be called in question; but
nothing herein contained is intended to justify the practice of wearing
concealed weapons," we must hold the act in question to be valid and
binding, and as intending only to interdict the carrying of weapons
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the court did not need to address the fact that the statute
prohibited all bearing of deadly weapons into "any school
room, or place where people are assembled for educational,
literary, or social purposes, or to any election precinct on
election day."227 Today, at least for school rooms and election
precincts, the general ban on carrying could be upheld under
2 28
Heller's "sensitive places" rule.

In State v. Shelby, the defendant was indicted in one
charge for "carrying about his person a deadly weapon when
under the influence of intoxicating drink, and in the other for
carrying concealed a deadly weapon." 229 The second charge,
concealed carry, was clearly valid because of Wilforth. 230 As

for the carrying-while-intoxicated charge, the Shelby Court
read Wilforth as standing for a broad legislative power to
regulate the manner of carrying.2 31 The Shelby Court also
looked to the purpose of bearing arms under the Missouri
Constitution, finding that the statute was "designed to
promote personal security, and to check and put down
lawlessness, and . . . thus in perfect harmony with the
constitution." 232 There was a self-defense exception to the

carrying-while-intoxicated charge,233 and this provision
rendered the statute constitutional.
The court concluded that the challenged statutes
constituted "reasonable regulation of the use of such arms,
concealed.
State v. Wilforth, 74 Mo. 528, 531 (1881).
227. State v. Shelby, 2 S.W. 468, 469 (Mo. 1886).
228. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2817 (2008).
229. Shelby, 2 S.W. at 468.
230. Id. at 468-69.
231. The Shelby court wrote:
The validity of the act of 1875 is made to stand upon the ground that
the legislature may thus regulate the manner in which arms may be
borne. If this may be done, as to time and place, as is done by that act,
no good reason is why the legislature may not do the same thing with
reference to the condition of the person who carries such weapons. The
mischief to be apprehended from an intoxicated person going abroad
with fire-arms upon his person is equally as great as that to be feared
from one who goes into an assemblage of person with one of the
prohibited instruments.
Id. at 469.
232. Id.
233. Id. (noting a separate provision provided a defense "if the defendant
shall show that he has been threatened with great bodily harm, or had good
reason to carry the same in the necessary defence of his person, home, or
property").
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and to which the citizen must yield, and a valid exercise of
the legislative power." 234 The court stated no clear theory for
determining what constitutes "reasonable regulation," but
found that regulation of possession-while-intoxicated (with
235
allowance for self-defense) was reasonable.
G. North Carolina(1882)
The first postbellum North Carolina case was State v.
Speller, which upheld a challenged gun control statute. 236 L.
R. Speller and a man named Jenkins had engaged in
an escalating argument.
According to Speller, Jenkins
attempted to cut Speller with a razor and made death threats
against him. Jenkins and Speller subsequently swore out
complaints against each other. After a police officer serving
the warrant against Speller found a concealed pistol on him,
Speller was arrested, indicted, and convicted of carrying a
concealed weapon in violation of an 1879 North Carolina
statute.23v
On appeal, Speller's attorney argued that the judge
should have instructed the jury that the extenuating
circumstances took precedence over the concealed weapon
law. 238
Speller's
attorney
also
challenged
the
constitutionality of the concealed weapons statute.
The North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the
conviction.239 Like Missouri's, North Carolina's constitution
specifically excluded the practice of carrying concealed
weapons. 240 The Speller Court, therefore, had no trouble
dismissing the notion that the concealed carry ban violated
Speller's right to bear arms. Moreover, Speller could have
openly carried a gun for protection, and there was no reason
why he should have enjoyed concealment-and the special
advantage of surprise-against his enemy. 241 Open carry was

234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

Id.
State v. Shelby, 2 S.W. 468, 469 (Mo. 1886).
State v. Speller, 86 N.C. 697 (1882).
Id. at 697.
Id.
Id. at 700-01.

240.

N.C. CONST. art. I, § 30 (1970).

241. The court wrote:
We concede the full force of the ingenious argument made by counsel

upon this point, but cannot admit its application to the statute in
question. The distinction between the "right to keep and bear arms,"
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protected while concealed carry was not, even in lifeThus, open carry was
threatening circumstances.
242
categorically protected.
H. West Virginia (1891)
State v. Workman is another case in which a state
supreme court limited the right to keep and bear arms to
militia weapons.24 3 In 1891, there was no right to arms in the
state constitution, so the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals turned to the Second Amendment. The court held
that it protected only militia-type arms, and applied to:
[Weapons of warfare to be used by the militia, such as
swords, guns, rifles, and muskets-arms to be used in
defending the State and civil liberty-and not to pistols,
bowie-knives, brass knuckles, billies, and such other
weapons as are usually employed in brawls, street-fights,
duels, and affrays, and are only habitually carried by
bullies, blackguards, and desperadoes, to the terror of the
community and the injury of the State. 2"

and "the practice of carrying concealed weapons" is plainly observed in
the Constitution of this State. The first, it is declared, shall not be
infringed, while the latter may be prohibited. Art. I, § 24.
As the surest inhibition that could be put upon this practice
deemed so hurtful as to be the subject of express mention in the
organic law of the State, the Legislature has seen fit to enact that at no
time, and under no circumstances, except upon his own premises, shall
any person carry a deadly weapon concealed about his person, and it is
the strict duty of the courts, whenever an occasion offers, to uphold a
law thus sanctioned and approved. But without any constitutional
provision whatever on the subject, can it be doubted that the
Legislature might by law regulate this right to bear arms-as they do
all other rights whether inherent or otherwise-and require it to be
exercised in a manner conducive to the peace and safety of the public?
This is as far as the statute assumes to go. It does not say that a
citizen when beset with danger shall not provide for his security by
wearing such arms as may be essential to that end; but simply that if
he does do so, he must wear them openly, and so as to be seen by those
with whom he may come in contact. The right to wear secret weapons
is no more essential to the protection of one man than another, and
surely it cannot be supposed that the law intends that an unwary
advantage should be taken even of an enemy.
Speller, 86 N.C. at 700 (emphasis omitted).

242. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2816 (2008).
243. State v. Workman, 14 S.E. 9 (W. Va. 1891).
244. Id. at 12. For a history of the arms right in West Virginia, see generally
Stephen P. Halbrook, Rationing Firearms Purchases and the Right to Keep
Arms: Reflections on the Bills of Rights of Virginia, West Virginia, and the

2010]

STATE COURT STANDARDS OF REVIEW

1157

While Heller does not restrict the Second Amendment's
application to militia-type arms, the Heller Court did agree
with Workman's finding that the right to arms does not
encompass weapons that are, in Workman's words,
"habitually carried by bullies, blackguards, and desperadoes,"
rather than by good citizens.24 Workman indicated that a
defendant might escape punishment by proving himself a
"quiet and peaceable citizen, of good character and standing
in the community."

246

IV. EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY DECISIONS
In the twentieth century, gun control ceased to be a
peculiar Southern institution. Fear of labor unrest and
massive waves of immigrants, as well as the emigration of
Southern blacks, brought gun control north.247 Many gun
control laws were upheld, and many others were not even
constitutionally questioned.
A. Ohio (1900)
In the late nineteenth century, Ohio had a statute known
as the "Tramp Law," which prohibited begging (except by
women and the blind) and made it a criminal offense for a
tramp to bear arms.248 Although the defendant, Timothy
Hogan, was not accused of carrying any sort of arms, the Ohio
Supreme Court nonetheless chose to discuss the issue when it
upheld the Tramp Law as constitutional in State v. Hogan.249
United States, 96 W. VA. L. REV. 1 (1993).
245. Workman, 14 S.E. at 11; see also Heller, 128 S. Ct at 2817.
246. Workman, 14 S.E. at 9.
247. Don B. Kates Jr., Toward a History of Handgun Prohibition in the
United States, in RESTRICTING HANDGUNS: THE LIBERAL SKEPTICS SPEAK OUT

15-22 (Don B. Kates Jr., ed., 1979).
248. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 6995 (1908). Such tramp laws and related
concerns were widespread in the last decades of the nineteenth century and
first decades of the twentieth. See Current Topics, 21 ALBANY L.J 142 (1880).
See generally 40 O.F. Lewis, The Tramp Problem, in ANNALS AMERICAN
ACADEMY OF POLITICAL & SOCIAL SCIENCE 217 (1912); REPORT OF THE
COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL LAW, PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEVENTH
CONFERENCE OF CHARITIES AND CORRECTION 277-281 (1880).

ANNuAL

We realize that the year 1900 was part of the nineteenth century, not the
twentieth. Hogan has more in common with the twentieth-century Northern
cases based on class fears than it does with the nineteenth-century southern
cases based on racial animus, so we include Hogan in the twentieth century
discussion.
249. State v. Hogan, 58 N.E. 572 (Ohio 1900).
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According to the Hogan Court, the right to arms was for the
noble purposes of self-defense and civil liberty; it did not
apply to the nefarious purposes for which tramps carried
guns, namely to terrorize good people.25 °
Neither the head notes nor the court's decision reveal
whether the right under discussion derived from the state
constitution or from the Second Amendment. Perhaps to the
Hogan Court, they were the same. The rest of the Hogan
decision expounded the dangers of the tramp.25 ' Hogan is one
of the earliest cases allowing the disarming of allegedly
dangerous persons who have neither been convicted nor
charged with a crime, nor have exhibited disloyalty to the
250. The court wrote:
But it is insisted that the bill of rights is infringed, because the act
forbids the tramp to bear arms. The question was not involved in this
prosecution, but we see no real difficulty in it. The constitutional right
to bear arms is intended to guaranty to the people, in support of just
government, such right, and to afford the citizen means for defense of
self and property. While this secures to him a right of which he cannot
be deprived, it enjoins a duty in execution of which that right is to be
exercised. If he employs those arms which he ought to wield for the
safety and protection of his country, his person, and his property, to the
annoyance and terror and danger of its citizens, his acts find no
vindication in the bill of rights. That guaranty was never intended as a
warrant for vicious persons to carry weapons with which to terrorize
others. Going armed with unusual and dangerous weapons, to the
terror of the people, is an offense at common law. A man may carry a
gun for any lawful purpose, for business or amusement, but he cannot
go about with that or any other dangerous weapon to terrify and alarm
a peaceful people.
Id. at 575. The careful reader will notice the very strong similarity of the
language to the State v. Huntly (1843) decision. See supra text accompanying
note 118.
251. The court wrote:
Speaking of the class, the genus tramp, in this country, is a public
enemy. He is numerous, and he is dangerous. He is a nomad, a
wanderer on the face of the earth, with his hand against every honest
man, woman, and child, in so far as they do not promptly and fully
supply his demands. He is a thief, a robber, often a murderer, and
always a nuisance. He does not belong to the working classes, but is an
idler. He does not work, because he despises work. It is a fixed
principle with him that, come what may, he will not work. He is so low
in the scale of humanity that he is without that not uncommon virtue
among the low, of honor among thieves. He will steal from a fellow
tramp, if in need of what that fellow has, and will resort to violence
when that is necessary. So numerous has the class become that the
members may be said to overrun the improved parts of the country,
especially the more thickly settled portions.
Hogan 58 N.E. at 574. This passionate, angry denunciation continues for many
more paragraphs.
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state.
B. Idaho (1902)
L.D. Brickey was convicted of carrying a loaded revolver
within the city limits of Lewiston, Idaho.2 52 On appeal, the
Idaho Supreme Court held in In re Brickey that the law
violated both the Second Amendment and its Idaho
analogue. 2 3 The legislature had the authority to "regulate
the exercise of this right," but there was a limit: it could
prohibit concealed carrying, but not all carrying.254
C. Vermont (1903)
In State v. Rosenthal, the Vermont Supreme Court struck
down a Rutland ordinance that prohibited concealed carry of
a pistol without a permit.25 The court relied on the Vermont
Constitution, which declares "[t]hat the people have a right to
bear arms for the defense of themselves and the State."2 56
According to the court, the ordinance, "so far as it relates to
the carrying of a pistol, is inconsistent with, and repugnant
to, the Constitution and the 257laws of the State, and it is
therefore, to that extent, void."
To this day, Vermont remains one of two states (the other
252. In re Brickey, 70 P. 609, 609 (Idaho 1902).
253. The Idaho Supreme Court wrote:
The second amendment to the federal constitution is in the following
language: "A well-regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a
free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be
infringed." The language of section 11, article 1 of the constitution of
Idaho is as follows: "the people have the right to bear arms for their
security and defense, but the legislature shall regulate the exercise of
this right of law."
Under these constitutional provisions, the
legislature has no power to prohibit a citizen from bearing arms in any
portion of the state of Idaho, whether within or without the corporate
limits of cities, towns, and villages. The legislature may, as expressly
provided in our state constitution, regulate the exercise of this right,
but may not prohibit it. A statute prohibiting the carrying of concealed
deadly weapons would be a proper exercise of the police power of the
state. But the statute in question does not prohibit the carrying of
weapons concealed, which is of itself a pernicious practice, but prohibits
the carrying of them in any manner in cities, towns, and villages. We
are compelled to hold this statute void.
Id.
254. See id.
255. State v. Rosenthal, 55 A. 610, 610 (Vt. 1903).
256. VT. CONST. art. 16.
257. Rosenthal, 55 A. at 611.
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being Alaska) where a law-abiding citizen may carry
a
2 58
concealed handgun in public without need for a permit.
D. Kansas (1905)
In City of Salina v. Blaksley, James Blaksley was
convicted "of carrying a revolving pistol within the city while
Blaksley
under the influence of intoxicating liquor."2 59
appealed the conviction, relying on section 4 of the Kansas
Bill of Rights: "The people have the right to bear arms for
their defense and security; but standing armies, in time of
peace, are dangerous to liberty, and shall not be tolerated,
and the military shall be in strict subordination to the
civil power."260 The prosecutor defended the city ordinance
as a permissible regulation of the right.26 ' Sua sponte,26 2
the Kansas Supreme Court announced an innovative
interpretation of a state constitutional arms provision: the
purpose of the right was to protect the power of the state to
control a militia.26
The decision was nonsense. While it is possible to
imagine that a provision in the federal constitution might
have protected state militia power against federal
258. See Act of 2003, 2003 Alaska Laws (eliminating the requirement for a
permit in order to carry a concealed weapon in almost all public places).
259. City of Salina v. Blaksley, 83 P. 619 (Kan. 1905).
260. Id. at 620.
261. Robert Dowlut, Federaland State ConstitutionalGuarantees to Arms, 15
U. DAYTON L. REV. 59, 76-77 (1989).
262. Id.
263. City of Salina, 83 P. at 620. The Kansas Supreme Court wrote:
The provision in section 4 of the Bill of Rights that "the people have the
right to bear arms for their defense and security" refers to the people as
a collective body. It was the safety and security of society that were
being considered when this provision was being put into our
constitution. It is followed immediately by the declaration that
standing armies in time of peace are dangerous to liberty and should
not be tolerated, and that "the military shall be in strict subordination
to the civil power." It deals exclusively with the military; individual
rights are not considered in this section. The manner in which the
people shall exercise this right of bearing arms for the defense and
security of the people is found in article 8 of the constitution, which
authorizes the organizing, equipping and disciplining the militia, which
shall be composed of "all able-bodied male citizens between the ages of
twenty-one and forty-five years." The militia is essentially the people's
army, and their defense and security in time of peace. In the absence
of constitutional or legislative authority no person has the right to
assume such duty.
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interference, it is not possible to imagine a similar provision
in a state constitution. Why would a state constitution need
to protect the right of the state to maintain a militia? The
Kansas Constitution can exercise no authority over the
federal government. Moreover, a Kansas provision affirming
Kansas state government militia powers would not be placed
in the "Bill of Rights" article of the Kansas Constitution.
Although the Salina court purported to cite some precedents,
not one of them even remotely supported the proposition that
the people's "right to keep and bear arms" is not a right, but
is instead a power that belongs to the state government. 2 4
The Kansas Supreme Court implicitly abandoned Salina
seven decades later in Junction City v. Mevis. 265 In Mevis, the
Court ruled that a local ordinance against gun carrying was
"overbroad." Overbreadth is a tool of strict scrutiny that was
formally introduced in a right to arms context by Lakewood v.
Pillow, a 1972 Colorado case that the Mevis Court cited with
approval.2 66
Mevis, however, did not explicitly overrule
Salina. A 2010 Kansas referendum to amend the state
constitution will provide Kansas voters with the opportunity
2 67
to complete the repudiation of Salina.
E. Washington (1907)
As labor conflicts grew, employers often deployed goon

264. Kopel, supra note 110, at 1510-12.

The Kansas Constitution was

modeled on the Ohio Constitution. See FRANCIS H. HELLER, THE KANSAS STATE

CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 4 (1992) ("[The delegates turned to
existing models. By a formal vote they decided to use as the prototype for the
new constitution the constitution written in Ohio in 1850, with that of Indiana a
close second."). Similar text in the Ohio and Indiana state constitutions has
always been interpreted as protecting an individual right. See, e.g., Klein v.
Leis, 795 N.E.2d 633 (Ohio 2003); State v. Hogan, 58 N.E. 572 (Ohio 1900).
The notion that the word "people" implies a power of the government,
rather than a right of individual people, is contrary to the rest of the Kansas
Bill of Rights. See KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights § 3 ("The people have the right to
assemble . . . ."); see also KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights § 15 ("The right of the
people to be secure in their persons and property.... ").
265. Junction City v. Mevis, 601 P.2d 1145 (Kan. 1979).
266. Id. at 1150.
267. The proposed amendment to the Kansas Constitution reads: "A person
has the right to keep and bear arms for the defense of self, family, home and
state, for lawful hunting and recreational use, and for any other lawful
purpose." Chris Green, Gun-Rights Amendment Targets 1905 Court Ruling,
HUTCHNEWS.COM, March, 24, 2010, http'/www.hutchnews.com/Todaystop/
rights2009-03-24T21-23-15.
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squads to attack strikers.268 Some state constitutions of the
late nineteenth century, such as those of Washington and
Montana, forbade the use or importation of armed bodies of
men without government consent.
In State v. Gohl, Gohl was convicted of "organizing,
maintaining and employing an armed body of men" in
violation of a Washington statute.269 On appeal, Gohl argued
that the statute in question violated the Washington
Constitution, which stated that "[t]he right of the individual
citizen to bear arms in defense of himself or the state shall
not be impaired." 270

As the court pointed out, however, this

sentence is immediately followed by the statement that the
right is not to be "construed as authorizing individuals or
corporations to organize, maintain or employ an armed body
of men,"27' and that was exactly what Gohl had done.272
F. Indiana (1908)
In McIntyre v. State, the Indiana Supreme Court upheld
a statute banning concealed carry. Edwin E. McIntyre had
been convicted of carrying a concealed revolver in
Indianapolis. McIntyre was a deputy constable in Marion
County at the time of his arrest-though it appears he was
not acting in that capacity at the time of the offense. On
appeal, McIntyre argued that the state 2 7constitution
3
guaranteed his right to carry concealed weapons.
In the period between Mitchell (1833), and McIntyre
(1908), Indiana adopted a new constitution but kept a
provision from its 1816 Constitution noting: "That the people
have a right to bear arms for the defense of themselves, and
the State; and that the military shall be kept in strict
subordination to the civil power." 27 4

The two provisions,

268. Cramer, supra note 25, at 132-34. Most prominent among them were
the Pinkertons. Allen Pinkerton's book Strikers, Communists, Tramps and
Detectives celebrated at length the Pinkerton National Detective Agency's role
in strike-breaking. ALLEN PINKERTON, STRIKERS, COMMUNISTS, TRAMPS, AND

DETECTIVES (G.W. Carleton & Co., Publsishers 1978).
269. State v. Gohl, 90 P. 259 (Wash. 1907).
270. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 24.
271. Id.
272. Gohl, 90 P. 259 at 260-61.
273. McIntyre v. State, 83 N.E. 1005 (Ind. 1908).
274. IND. CONST., art. I, §§ 32-33 (1816).
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however, were located in separate sections.275
The Indiana Supreme Court ruled that "when a clause or
provision of a constitution or statute has been readopted after
the same has been construed by the courts of such state, it
will be concluded that it was adopted with the interpretation
and construction which said courts had enunciated."276
Therefore, the court looked to Mitchell, and held that the
statute banning concealed carry was legal. As discussed
announced a result, but had provided not
supra, Mitchell had277
a word of rationale.
G. Oklahoma (1908)
The Oklahoma Supreme Court's decision in Ex parte
Thomas involved yet another challenge to a law against
carrying concealed handguns. According to the court, a
"pistol" was not within the right to arms.278 Despite what the
Thomas court claimed, there was not a single precedent for
the proposition that all handguns could be banned. 279 The
court reiterated the civilized warfare test 280 accurately, but
failed to explain how large handguns would be omitted from
the test's protections.28 1
275. See id.
276. McIntyre, 83 N.E. at 1006.
277. See supra text accompanying note 71.
278. Exparte Thomas, 97 P. 260, 262 (Okla. 1908).
279. See CRAMER, supra note 268, at 153-54. Of course the 1905 Salina case
from neighboring Kansas had denied that there was any personal right to arms.
See id. at 154. But no case that had acknowledged the individual right had
asserted that a ban on all handguns would be permissible. Several cases (all
from the South) had authorized bans on some models of handguns. These
limited bans were upheld only because they did not apply to all handguns, and
protected ownership of the handgun models, which were most useful for a
citizen serving in the militia. See supra text accompanying notes 152, 173, 178.
280. See supra text accompanying notes 90-96.
281. The court wrote:
Not everything that may be useful for offense or defense; but what
may, properly be included or understood under the title of "arms,"
taken in connect with the fact that the citizen is to keep them as a
citizen. Such, then, as are found to make up the usual arms of the
citizen of the country, and the use of which will properly train and
render him efficient in defense of his own liberties, as well as of the
state. Under this head, with a knowledge of the habits of our people,
and of the arms in the use of which a soldier should be trained, we
would hold that the rifle of all descriptions, the shotgun, the musket,
and repeater are all such arms; and that under the Constitution the
right to keep such arms cannot be infringed or forbidden by the
Legislature ....
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Moreover, civilized warfare was the wrong test for
The state constitutional convention had
Oklahoma.
specifically rejected proposals to limit the right to arms to
"common defense."2 82
Instead, the Oklahoma state
constitution right to arms was copied nearly verbatim from
the constitutions of Colorado and Missouri, both of which
include a right of personal self-defense. 28 3 The Missouri
Supreme Court had already ruled that revolvers are protected

arms. 284
H. Georgia (1911)
In 1910, the Georgia Legislature enacted a licensing
requirement for the open carrying of handguns. 285 The 1910
law was not like the carry licensing laws in effect today in
Georgia and most other states; the modern laws use objective
criteria to grant concealed carry permits to adults who meet
certain objective criteria, such as passing a fingerprint-based
background check and a safety course.28 6 In contrast, the
1910 Georgia statute provided almost limitless discretion to
the licensing authority, so that in effect, political cronies
could get licenses and black people could not. Because the

Thomas, 97 P. at 263. This language comes directly from the 1871 Tennessee
case Andrews v. State, discussed supra. See Andrews v. State, 50 Tenn. (3
Heisk.) 165 (1871). Andrews plainly used "repeater" to mean a revolver, which
was the predominant type of handgun at the time. See id.
282. DANNY M. ADKISON & LISA MCNAIR PALMER, THE OKLAHOMA STATE
CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 46-47 (2001); 8 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS

OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 36, 99 (William F. Swindler ed., 1979); see
AMOS D. MAXWELL, THE SEQUOYAH CONVENTION 73 (1953).

283. OKLA. CONST., art. II, § 26 ("The right of a citizen to keep and bear arms
in defense of his home, person, or property, or in aid of the civil power, when
thereunto legally summoned, shall never be prohibited; but nothing herein
contained shall prevent the Legislature from regulating the carrying of
weapons."); Robert Dowlut & Janet A. Knoop, State Constitutionsand the Right
to Keep and Bear Arms, 7 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 177, 217, 236 (1982); David B.
Kopel, What State Constitutions Teach About the Second Amendment, 29 N. KY.
L. REV. 827, 844 n.131 (2002).
284. "Conceding that a revolving pistol comes within the description of such
arms as one may carry for the purposes designated in the constitution .... "
State v. Shelby, 2 S.W. 468, 469 (Mo. 1886). For more on Shelby, see supra text
at notes 227-35.
285. The license fee was fifty cents, and a $100 bond was required of those
who sought a license to carry.
286. See Clayton E. Cramer & David B. Kopel, Shall Issue: The New Wave of
Concealed Handgun Permit Laws, 62 TENN. L. REV. 679 (1995) (describing laws
enacted through 1994).
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legislature had previously outlawed concealed carry,8 7
for a
obtaining an open carry license became the only way
2'8
handguns.
bear
to
right
the
exercise
lawfully
to
person
In Strickland v. State, the Georgia Supreme Court
upheld the licensing statute.28 9 The court observed that in
some of the states where common defense was the only stated
purpose of the right to arms, carry restrictions had been
upheld because arms carrying for personal defense was not
related to militia service. 290 But what about in states where
the right to arms explicitly included individual self-defense?
The court said that restrictions could be imposed "in
connection with the general police power of the state."29 1
Strickland and the cases on which it relied, however, are
invalid for Second Amendment interpretation post-Heller for
two reasons. First, Heller plainly states that the right to keep
287. See Hill v. State, 53 Ga. 472 (1874).
288. Under modern Georgia law, a person who wishes to carry a handgun for
protection, either openly or concealed, may obtain a permit which is issued
under objective criteria, to adults who have a clean record. See GA. CODE ANN. §
16-11-129 (2007).
289. Strickland v. State, 72 S.E. 260 (Ga. 1911).
290. The Georgia Supreme Court wrote:
An examination of the various decisions, whether dealing with laws
against carrying concealed weapons, or with regulations as to the
prohibition against carrying weapons of a particular character, will
show that two general lines of reasoning have been employed in
upholding such statutes: First, that such provisions are to be construed
in the light of the origin of the constitutional declarations, or their
connection with words declaratory of the necessity for an efficient
militia or for the common defense, or the like, where they are used, and
in view of the general public purpose which such provisions were
intended to subserve; and, second, that the right to bear arms, like
other rights of person and property, is to be construed in direct
connection with the constitutional declaration as to the right.
Id. at 262.
291. The court further wrote:
But even where such expressions do not occur, it has been held that the
different provisions of the Constitution must be construed together,
and that the declaration or preservation of certain rights is not be
segregated and treated as arbitrary, but in connection with the general
police power of the state, unless the language of the instrument itself
should exclude such a construction. Thus, if the right to bear arms
includes deadly weapons of every character, and is absolute and
arbitrary in its nature, it might well be argued, as it was in earlier
days, that the citizen was guaranteed the right to carry weapons or
arms, in the broadest meaning of that term, whenever, wherever, and
however he pleased, and that any regulation, unless expressly provided
for in the Constitution, was an infringement of that right.
Id. at 262-63.
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and bear arms is not dependent on the militia.292 Second,
Heller's result is contrary to the theory that any law which
can be justified under the police power is therefore
permissible under the Second Amendment.293
I. Florida(1912)
In Carlton v. State, three brothers were convicted of firstdegree murder of a peace officer in St. Johns County.
Relative to the murder conviction that the Carlton brothers
appealed, the related weapons violations constituted a small
matter and, perhaps for this reason, the Florida Supreme
Court put little effort into the discussion of the issue.294
The Carlton brothers sought to overturn the concealed
weapons statute295 because the Florida Bill of Rights
protected the right of the people "to bear arms in defense of
themselves and the lawful authority of the state."296 The
Florida Supreme Court held:
This section was intended to give the people the means of
protecting themselves against oppression and public
outrage, and was not designed as a shield for the
individual man, who is prone to load his stomach with
liquor and his pockets with revolvers or dynamite, and to
make of himself a dangerous nuisance to society.297
Carlton was inconsistent with the text of the state
constitution. The right to bear arms "in defense" of "the
lawful authority of the state" might have been construed as a
right of the people to use arms to protect themselves against
tyranny and public outrage. The constitution, however,
separately specified the right to bear arms "in defense of
themselves," and its language most naturally pointed to
ordinary personal defense.
The only precedents cited in Carlton were State v.
292. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2814 (2008).
293. See supra text accompanying notes 23-24.
294. Carlton v. State, 58 So. 486 (Fla. 1912).
295. In 1893 (with revisions in 1901 and 1906), Florida adopted a general
prohibition on the carry of handguns and repeating rifles (openly or concealed)
with exceptions for peace officers and persons licensed by the county
commissioners. Watson v. Stone, 4 So. 2d 700, 703 (Fla. 1941); Carlton, 58 So.
at 488; State ex rel. Russo v. Parker, 49 So. 124, 125 (Fla. 1909).
296. FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. I, § 20. The same language is now in section 8
of the current constitution.
297. Carlton, 58 So. at 488.
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Workman (W.V. 1891) and Presser v. Illinois (U.S. 1886).
Neither precedent supported the notion that the right to arms
did not include individual self-defense.29 8 In light of the
graver issues decided in Carlton, it is not surprising that the
court gave so little attention to the carry issue.
Unfortunately, the Florida Supreme Court still used Carlton's
sloppy language as a precedent in the 1960s and 1970s.21
We have some information about why Florida had
adopted a requirement for a license to carry handguns in
1893, with revisions in 1901 and 1906. The Florida statute
was a general prohibition on carry of handguns and repeating
rifles, openly or concealed, with exceptions for peace officers
and persons licensed by the county commissioners. What
prompted this statute? In 1941, the Florida Supreme Court
refused to find that a pistol in an automobile glove
compartment was "carrying" within the meaning of the
statute. A concurring opinion by Justice Buford explained:
I know something of the history of this legislation. The
original Act of 1893 was passed when there was a great
influx of negro laborers in this State drawn here for the
purpose of working in turpentine and lumber camps. The
same condition existed when the Act was amended in 1901
and the Act was passed for the purpose of disarming the
negro laborers and to thereby reduce the unlawful
homicides that were prevalent in turpentine and saw-mill
camps and to give the white citizens in sparsely settled
areas a better feeling of security. The statute was never
intended to be applied to the white population and in

practice has never been so applied. We have no statistics
available, but it is a safe guess that more than 80% of the
white men living rural sections of Florida have violated
this statute. It is also a safe guess to say that not more
than 5% of the men in Florida who own pistols and
repeating rifles have ever applied to the Board of County
Commissioners for a permit to have the same in their
possession and there has never been, within my
knowledge, any effort to enforce the provisions of this
statute as to white people, because it has been generally
conceded to be in contravention of the Constitution and
30 0
non-enforceable if contested.
298. See supra text accompanying notes 216, 243.
299. See Rinzler v. Carson, 262 So. 2d 661, 666 (Fla. 1972).
300. Watson, 4 So. 2d at 703 (emphasis added).
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J. New York (1911-1931)
In People v. Persce, New York's highest court, the Court
of Appeals, heard a challenge to Penal Law section 1897,
which prohibited the possession or carrying of a "slungshot,
billy, sand club or metal knuckles." 30 1 The statute was
unclear as to whether it prohibited possessing in one's home,
carrying with criminal intent, or simply carrying in public.30 2
Detective Giuseppe Persce was arrested at two o'clock in
the morning, in a room with two other men. A slungshot was
found in his pocket, and he was charged and convicted under
section 1897 in New York County (Manhattan). On appeal,
Persce's attorneys argued that the statute made "mere
possession of a slungshot or a billy, no matter how innocent, a
felony" and was therefore unconstitutional.3 3
Persce's
attorneys cited the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to
the U.S. Constitution, but not the Second Amendment. They
also cited provisions of the New York State Constitution, but
there were no provisions related to the right to keep and bear
arms. The New York Civil Rights Law included a verbatim
copy of the Second Amendment. 30 4 Although Persce did not
plead the Civil Rights Law, the Court of Appeals addressed it.
The court refused to overturn the statute and held that
the legislature had the authority to prohibit simple
possession of an object, even where possession was not
associated with criminal intent. The court discussed the
purpose of this statute and the weapons to which it applied,
characterizing them as "dangerous and foul weapons seldom
used for justifiable purposes but ordinarily the effective and
illegitimate implements of thugs and brutes in carrying out
their unlawful purposes."305
The court then addressed the statutory right to bear
arms, finding it applied to "ordinary legitimate weapons for
defense" and not "to instruments which are ordinarily used
for criminal and improper purposes."3 6 The formulation is
very similar to Heller's test for what arms are encompassed in

301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.

People v. Persce, 204 N.Y. 397, 398 (1912).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 403.
Id. at 398-99, 400, 402-03.
Id. at 403.
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the Second Amendment. °7
The Sullivan Law, passed in 1911, required a license not
only for carrying handguns, but also for their ownership. Its
sponsor was New York State Senator Timothy Sullivan, who
was widely believed to be involved in financial corruption in
the city government. °8 In People ex rel. Darlingv. Warden of
City Prison, New York's intermediate court of appeals made
the distinction between prohibition and regulation, and
therefore upheld a conviction for unlicensed possession of a
handgun at home. 0 9 This was apparently a test case. 10
Darling's argument against the statute was based on "the
inherent and inalienable right to keep and bear arms,
declared by the English Bill of Rights, inherited by the
Congress, recognized by the Bill of Rights adopted in this
State, . . . and alluded to in the second amendment to the
Constitution of the United States." 31' Not surprisingly, the
court found that the U.S. Bill of Rights was not a limitation
on state actions-a perfectly valid assertion in 1913. By
moral retort, the New York court noted the U.S. Supreme
Court's 1897 decision in Robertson v. Baldwin, which
reasoned that all constitutional protections have some
implicit exceptions.1 2 Just as laws against libel or obscenity
do not violate the First Amendment, "the right of the people
to keep and bear arms.., is not infringed by laws prohibiting
the carrying of concealed weapons."313 But of course, the
Sullivan Law was not about carrying concealed weapons, but
307. See supra text at note 8.
308.

MARK

GROSSMAN,

POLITICAL

CORRUPTION

IN

AMERICA:

AN

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SCANDALS, POWER, AND GREED 312 (2003); see People ex rel.
Darling v. Warden of City Prison, 139 N.Y.S. 277 (App. Div. 1913).
309. Darling,139 N.Y.S. 277.
310. The court wrote:
The relator notified the police that he had a pistol in his house without
a permit. Thereupon a captain of police went to his house and found a
loaded revolver and some loaded shells in a small cabinet in the
bedroom adjoining the parlor. He asked the defendant why he kept the
revolver there and defendant said he preferred not to answer the
question. The captain asked if defendant had a permit, to which he
replied no. Whereupon the captain placed the relator under arrest and
took him before a city magistrate, charging him with a violation of
section 1897 ....
Id. at 279.
311. Id. at 281.
312. Id.
313. Id. at 283.

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

1170

[Vol:50

rather owning concealable weapons.
Concerning the New York Civil Rights Law (also known
as the New York Bill of Rights), the Darling Court pointed
out that it was not a part of the New York Constitution, and
being statutory, was simply another law that could be limited
by a subsequent state legislative act. Even so, the Civil
Rights Laws reflected principles of free government
everywhere:
Nevertheless we fully recognize the proposition that the
rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights were not created
by such declaration. They are of such character as
necessarily pertains to free men in a free State. But in
order to appeal thereto for the purpose of declaring null
and void an act of the Legislature, possessing all the lawmaking power of the people, it is necessary, before the act
is declared null and void, that it should clearly be made to
appear that it is in flat violation of some fundamental
right of which the citizen may not be deprived by any
power.
The right to keep and bear arms is coupled with the
statement why the right is preserved and protected, viz.,
that "a well regulated militia being necessary to the
security of a free State." (Civil Rights Law, §4). If the
Legislature had prohibited the keeping
of arms, it would
314
have been clearly beyond its power.
Thus, banning guns would have violated the Civil Rights
Law. The legislature, however, merely required a license. As
long as the licensing law was not "unduly oppressive," it was
constitutional.3 1 5
314. Id. at 284.
315. The court wrote:

In the statute at bar the Legislature has not prohibited the keeping of
arms. For the safety of the public, for the preservation of the public
peace, in the exercise of the police power, the means employed being
within its discretion and not in that of the courts, unless flagrantly in
violation of constitutional provisions, the Legislature has passed a
regulative, not a prohibitory, act. Legislation which has for its object
the promotion of the public welfare and safety falls within the scope of
the police power and must be submitted to even though it imposes
restraints and burdens on the individual. The rights of the individual
are subordinate to the welfare of the State. The only question that can
then arise is whether the means employed are appropriate and
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose in view
and are not unduly oppressive.
People ex rel. Darling v. Warden of City Prison, 139 N.Y.S. 277, 285 (1913).
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The Darling court split 3-2. Dissenting Justice Scott
wrote that the Sullivan Law ought to be narrowly construed,
vague and shadowy
especially when based on "that somewhat
316
right known as the police power."
K

Ohio (1920)
A 1917 Ohio statute prohibited the carrying of "a pistol,
bowie knife, dirk, or other dangerous weapon concealed on or
about his person," with the usual exemptions for police
officers.3 17 Doubtlessly reflective of the labor strife then
gripping the United States, "specially appointed police
officers" were entitled to carry arms if they posted a $1000
bond, apparently to work as company police.318 General Code
section 13693 also provided an affirmative defense for
ordinary persons who carried concealed weapons: "[T]he jury
shall acquit the defendant if it appear that he was at the time
engaged in a lawful business, calling or employment, and that
the circumstances, in which he was placed, justified a
weapon for the defense of his
prudent man in carrying such
319
person, property, or family."
In State v. Nieto, Mike Nieto, "a Mexican in the employ of
the United Alloy Steel Company," was asleep in a railroad car
that was functioning as a company bunkhouse. 320 Nieto was
accused of threatening the camp cook's life while drunk on
Christmas night, 1919.321 On the morning of December 26,
two company police officers searched the still-intoxicated
Nieto while he lay in his bed, and found a revolver concealed
3 22
in his clothing.
316. Justice Scott wrote:
[T]hat every statute shall be given a reasonable construction, where its
language is susceptible of more than one construction, and in
determining what is a reasonable construction, regard is to be had not
only to the language but also to the evil sought to be guarded against
and to the nature of the remedy provided. This is especially true of
statutes like the one now under consideration which is highly penal,
creates a crime out of that which was formerly lawful and relies for its
authority upon the existence of that somewhat vague and shadowy
right known as the police power.
Id. at 287 (Scott, J., dissenting).
317. State v. Nieto, 130 N.E. 663, 663 (Ohio 1920).
318. Id. at 664.
319. Id. at 665 (quoting section 13693 of the General Code).
320. Id. at 663.
321. Id.
322. Id.
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The trial judge charged the jury to determine whether
the bunkhouse was Nieto's home, because "if that was his
place of living, where he slept, then that was his home, and,
being his home, he had a right,... as a matter of law, to have
a pistol, either loaded or empty, with him and in his
possession, or concealed on his person."3 23 Not surprisingly,
the jury acquitted Nieto and the prosecutor appealed. Unlike
in many other arms cases in which a jury set the defendant
free, Nieto had an attorney when the matter reached the
state supreme court.3 24 Nieto's attorney argued that the
statute violated Article I, section 4 of the Ohio
Constitution. 2 5
The majority opinion, written by Justice Avery, pointed
to such decisions as Dunston v. State, and Carroll v. State for
the theory that the state could prohibit concealed carry in
The court employed a balancing of
one's own home. 326
interests approach to the right to be armed:
The statute does not operate as a prohibition against
carrying weapons, but as a regulation of the manner of
carrying them. The gist of the offense is concealment.
The constitution contains no prohibition against the
legislature making such police regulations as may be
at large as to the
necessary for the welfare of the public
327
manner in which arms shall be borne.
Justice Wanamaker's dissent discussed the racial issue
323. State v. Nieto, 130 N.E. 663 (Ohio 1920).
324. Id.
325. Id. at 663-64.
326. Id. at 664. Dunston v. State, 27 So. 333, 334 (Ala. 1900), found that
concealed carry of a pistol in one's own home could be prohibited because the
law was intended to avoid "bad influences" exerted upon the wearer or a deadly
weapon and the resulting insecurity of others. Carrollv. State, 28 Ark. 99, 101
(1872), similarly upheld a ban on concealed carry in one's own home:
There is no provision in the statute excusing a party when
carrying a pistol concealed as a weapon on his own premises, nor would
it constitute any excuse for so wearing a weapon, to show that the
accused was in fear or even in danger of being attacked....
Neither natural nor constitutional right authorizes a citizen to use
his own property or bear his own arms in such way as to injure the
property or endanger the life of his fellow citizen, and these regulations
must be left to the wisdom of the legislature, so long as their discretion
is kept within reasonable bounds. And it is not unreasonable for the
legislature to enact that deadly weapons shall not be worn concealed,
that those associating with the bearer may guard against injury by
accident or otherwise.
327. Nieto, 130 N.E. at 664.
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that underlies much of gun control history in the United
States. He stated:
I desire to give some special attention to some of the
authorities cited, supreme court decisions from Alabama,
Georgia, Arkansas, Kentucky, and one or two inferior
court decisions from New York, which are given in support
of the doctrines upheld by this court. The southern states
have very largely furnished the precedents. It is only
necessary to observe that the race issue there has extremely
intensified a decisive purpose to entirely disarm the32negro,
8
and this policy is evident upon reading the opinions.
Justice Wanamaker did not dispute the notion of lawful
regulation, but did argue that the standard of review should
be rigorous:
I hold that the laws of the state of Ohio should be so
applied and so interpreted as to favor the law-abiding
rather than the law-violating people. If this decision shall
stand as the law of Ohio, a very large percentage of the
good people of Ohio to-day are criminals, because they are
daily committing criminal acts by having these weapons
in their own homes for their own defense. The only safe
course for them to pursue, instead of having the weapon
concealed on or about their person, or under their pillow
at night, is to hang the revolver on the wall and put below
it a large placard with these words inscribed:
"The Ohio supreme court having decided that it is a
crime to carry a concealed weapon on one's person in one's
home, even in one's bed or bunk, this weapon is hung
upon the wall that you may see it, and before you commit
any burglary or assault, please, Mr. Burglar, hand me my
gun."32 9
Decades later, the Wisconsin Supreme Court took a
similar approach, holding that concealed carry may not be
prohibited in one's home or place of business.33 °
L. North Carolina(1921)
In 1919, North Carolina's Forsyth County passed an
ordinance that prohibited carrying "Bowie knives, dirks,
daggers, slung-shots, loaded canes, brass, iron, or metallic
328. Id. at 669 (Wanamaker, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
329. Id. at 670 (Wanamaker, J., dissenting).
330. See State v. Hamdan, 665 N.W.2d 785, 807 (Wis. 2003).
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knucks, razors," or handguns in public without a permit.3 3 '
In 1921, O.W. Kerner was attacked in Kernersville, Forsyth
County.33 2 He went to his place of business, retrieved a
handgun, and returned to where he had been attacked.3 3 3 At
trial, the court directed a verdict of not guilty, opining that
the statute conflicted with the constitutional right to bear
arms, and the state appealed. 3 4
The North Carolina Supreme Court struck down the
Forsyth County law based on North Carolina's constitutional
protections:
The Constitution of this state, section 24, art. 1, which is
entitled, "Declaration of Rights," provides, "The right of
the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed,"
adding, "nothing herein contained shall justify the
practice of carrying concealed weapons or prevent the
Legislature from enacting penal statutes against said
practice." This exception indicates the extent to which the
right of the people to bear arms can be restricted; that is,
the Legislature can prohibit the carrying of concealed
weapons but no further. This constitutional guaranty was
construed in State v. Speller, 86 N. C. 697, in which it was
held that the distinction was between the "right to keep
and bear arms" and the "practice of carrying concealed
weapons." The former is a sacred right based upon the
experience of the ages in order that the people may be
accustomed to bear arms and ready to use them for the
protection of their liberties or their country when occasion
serves. The provision against carrying them concealed
was to prevent assassinations or advantages taken
by the
335
lawless; i.e., against the abuse of the privilege.
The court held that of all the weapons banned from carry
by the Forsyth County ordinance, only the pistol was
protected:
None of these except "pistol" can be construed as coming
within the meaning of the word "arms" used in the
constitutional guaranty of the right to bear arms. We are
of the opinion, however, that "pistol" ex vi termini is
properly included within the word "arms," and that the
331. State v. Kerner, 107 S.E. 222, 224 (N.C. 1921).

332.
333.
334.
335.

Id. at 222.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 223.
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right to bear such arms cannot be infringed. The
historical use of pistols as "arms" of offense and defense is
beyond controversy.
It is true that the invention of guns with a carrying
range of probably 100 miles, submarines, deadly gases,
and of airplanes carrying bombs and other modern
devices, have much reduced the importance of the pistol in
warfare except at close range. But the ordinary private
citizen, whose right to carry arms cannot be infringed
upon, is not likely to purchase these expensive and most
modern devices just named. To him the rifle, the musket,
the shotgun, and the pistol are about the only arms which
he could be expected to "bear," and his right to do this is
that which is guaranteed by the Constitution. To deprive
upon the
him of bearing any of these arms is to infringe
3 36
right guaranteed to him by the Constitution.
The court made clear that there was no problem with laws
that prohibited "carrying of deadly weapons when under the
influence of intoxicating drink, or to a church, polling place,
or public assembly, or in a manner calculated to inspire
terror."337 These were "reasonable regulations" that did "not
infringe upon the object of the constitutional guaranty which
is to preserve to the people the right to acquire and retain a
practical knowledge of the use of fire arms." 338 The court also
held that laws prohibiting "pistols of small size which are not
borne as arms but which are easily and ordinarily carried
concealed" would be constitutional. 3 9
In short, a discretionary licensing system for open carry
of large handguns was unconstitutional. The right to carry
handguns was "not an idle or an obsolete guaranty, for there
are still localities, not necessary to mention, where great
corporations, under the guise of detective agents or private
police, terrorize their employees by armed force."34 °
Which "great corporations" was the court referring to?
Perhaps the court was cognizant of the labor violence in West
Virginia, where deputy sheriffs, nominally public employees,
336. Id. at 224.
337. State v. Kerner, 107 S.E. 222, 225 (N.C. 1921).
338. Id.
339. Id. ("To exclude all pistols, however, is not a regulation, but a
prohibition, of arms which come under the designation of "arms" which the
people are entitled to bear.").
340. Id.
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were paid their salaries by coal companies, and were
stationed on coal company property while perpetrating
violence against strikers and union organizers. West Virginia
was a site of continuing labor violence from 1890 into the
341
early 1920s.
M. Michigan (1922)
Ostensibly to protect wildlife, a 1921 Michigan ordinance
required a permit for aliens to possess a firearm. 342 Gun
control laws supposedly for the protection of wildlife have a
long history. Blackstone observed that game laws had many
motivations, including the "preventi[on]
of popular
insurrections and resistance to the government, by disarming
the bulk of the people: which last is a reason often meant,
than avowed, by the makers of forest or game laws."3 43
The defendant in People v. Zerillo was a ne'er-do-well,
and the temptation to put him behind bars must have been
strong. The Michigan Supreme Court, however, decided
otherwise, and defended the rights of aliens. James Zerillo
(alias Joseph Zerillo) possessed a .38-caliber revolver in the
door of his car when he was arrested at approximately 5 a.m.
in Detroit. 34 The Michigan Supreme Court noted that Zerillo
was not charged with illegal hunting or with intending to
hunt.34 5
Under the Michigan Constitution, "Every person has a
right to bear arms for the defense of himself and the state."3
In explicating this provision, the Michigan Supreme Court
looked to the more detailed provision in the Colorado
Constitution:
That the right of no person to keep and bear arms in
defense of his home, person, and property, or in aid of the
civil power when there to lawfully summoned, shall be
341. Deputy sheriffs, paid by the coal companies to guard company facilities,
often committed illegal violence against union organizers. WINTHROP D. LANE,
CIVIL WAR IN WEST VIRGINIA 17-19, 48-49 (2d ed. 1969). Armed violence, on
both sides, was not at all in short supply during this period, with coal
companies using private detective agencies to intimidate and on occasion,
murder union organizers. Id.
342. 1921 MICH. PuB. ACTS 23.
343. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARiES *412.
344. People v. Zerillo, 189 N.W. 927, 927-28 (Mich. 1922).
345. Id. at 928.
346. MCH. CONST. of 1908, art. II, § 5.
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called in question; but nothing herein contained shall be
construed to justify the practice of carrying concealed
weapons.347
The court found this should also include the right of the
legislature to regulate the carrying of firearms, noting:
Firearms serve the people of this country a useful purpose
wholly aside from hunting, and under a constitution like
ours, granting to aliens who are bona fide residents of the
state the same rights in respect to the possession,
enjoyment, and inheritance of property as native-born
citizens, and to every person the right to bear arms for the
defense of himself and the state, while the Legislature has
power in the most comprehensive manner to regulate the
carrying and use of firearms, that body has no power to
constitute it a crime for a person, alien or citizen, to
possess a revolver for the legitimate defense of himself
and his property. The provision in the Constitution
granting the right to all persons to bear arms is a
limitation upon the power of the Legislature to enact any
law to the contrary.
The exercise of a right guaranteed by the Constitution
cannot be made subject to the will of the sheriff. The part
of the act under which the prosecution was planted is not
one of regulation, but is one of prohibition and
confiscation. It is not regulation to make it a crime for an
unnaturalized foreign-born resident of the state to possess
a revolver, unless permitted to have one by the sheriff of
348
the county where he resides.
Zerillo fits within the standard nineteenth century
understanding of the right to arms, and comports with the
analysis.
to
Second
Amendment
Heller
approach
Significantly, the court did not defer to legislative assertions
about the purported purpose of protecting game. The court
looked past the legislative claim to observe that in effect, the
law made it a crime for a legal alien "to possess a revolver for
349
the legitimate defense of himself and his property."
Although in theory an alien could apply for a license,
"Ithe exercise of a right guaranteed by the Constitution
cannot be made subject to the will of the sheriff."35 0 The
347. COLO. CONST. art. II, §13.
348. Zerillo, 189 N.W. at 928.
349. Id.
350. Id.
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phrase "the will of the sheriff' is key to how the right to arms
developed in the late twentieth and early twenty-first
centuries. In about eighty percent of the states today, the
long-standing controversy about concealed arms has ended
with a compromise that satisfies large majorities, including
law enforcement: in order to carry concealed arms in public
places, a permit is required. The permit may require a
fingerprint-based background check as well as safety
training. If the applicant has a clean record and passes the
safety class, the applicant "shall" be granted a permit to carry
a concealed handgun for lawful self-defense. 5 '
While open carry remains legal in most states, the
socially-preferred form of carrying is now concealed carry.35 2
Concealed carry is considered preferable because it reduces
the opportunities for a miscreant to snatch a gun.3 53 In
addition, concealed carry reduces the anxiety among what
some nineteenth century courts called the "timid" portion of
the populace who are afraid of seeing a firearm.3 54
The Zerillo decision is also consistent with Heller in that
the court did not delve into whether a particular gun is a
militia weapon. The Zerillo court accepted the self-defense
text of the state constitution. Moreover, Zerillo recognized
broad legislative power to regulate arms-carrying, but
legitimate regulation did not include capricious licensing or
prohibition. 5 5
Finally, Zerillo affirmed that legal aliens can sometimes
have constitutional rights. While the legislature might be
able to ban aliens from taking game, the state Constitution
protects the right of "every person," including legal aliens, to
self-defense. 5 6 At the height of the resurgence of the second
351. Cramer & Kopel, supra note 286.
352. See Sam Howe Verhovek, Why Not Unconcealed Guns? N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 3, 1995, at 41.
353. See, e.g., David B. Kopel, The Licensing of Concealed Handguns for
Lawful Protection: Support from Five State Supreme Courts, 68 ALB. L. REV.
305, 335 (2005).
354. Haile v. State, 38 Ark. 564, 566 (1882).
355. Zerillo, 189 N.W. at 929.
356. In Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275 (1897), the Supreme Court,
interpreting the Thirteenth Amendment so as not to ban personal service
contracts for merchant seamen, said that all constitutional rights include
implicit exceptions, commonly understood at the time of adoption.
"Every person" does not mean "every person" in the most hyper-literal
sense. It does not include soldiers of an invading army; if Chinese troops
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Ku Klux Klan, the Michigan Supreme Court vindicated the
rights of immigrants.
N. New Jersey (1925)
Because the New Jersey Constitution is one of only six
U.S. state constitutions without a right to arms guarantee,
the first New Jersey decision on the meaning of the right did
In State v. Angelo, defendant
not emerge until 1925.
Dominick Angelo pleaded guilty to carrying a concealed
revolver and upon sentencing, appealed on the grounds that
his right to bear arms was infringed.
Presumably, Angelo's argument and the court's decision
were based upon the Second Amendment. The Supreme
Court of New Jersey accepted the existence of such an
individual Second Amendment right to arms for personal
defense, denied that the right was absolute, and then said
that the statute was constitutional.3 57 The first two steps
seem obvious, but the third step needed more analysis. That
a right is non-absolute does not prove that every restriction
on the right is constitutional. Thus, Angelo suffered from the
same logical gaps as the 1842 Arkansas decision in State v.
Buzzard. s
0. Oklahoma (1929)
One result of alcohol prohibition was a vicious cycle of
law evasion and increasing repression by law enforcement
authorities. As in the drug war of today, law enforcement in
the "alcohol war" often looked for broad laws to give them the
power to punish suspected traffickers in illegal substanceseven when the suspect could not be proved in court to be a
trafficker.
entered Michigan, the Michigan state government would not violate the state
constitution by disarming them. Likewise, "every person" has an implicit
exception for persons confined in prisons or jails.
357. The Supreme Court of New Jersey wrote:
The right of a citizen to bear arms is not unrestricted. The state
government, in the exercise of its police power, may provide such
conditions precedent to the right to carry concealed weapons as the
safety and welfare of the people of the state in its judgment require.
The statute upon which the indictment was based is a valid exercise of
the police power.
State v. Angelo, 130 A. 458, 459 (N.J. 1925).
358. See supra notes 108-117 and accompanying text.
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The case of Pierce v. Oklahoma came out of Oklahoma
during Prohibition.
Three police officers went to Fritz
Pierce's property with a search warrant for a still.359 When
they arrived, Pierce came to the door with a gun in his belt,
"about half of the gun being visible."360 While the officers
were searching for a still, Pierce went into his yard with the
gun in his belt.361 At no point did Pierce attempt to use the
gun, which he said he had purchased to protect himself from
robbery.62 The police found no still or any other evidence of
criminal behavior-except that Pierce had walked from his
front door into the front yard wearing a gun-so they arrested
3 63

him.

On appeal, Pierce pointed to Article 2, section 26 of the
Oklahoma Constitution, and argued the right to carry a gun
openly in one's own house and yard. 364 The Court of Criminal

Appeals rejected this position, pointing to Ex parte Thomas;
according to the court, the right to arms included only "such
arms as are recognized in civilized warfare."365
The civilized warfare test is not an implausible standard
for state constitutions that mention "common defense" as the
sole purpose for the right to arms. The Pierce Court's use of
civilized warfare, however, was grossly defective in at least
two respects.
First and most importantly, the right to arms in the 1907
Oklahoma Constitution includes self-defense: "The right of a
citizen to keep and bear arms in defense of his home, person,
or property, or in aid of the civil power, when thereunto
legally summoned, shall never be prohibited ...
366
Therefore, the proper Oklahoma standard is whether the
particular arm is useful "in defense of his home, person, or
property," or if it is useful "in aid of the civil power, when
thereunto legally summoned." Either use would qualify for
constitutional protection. 67
359. Pierce v. State, 275 P. 393, 393 (Okla. Crim. App. 1929).
360. Id. at 394.
361. Id.
362. Id. at 393.
363. Id. at 396.
364. Id. at 394.
365. Pierce v. State, 275 P. 393, 395 (Okla. Crim. App. 1929).
366. OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 26.
367. This is the approach taken by Oregon courts, for a similar provision in
that state. See infra notes 467-505 and accompanying text.
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Second, even if "civilized warfare" were the proper rule in
Oklahoma, at least some handguns qualified for protection.
The nineteenth century "Army and Navy model" handguns
are indisputable examples. In 1929 (as in 1879, 1969, or
2010), handguns were among the firearms often carried in the
army and navy, and select militia (today's National Guard). 68
But, the Oklahoma court asserted that handguns were not of
military utility, thus, their carrying and possession could be
banned. 69
In this context, Pierce's upholding of the
prohibition on carrying or possessing handguns on one's own
property is inconsistent with Heller.
P. Tennessee (1928)
Fifty years after allowing the near-nullification of the
right to bear arms, the Tennessee Supreme Court overturned
a city ban on the carrying of pistols. 7 ° W.R. Glasscock, T. F.
Brandon, and Dick Edwards, apparently independently of
each other, were convicted of violating the Chattanooga
ordinance.37 1
The decision in Glasscock v. City of
Chattanooga,however, does not mention the manner in which
the defendants were carrying pistols.
The court quoted the 1870 Tennessee Constitution,
recapitulated the 1871 Andrews decision, and pointed out
that the city ordinance prohibited all carrying of pistols:
There is no qualification of the prohibition against the
carrying of a pistol in the city ordinance before us, but is
made unlawful "to carry on or about the person any
pistol"; that is, any sort of pistol in any sort of manner.
Upon the authority of Andrews v. State . . . we must
accordingly hold the provision of this ordinance as to the
368. 10 U.S.C. § 311 (2006).
369. The court wrote:
[Tihe Legislature has power to not only prohibit the carrying of
concealed or unconcealed weapons [of the type specified in the deadly
weapons statutes], but also has the power to even prohibit the
ownership or possession of such arms.... As law now is in this state, a
person may lawfully own and possess any of the weapons named ...
and may move such weapons from room to room in their place of
residence, but may not wear them on their person and transport them
about the yard as shown by the evidence to have been done by the
defendant in this case.
Pierce, 275 P. at 395.
370. Glasscock v. City of Chattanooga, 11 S.W.2d 678 (Tenn. 1928).
371. Id. at 678.
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372

While it found the Chattanooga ordinance unconstitutional,
the Tennessee court did not challenge the state statute that
only one mode of carrying a handgun was protected-openly,
in the hand.37 3
Q. Michigan (1931)
The Michigan Supreme Court, in People v. Brown, upheld
the conviction of a three-time felon for possession of a
blackjack.3 74 This fourth felony conviction subjected him to a
life sentence.
In Zerillo, the Michigan Supreme Court voided a ban on
firearms possession by legal aliens. 7 The Brown court drew
a distinction based on the type of weapon:
Some arms, although they have a valid use for the
protection of the state by organized and instructed
soldiery in times of war or riot, are too dangerous to be
kept in a settled community by individuals, and, in times
of peace, find their use by bands of criminals and have
legitimate employment only by guards and police. Some
weapons are adapted and recognized by the common
opinion of good citizens as proper for private defense of
person and property. Others are the peculiar tools of the
criminal. The police power of the state to preserve public
safety and peace and to regulate the bearing of arms
cannot fairly be restricted to the mere establishment of
conditions under which all sorts of weapons may be
privately possessed, but it may take account of the
character and ordinary use of weapons and interdict those
whose customary employment by individuals is to violate
the law. The power is, of course, subject to the limitation
that its exercise be reasonable, and it cannot
constitutionally result in the prohibition of the possession
of those arms which, by the common opinion and usage of
law-abiding people, are proper and legitimate to be kept
upon private premises for the protection of person and
property....
The list of weapons in section 16751, supra, is
significant and demonstrates a definite intention of the
372. Id.
373. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
374. People v. Brown, 235 N.W. 245 (Mich. 1931).
375. See supra notes 344-56 and accompanying text.
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Legislature to protect society from a recognized menace.
It does not include ordinary guns, swords, revolvers, or
other weapons usually relied upon by good citizens for
of the arsenal
defense or pleasure. It is a partial inventory
376
"gangster."
the
enemy,"
"public
the
of
The court's protection of "ordinary guns, swords, revolvers, or
other weapons usually relied upon by good citizens for
defense or pleasure" foreshadows Heller's rule of protecting
all arms commonly possessed for legitimate purposes.37 7
R. California(1932)
The California Court of Appeals in People v. Ferguson
addressed a weapon considered criminal in nature, upholding
a prohibition on possession of metal knuckles. The court
explained that while "[flirearms have their legitimate uses,"
metal knuckles do not, so they could be prohibited.378
The California Constitution contains no right to arms
guarantee. Ferguson should therefore be understood as an
explication of the limits of the police power-a power that
does not extend to banning firearms or other arms that have
"legitimate uses."
S. Colorado (1936)
Colorado, like some other states during the emergence of
the second Ku Klux Klan, prohibited resident aliens from
hunting "any wild bird or animal, either game or otherwise"
and prohibited all aliens from owning firearms.3 79 In People
376. Brown, 235 N.W. at 247-48 (emphasis added).
377. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2815 (2008).
378. The California Court of Appeals wrote:
Firearms have their legitimate uses; hence the law regulates their use
and prescribes who shall be prohibited their possession. But there is
impressed upon slung-shots, sandbags, blackjacks and metal knuckles
To every person of
the indubitable indicia of criminal purpose.
ordinary intelligence these instruments are known to be the tools of the
brawl fighter and cowardly assassin and of no beneficial use whatever
to a good citizen or to society. The legislature may take note of and act
upon such common facts. It can regulate and proscribe the use of a
thing so that its beneficial use may be enjoyed and its detrimental use
prohibited. It follows that if the beneficial use of a thing is entirely
lacking or grossly disproportionate to its harmful use the police power
may absolutely prohibit its possession.
People v. Ferguson, 129 Cal. App. 300, 304 (Ct. App. 1933) (citation omitted).
379. People v. Nakamura, 62 P.2d 246, 246 (Colo. 1936) (quoting Colo.
Compiled Laws, § 6882 (1921)).
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v. Nakamura, defendant Charles Nakamura was charged
with violating the statute.8 0 He pleaded guilty on the first
count of "unlawful possession of three pheasants."3 8' On the
second count, unlawful possession of a firearm, he pointed to
Article 2 of the Colorado Constitution. 8 2 Section 13 noted
that "[t]he right of no person to keep and bear arms in
defense of his home, person and property, or in aid of the civil
power when thereto legally summoned, shall be called in
question; but nothing herein contained shall be construed to
justify the practice of carrying concealed weapons.""' The
trial court quashed the second count of the indictment, and
the prosecutor appealed.3 4
The Colorado Supreme Court refused to accept the state's
argument that the right in question was solely a collective
right,3 85 and held that right of every "person" included legal
aliens:
It is equally clear that the act wholly disarms aliens for all
purposes. The state may preserve its wild game for its
citizens, may prevent the hunting and killing of same by
aliens, and for that purpose may enact appropriate laws,
but in so doing, it cannot disarm any class of persons or
deprive them of the right guaranteed under section 13,
article 2 of the Constitution, to bear arms in defense of
home, person, and property. The guaranty thus extended
is meaningless if any person is denied the right to possess
arms for such protection.
Under this constitutional
guaranty, there is no distinction between
unnaturalized
386
foreign-born residents and citizens.
While the dissent urged that attention be paid to whether
Nakamura himself had the guns for self-defense, the majority
was more concerned that the statute presumptively disarmed
an entire class of people.
T. Idaho (1945)
In Idaho v. Hart,the defendant argued that an ordinance
prohibiting the carrying of concealed deadly weapons was
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.

Id.
Id.
COLO. CONST. art. II.
Id. § 13.
Nakamura, 62 P.2d at 246.
Id. at 247.
Id.
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The Hart majority pointed to In re
unconstitutional.8 7
Brickey,38 8 where the court had insisted that some form of
carry had to be legal, to avoid running afoul of the Second
Amendment and the Idaho Constitution. It also pointed to
State v. Woodward, which acknowledged the right to open
carry. 38 9 The Hart Court ruled that because open carry was
legal, it was a "reasonable exercise of the police power of a
municipality to prohibit the concealed carrying of deadly or
dangerous weapons."390
Chief Justice Ailshie's dissent pointed to the imminent
peril faced by Hart, whose life had been threatened, and to
the impossibility of obtaining a concealed carry permit in an
emergency.391 The dissent, however, did not explain why
Hart could not have protected himself by carrying an
unconcealed handgun.
V. MODERN ERA DECISIONS
Adam Winkler's attempt at a comprehensive review of
state cases begins with 1946 decisions. 392 There is nothing
wrong with his choice of a start date, but there is nothing
particularly illuminating about it either. Unlike the Civil
War, the Second World War did not lead to any broad changes
in state right to arms jurisprudence. Because Winkler was
387. State v. Hart, 157 P.2d 72 (Idaho 1945).
388. See supra notes 252-54 and accompanying text.
389. State v. Woodward, 74 P.2d 92 (Idaho 1937). In Woodward, the
defendant appealed his conviction for assault with a deadly weapon on the
grounds that the jury instruction biased the jury against him. Id. at 94. The
instruction acknowledged a right to keep and bear arms for "security and
defense," but also stated, "[tihe legislature, however, has the power to regulate
the exercise of this right, and this you may consider in connection with the other
instructions given you herewith." Id. The Idaho Supreme Court ruled that
because open carry was constitutionally protected, the jury instruction had
prejudiced the jury, and therefore the court ordered a new trial. Id. at 97.
390. Hart, 157 P.2d at 73.
391. Chief Justice Ailshie wrote:
The right to defend one's person is not dependent upon a permit from
anyone else but the one being attacked or threatened to be attacked. It
would be utter folly to talk about requiring a man to get a permit to
carry a gun concealed to defend himself, when he is suddenly attacked
by a ruffian with threats to take his life. What he needs is the right to
act then and, unless he has a gun or other weapon with which to offer
equal persuasive peril, his right of self-defense would vanish and so
would he.
Id. at 75 (Ailshie, C.J., dissenting).
392. Winkler, supra note 26, at 687, 711.
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writing before the Heller decision, he could not have known
that Heller would cite some of the earlier cases, such as
Chandler and Nunn.39 3 Nor could he have known that Heller
would adopt rules about what types of weapons may be
banned, restrictions on arms carrying in sensitive places, and
other rules which appear very similar to the standards
adopted in pre-WWII cases. 9 4
As an author, Winkler was free to concentrate only on the
more recent cases. But the Heller leaves Winkler's article
incomplete as a guide for anyone looking to state cases to
interpret the Second Amendment.
A. Missouri (1946)
In State v. Plassard, Frank Plassard was convicted of
"feloniously exhibiting a deadly weapon" in Newton County,
Missouri.3 95
Plassard occupied a farm over which some
familial disputes had clouded his legal possession of the
property.396 In an argument about who was to plow part of
the land, Plassard fired one shot from a .22 rifle in the
presence of a constable, though in a direction clearly intended
as a warning and not as an attempt at injury. 9 7 The
Missouri Supreme Court addressed whether Plassard had a
right to carry a gun on his own land, noting that if he was
defending his home and property he had a constitutional
right to bear arms. 9 s Plassard was within his constitutional
rights because the arms were borne on private property. 9 9
B. Illinois (1950)
Walter Liss was convicted in Chicago of carrying a pistol
"concealed on or about his person. "400 The Illinois Supreme
Court's decision in People v. Liss, written by the aptly-named
Justice Gunn, reversed the conviction because of the lack of
evidence that Liss knew the gun was in the car he was
driving, which belonged to someone else.4 ° ' Of most interest,
393.
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.

See supra notes 125-32 and accompanying text.
See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2815-18 (2008).
State v. Plassard, 195 S.W.2d 495, 496 (Mo. 1946).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 497 (citing Mo. CONST. of 1875 art. II, § 17).
Id.
People v. Liss, 94 N.E.2d 320 (Ill. 1950).

401. Id. at 323.

20101

STATE COURT STANDARDS OF REVIEW

1187

however, is the Illinois Supreme Court's assertion about the
Second Amendment and the purpose for which the concealedcarry statute was intended:
The second amendment to the constitution of the United
States provides the right of the people to keep and bear
arms shall not be infringed. This, of course, does not prevent the enactment of a law against carrying concealed
weapons, but it does indicate it should be kept in mind, in
the construction of a statute of such character, that it is
aimed at persons of criminal instincts, and for the
prevention of crime, and not against use in the protection
of person or property. There is not an iota of evidence that
the defendant was a criminal, or had associated with
criminals, or that he came within any of40 2the specific
provisions against carrying a deadly weapon.
Liss suggests that a concealed weapon statute that did
not include malign intent as an element of the crime would
violate the Second Amendment. Liss thus used the technique
of narrow construction to avoid a constitutional violation.
C. Montana (1952)
In Montana v. Nickerson, Clarence Nickerson was
convicted of assault after drawing a loaded revolver on Fred
Hochalter, who had a law enforcement position with a nearby
Indian reservation. 40 3 Hochalter had knocked on the door and
Nickerson had bade him enter while training a handgun on
the doorway.40 4 In this particular case, the remote location,
along with Nickerson's reasonable concern that a criminal
with whom he had experienced a number of confrontations
was returning to do him injury, persuaded the Montana
Supreme Court that Nickerson's actions were not criminal.4 5
In justifying Nickerson's actions, the court found:
The law of this jurisdiction accords to the defendant the
right to keep and bear arms and to use same in defense of
his own home, his person and property.
The second amendment to the Constitution of the
United States provides that "the right of the people to
keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed."
402. Id.
403. State v. Nickerson, 247 P.2d 188, 189 (Mont. 1952).

404. Id. at 190.
405. Id. at 193.
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The Constitution of Montana provides: "The right of
any person to keep or bear arms in defense of his own
home, person and property, . . . shall not be called in
question, but nothing herein contained shall be held to
permit the carrying of concealed weapons."406
Accordingly, the court recognized the right to open carry
for self-defense.
As in Liss, the court used narrow
construction (regarding the necessary elements of the crime
of assault) in order to safeguard the constitutional right.
D. Indiana (1958)
The defendant in Matthews v. State was convicted of
"assault and battery with intent to commit murder and
carrying a pistol without a license" in Vanderburgh County,
Indiana.4 °7 Jasper Leroy Matthews apparently intended to
kill one person, but shot another.4 °8 While the "intent to
commit murder" was the most serious charge, most of the
Indiana Supreme Court's majority decision-and nearly all of
the dissent-involved the relatively minor charge of carrying
a pistol without a license. Indiana law required a license for
carrying a pistol in public places, and the majority found this
to be a reasonable regulation.4 9 The court held that this law
did not interfere with the right of self-defense because people
could freely carry long guns anywhere, and could carry
unlicensed pistols in their homes and place of business.4 10

406.
407.
408.
409.
410.

Id. at 192 (omission in original).
Matthews v. State, 148 N.E.2d 334, 334 (Ind. 1958).
Id. at 335.
Id. at 337.
The court wrote:
Appellant further asserts that the Firearms Act violates Art. I, §32
of the Indiana Constitution which provides that "The people shall have
a right to bear arms, for the defense of themselves and the State,"
because it restricts the right of the people to bear arms for their own
defense.
The purpose of the Firearms Act is to achieve a maximum degree
of control over criminal and careless uses of certain types of firearms,
while at the same time making them available to persons where
needed for protection....
Since, under the Act here under consideration, people may carry
pistols in their homes and fixed places of business, without a license,
and other kinds and types of firearms any place, we are unable to see
wherein it contravenes any of the provisions of Art. 1, § 32 of the
Indiana Constitution.
Id. at 337-38.
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E. Texas (1960)
In Morrison v. State, the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals drew upon Michigan's decision in People v. Brown to
hold that a submachine gun was one of the weapons of the
"gangster," not protected by the Texas Constitution's
guarantee of a right to arms. 4" Charles Walter Morrison had
used the submachine gun to render his wife's car inoperable
and discourage her from leaving him-not the best manner of
demonstrating his merits as a husband. 412
The Morrison court's decision reiterated the language
from Brown that protected weapons were "those arms which
by the common opinion and usage of law-abiding people, are
proper and legitimate to be kept upon private premises for
the protection of persons and property."4 1 3 The court cited
many precedents to justify that "gangster" weapons werd
not protected.4 1 4 Morrison is one of the many cases that
prefigures Heller's rule that protected arms are those
commonly kept by law-abiding citizens for legitimate
purposes.
F. Florida(1960)
When George B. Davis, III and John Allen Johnson were
"apprehended in a remote part of Dade County each had a
pistol in his hand and each carried a pistol in an unconcealed
holder."4 5 Both were charged under a state statute that
prohibited the carrying of pistols without a permit that was
issued from the county commissioners.4 1 6 Davis and Johnson
argued that the statute was a violation of section 20 of the
Declaration of Rights of the Florida Constitution, which
provides: "The right of the people to bear arms in defence of
themselves, and the lawful authority of the State, shall not be
infringed, but the Legislature may prescribe the manner in
which they may be borne."41 7
The Florida Supreme Court upheld the statute in Davis
411.
412.
413.
414.
415.
416.
417.

Morrison v. State, 339 S.W.2d 529 (Tex. Crim. App. 1960).
Id. at 530.
Id. at 532.
Id.
Davis v. State, 146 So. 2d 892, 893 (Fla. 1962).
Id.
Id. (emphasis omitted); FLA. CONST. of 1885, Declaration of Rights, § 20.

1190

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol:50

v. State, reasoning that the state's explicit authority to the
"manner in which they may be borne" was to protect the
people from "the bearing of weapons by the unskilled, the
irresponsible, and the lawless. "41 Oddly enough, the court
claimed to be unaware of any previous decisions concerning
this law, including Watson v. Stone, a 1941 decision in which
Justice Buford's concurring opinion explained that the
licensing statute's true purpose was to disarm black people.4 19
The court expressed no interest in why the original
statute applied only to pistols and repeating rifles, noting
"[e are concerned with whether or not the legislature went
too far, not with whether or not that body did not go far
enough. The wisdom of the law is a matter of legislative not
judicial concern."42 °
G. New Jersey (1968)
Illinois in 1967 and New Jersey in 1966 were the first
Northern states to enact a comprehensive licensing system
for the purchase of firearms. 421 The law requires that a
person wishing to purchase a handgun or long gun first
obtain a purchase permit from the local police.422
Arthur Burton and a number of associates, collectively
the Citizens Committee for Firearms Legislation, filed suit
arguing that the new law violated the Second Amendment.42 3
The intermediate court of appeals (Superior Court Appellate
Division) disagreed, and gave one of the more chilling
expressions of the balancing of interests approach to
constitutional rights:
We find no substantial merit in the claim that this law
wrongfully infringes upon the individual's constitutional
rights under any of the provisions specified. Under the
State's police powers, the common good takes precedence
over private rights. One's home may be destroyed to
418. Davis, 146 So. 2d at 894.
419. Watson v. Stone, 4 So. 2d 700, 703-04 (Fla. 1941) (Buford, J.,
concurring).
420. Davis, 146 So. 2d at 894.
421. Firearms Owners Identification Card Act, 430 ILCS 65/0.02 et seq. (Ill.
Compiled Statutes) (approved Aug. 3, 1967; eff. July 1, 1968); Mark K.
Benenson, A Controlled Look at Gun Controls, 14 N.Y.L. FORUM 718, 718
(1968).
422. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:151-33 (repealed 1979).
423. Burton v. Sills, 240 A.2d 432 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1968).
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prevent a conflagration. One's freedom of locomotion may
be impeded to prevent the spread of a contagious disease.
Our basic freedoms may be curtailed if sufficient reason
exists therefor. Only in a very limited sense is a person
free to do as he pleases in our modern American society.
Regulation by the government
is price we pay for living in
4 24
an organized community.
Rather than "balancing," the court put a cannon ball on
the side of the state, and a feather in the opposite pan.
Incredibly, the court cited not a single precedent for its
decision. The New Jersey Supreme Court, however, did a
better job of providing legal analysis in Burton v. Sills.42 5
The statute allowed the local police chief to deny a permit
to "any person where the issuance would not be in the
interest of the public health, safety or welfare."4 2' At oral
argument, the New Jersey Attorney General conceded that
the wide discretion could only be used when there was a
particular problem with an individual applicant. 427 Thus,
discretion could not be used to deny licenses just because the
police chief thought that reducing gun ownership would be
socially beneficial.
The New Jersey Supreme Court wrote: "In the light of
this narrowed construction, the statutory standard is
undoubtedly sufficient to withstand attack."428 It rejected
Appellants' Second Amendment arguments because it found
the Second Amendment did not grant an individual right.4 2 9
Burton and his fellow plaintiffs appealed to the U.S.
Supreme Court; but because they filed an appeal rather than
a petition for a writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court
responded with the standard rejection, stating "the appeal is
dismissed for want of a substantial federal question."43 °
While the summary dismissal did not adopt any particular
rationale, it did mean that a lower federal court could not
have found New Jersey's licensing system to be facially

424. Id. at 461-62.
425. Burton v. Sills, 248 A.2d 521 (N.J. 1968).
426. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:151-33 (repealed 1979).
427. Burton, 248 A.2d at 523.
428. Id.
429. Id. at 525-29.
430. Burton v. Sills, 394 U.S. 812 (1969). A summary dismissal operates to
preclude a lower federal court from reaching a different result in the case. See
Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176 (1977).
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unconstitutional in its entirety.

H. New Mexico (1971)
Leland James Moberg entered a police station in Las
Vegas, New Mexico, wearing a holstered pistol, intending to
report a theft from his automobile.4 31 A Las Vegas ordinance
prohibited carrying any deadly weapon, openly or concealed,
including "guns, pistols, knives with blades longer than two
and half inches, slingshots, sandbags, metallic metal
knuckles, concealed rocks, and all other weapons, by
whatever name known, with which dangerous wounds can be
inflicted. "432
Moberg was convicted under the ordinance and appealed
based on Article II, section 6 of the New Mexico Constitution,
which states: "The people have the right to bear arms for
their security and defense, but nothing herein shall be held to
permit the carrying of concealed weapons." The New Mexico
Court of Appeals agreed, noting that ordinances prohibiting
the carrying of concealed weapons have been held a proper
exercise of police power. The court noted that State v. Hart
and Davis v. State both upheld some gun control laws, but
that those laws merely regulated the right to bear arms,
unlike the ordinance at issue, which completely prohibited
the right to bear arms.433
Given the right to bear arms, a ban on carrying
handguns was unconstitutional.
I. Florida(1972)
In Rinzler v. Carson, Leonard Rinzler, owned a
submachine gun, and registered with the federal government
in accordance with the National Firearms Act of 1934.1 4 He
kept the gun at his business and used it in self-defense during
a 1969 incident in which he fired at his attacker's feet,
apparently without causing injury. 435 Rinzler was arrested

431. City of Las Vegas v. Moberg, 485 P.2d 737 (N.M. Ct. App. 1971).
432. Id. at 738 (quoting Las Vegas, Nev., Ordinance No. 3-3).
433. Id. ("It is our opinion that an ordinance may not deny the people the
constitutionally guaranteed right to bear arms, and to that extent the ordinance
under consideration is void.").
434. Rinzler v. Carson, 262 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 1972).
435. Id. at 663.
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and Sheriff Dale Carson seized the gun."3 6
The criminal charges against Rinzler were eventually
dismissed, but in the meantime, the Florida Legislature
enacted Florida statute section 790.221, which prohibited
possession of "any short-barreled rifle, short-barreled
shotgun, or machine gun which is, or may readily be made,
operable." Accordingly, Sheriff Carson refused to return
Rinzler's gun." 7 The sheriff also relied on a Jacksonville
ordinance as justification for holding on to Rinzler's

property. 438
Rinzler sued for return of his submachine gun, invoking
the right to keep and bear arms provision of the 1968 Florida
Constitution. 439 The Florida Supreme Court held that the
machine gun ban was "a valid exercise of the police power of
the state."" 0 In particular, the court noted that while the
legislature may not entirely prohibit the right to keep and
bear arms, it can regulate "the use and the manner" of
bearing certain weapons." 1 The court cited several Florida
precedents: Nelson v. State (discussing a ban on convicted
felons possessing concealable firearms);"4 2 Davis v. State
443
(involving a license to carry pistols and repeating rifles);
and Carlton v. State (prohibiting concealed carry of
weapons). 444
The Rinzler Court upheld the machine gun ban for the
same reason Heller suggested: machine guns were not Second
Amendment arms; they were "too dangerous to be kept in a
settled community by individuals, and one which, in times of
peace, finds its use by a criminal."" 5 The Rinzler Court
further found they were not "legitimate weapons of defense
and protection," but instead were "peculiarly adaptable to use
46
by criminals in the pursuit of their criminal activities.""
Florida's machine gun statute was written broadly and
436.
437.
438.
439.

Id.
Id. at 664.
Id.
Id. at 665.

440. Rinzler v. Carson, 262 So. 2d 661, 665 (Fla. 1972).
441. Id.
442. Nelson v. State, 195 So. 2d 853 (Fla. 1967).
443.
444.
445.
Heller,

See supra notes 415-20 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 294-97 and accompanying text.
Rinzler, 262 So. 2d 661 at 665-66; see also District of Columbia v.
128 S. Ct. 2783, 2815 (2008).

446. Rinzler, 262 So. 2d at 666.
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could be construed to include semi-automatic firearms." 7
Rinzler found that semi-automatic firearms were protected by
the right to arms."8 Accordingly, the court construed the
statute narrowly, so as not to prohibit semi-automatics. It
reasoned that semi-automatics were "commonly kept and
used by law-abiding people for hunting purposes or for the
protection of their persons and property."" 9
J. Colorado (1972)
A Lakewood, Colorado, ordinance prohibited carrying or
possession of any handgun "except within his own domicile,"
with the exemptions for travel to and from "any range, gallery
or hunting areas." 45 ° Also exempted were people licensed by
the city and of course, the police.4 5 '
The Colorado Supreme Court overturned this ordinance
in Lakewood v. Pillow, holding:
ITlhat it is so general in its scope that it includes within
its prohibitions the right to carry on certain businesses
and to engage in certain activities which cannot under the
police powers be reasonably classified as unlawful ....
Furthermore, it makes it unlawful for a person to possess
a firearm in a vehicle or in a place of business for the
447. In a semi-automatic, the gun fires only one shot when the trigger is
pulled. In an automatic (a term often used as a synonym for "machine gun"),
when the trigger is kept pressed, shots will fire automatically, one after the
other, until all the ammunition is gone.
448. Id.
449. The court wrote:
The definition of the term "machine gun" used in the statute as being
"any firearm, as defined herein, which shoots or is designed to shoot,
automatically or semi-automatically, more than one shot, without
manually reloading, by a single function of the trigger," could be
construed to prohibit any person owning or possessing any semiautomatic hand gun. But such a construction might run counter to the
historic constitutional right of the people to keep and bear arms. We
cannot believe that it was the intention of the Legislature in enacting
this statute to deny such right, and it is our duty in construing the
statute to preserve its constitutionality, if reasonably possible. We,
therefore, hold that the statute does not prohibitthe ownership, custody
and possession of weapons not concealed upon the person, which,
although designed to shoot more than one shot semi-automatically,are
commonly kept and used by law-abidingpeople for hunting purposes or
for the protection of their persons and property, such as semi-automatic
shotguns, semi-automaticpistols and rifles.
Id. (emphasis added).
450. City of Lakewood v. Pillow, 501 P.2d 744, 745 (Colo. 1972).
451. Id.
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purpose of self-defense. Several of these activities are
constitutionally protected. 5 2

The court agreed that the ordinance was a lawful exercise of
the police power, but it noted that the analysis did not end
there. The ordinance had to have a proper fit with its
objectives:
A governmental purpose to control or prevent certain
activities, which may be constitutionally subject to state or
municipal regulation under the police power, may not be
achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly
and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. Even
though the governmental purpose may be legitimate and
substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means
that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when
the end can be more narrowly achieved. 3

The Lakewood Court used the analytical techniques of
narrow tailoring, and "less restrictive
overbreadth,
As Winkler
alternative" to reach its conclusion.
acknowledged, the requirements of narrow tailoring and less
restrictive means are "the most important elements of
heightened review.
In the subsequent decades, many other states favorably
cited Lakewood, sometimes as part of a decision declaring a
gun control statute unconstitutional. 45 5 The tools of strict
452. Id. (citing COLO. CONST. art. II, §13).
453. Id. (citations omitted).
454. Winker, supra note 26, at 696; see also id. at 727 (describing "narrow
tailoring" as "[sitrict scrutiny's second prong"). For an examination of
overbreadth in diverse contexts, see generally John F. Decker, Overbreadth
Outside the First Amendment, 34 N.M. L. REV. 53 (2004). It is true that the
Lakewood ordinance perhaps could have been stricken under a lower standard
of review. Yet the fact is, the Colorado Supreme Court chose to apply strict
scrutiny. Consider a law which declares: "In order to prevent traffic congestion,
no negroes may drive automobiles on Tuesdays." Such a law would surely fail
rational basis review. However, if the court strikes the law because the court
says that the law is "overbroad, not narrowly tailored, and not the less
restrictive alternative," then we know that the court applied strict scrutiny and
that the court considered strict scrutiny appropriate for the type of law in
question.
455. Benjamin v. Bailey, 662 A.2d 1226, 1234 (Conn. 1995); Winters v.
Concentra Health Services, Inc., No. CV075012082S, 2008 WL 803134, at *3
(Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 5, 2008) (refusing to strike plaintiffs claim that he was
illegally discharged for lawful carry of a firearm at work, when the company
had no policy against firearms in the workplace, and the state constitution
protected the right to carry handguns); Junction City v. Mevis, 601 P.2d 1145,
1150 (Kan. 1979) (relying on Pillow to void a city ordinance against handgun
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scrutiny are part of state court jurisprudence on right to arms
cases, even if the cases do not use the words "strict scrutiny."
In this context, if someone uses carpentry tools to shape
wood, then he is engaging in carpentry even if he does not say
"I am a carpenter." In the broader spirit of Lakewood, courts
can also employ other First Amendment tools, beyond the
particular ones that the Lakewood court used.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,
in United States v. Emerson, adopted a similar standard,
allowing "limited, narrowly tailored specific exceptions or
restrictions for particular cases that are reasonable and not
inconsistent with the right of Americans generally to
individually keep and bear their private arms as historically
understood in this country." 456 Incidentally, the Emerson
language shows that the mere appearance of the word
"reasonable" in an opinion does not mean that the court is
using a feeble standard of review.
K Ohio (1976)
In Mosher v. City of Dayton, the Ohio Supreme Court
upheld a Dayton ordinance that required handgun purchasers

carrying); Bowers v. State, 389 A.2d 341, 347 (Md. 1978) (citing Pillow for the
proposition that "more rigorous standard of vagueness review is triggered
whenever an ill-defined penal statute is alleged to infringe upon Any of the
fundamental freedoms protected under the Bill of Rights," but upholding the
child abuse law because it would pass strict scrutiny); People v. Swint, 572
N.W.2d 666, 673 n.8 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997) (upholding felon-in-possession law,
and noting Colorado courts had done the same because Pillow involved a nonfelon); Arnold v. Cleveland, 616 N.E.2d 163, 176 (Ohio 1993) (Hoffman, J.,
concurring and dissenting) (stating that because "[elxercise of the police power
may not be achieved by a means which sweeps unnecessarily broadly," the
Cleveland "assault weapon" ban should be declared unconstitutional); City of
Seattle v. Riggins, 818 P.2d 1100, 1104 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991) (stating that
Pillow is not applicable because carrying a dangerous knife within city limits is
not an innocent activity); Perito v. County of Brooke, 597 S.E.2d 311, 316 (W.
Va. 2004) (stating that Pillow is consistent with ban on firearms possession by
convicted felons); State ex rel. City of Princeton v. Buckner, 377 S.E.2d 139, 143
(W. Va. 1988) (finding that discretionary statute licensing for concealed
handguns is unconstitutional); State v. Hamdan, 665 N.W.2d 785, 817 (Wis.
2003) (Crooks, J., concurring and dissenting) (stating that because the
concealed carry law was "unnecessarily broad" it should be declared
unconstitutional, rather than, as the majority held, only declared
unconstitutional in certain applications). But see Galloway v. State, 781 A.2d
851, 861 n.11 (Md. 2001) (finding that in Maryland, overbreadth is only for First
Amendment, and not applicable to harassment statute).
456. United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 261 (5th Cir. 2001).
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to obtain an identification card. The court observed that
"[t]he ordinance does not deprive any individual of the
protection of Section 4, Article I of the Ohio Constitution. All
that the ordinance requires is that the person seeking to
possess a handgun be identified under the provisions of the
ordinance."4 57
After citing State v. Nieto to show that the state had the
authority to regulate the carrying of arms, the court stated:
The Dayton ordinance in the present case is still less
restrictive, for it does not limit the bearing of arms, but
only requires that anyone who wishes to acquire a weapon
first obtain an identification card in order to demonstrate
that he is entitled to possess such a weapon. This is a
reasonable police regulation which finds ample
justification in the public interest of keeping dangerous
weapons out of the hands of convicted felons and others
forbidden to own and carry them .... Reasonable gun
control legislation is within the police power of a
458
legislative body to enact ....
Mosher is a leading case supporting a "reasonableness"
standard.
L. Connecticut (1979)
The Connecticut Constitution of 1818 guaranteed the
right of every citizen "to bear arms in defense of himself and
the State."45 9 This provision was retained in the 1955 and
1965 Constitutions. But until Rabbitt v. Leonard 'in1979,
there were no cases dependent on that clause. Here, the case
advanced only to Superior Court.46 °
Joseph M. Rabbitt's permit to carry a handgun was
revoked without notice.46 1 In response, Rabbitt sought a writ
of mandamus to force the reinstatement of his permit, and
argued that his "fundamental right to bear arms and to
defend himself"under the Connecticut Constitution had been
denied. 462 The court pointed to U.S. Supreme Court decisions
in United States v. Cruikshank, and United States v. Miller,

457.
458.
459.
460.
461.
462.

Mosher v. City of Dayton, 358 N.E.2d 540, 542 (Ohio 1976).
Id. at 543.
CONN. CONST. art. I, § 17, amended by CONN. CONST. art. I, § 15.
Rabbitt v. Leonard, 413 A.2d 489, 490 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1979).
Id. at 489.
Id. at 490.
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and to Circuit Court of Appeals decisions to demonstrate that
the Second Amendment was not a restriction on state laws.46 3
The court also used these cases to show that there was not an
"absolute right of an individual to carry a gun.
The court then discussed the text of the Connecticut
Constitution:
The language of article first, §15, of the Connecticut
constitution, which states that "[elvery citizen has a right
to bear arms in defense of himself and the state," is
different from that of the second amendment and the
other state constitutional provisions discussed above. The
use of the conjunction "and" gives every citizen a dual
right; he has the right to bear arms to defend the state, a
clear reference to the militia; and he may also bear arms
to defend himself. It appears that a Connecticut citizen,
under the language of the Connecticut constitution, has a
fundamental right to bear arms in self-defense, a liberty
interest which must be protected by procedural due
process.4 65
In this particular case, Rabbitt had failed to exercise his
procedural right to request a de novo administrative hearing
regarding his permit.
Accordingly, his lawsuit was
4 66
dismissed.
M. Oregon (1980-1989)
A series of decisions from the Oregon Supreme Court and
Court of Appeals in the 1980s provides several modern
examples of taking the right to keep and bear arms
seriously.46 7 In 1980, the Oregon Supreme Court decided
State v. Kessler.46'
This decision is one of the most
historically thorough state right to arms opinions. Rather
than simply relying on precedent from other courts, the
Oregon Supreme Court traced the origins of the Oregon
Constitutional provision, Article I, section 27, which notes:
"The people shall have the right to bear arms for the defence
463. Id.
464. Id.
465. Id. at 491.

466. Rabbitt v. Leonard, 413 A.2d 489, 490 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1979).
467. Cf RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 194 (Harvard
University Press 1977) (stating that citizens have rights which cannot be
trumped by majority will or majority perceptions of utility).
468. State v. Kessler, 614 P.2d 94 (Or. 1980).
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of themselves, and the State."
Kessler was convicted of possessing two billy clubs in his
apartment, in violation of the state statute banning
"possession of a slugging weapon."4 69 Kessler argued that the
statute violated his right to possess arms in his home for
personal defense.47 °
The Kessler Court acknowledged that the meaning of the
Oregon right to arms had never been explored by the Oregon
courts. So the court decided to investigate three questions:
"(a) To whom does the right belong? (b) What is the meaning
of 'defense of themselves'? (c) What is the meaning of 'arms,'
and what, if any, weapons of current usage are included in
this term"?471 The court recognized:
[Tihat there is current controversy over the wisdom of a
right to bear arms, and that the original motivations for
such a provision might not seem compelling if debated as a
new issue.
Our task, however, in construing a
constitutional provision is to respect the principles given
the status of constitutional guarantees and limitations by
the drafters; it is not to abandon these principles when
this fits the needs of the moment.4 72
The Kessler court first traced Oregon's arms provision to
the Indiana Constitution of 1816, then to the state
constitutions of Kentucky (1799) and Ohio (1802); from there,
the court recognized the Second Amendment and the 1689
English Bill of Rights.4 73 The court cited People v. Brown for
the position that the Second Amendment protected both
militia rights and personal self-defense.4 74
The court then took up the question of what constitutes
"arms," concluding that the term "probably was intended to
include those weapons used by settlers for both personal and
military defense . . . [and] was not limited to firearms, but
included several handcarried weapons commonly used for
defense . . . [and] would not have included cannon or other
heavy ordnance not kept by militiamen or private citizens."4 75
469. Id. at 95 (citing OR. REV. STAT. § 166.510 (repealed 1985)).
470.
471.
472.
473.

Id. at 97.
Id. at 95.
Id.
Id. at 96.

474. State v. Kessler, 614 P.2d 94, 98 (Or. 1980) (citing People v. Brown, 235
N.W. 245, 246 (Mich. 1931)).

475. Id. at 98.
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Because the Oregon Constitution included "defense of
themselves," the Kessler Court concluded that any weapon
commonly used for defense was protected, even if "unlikely to
be used as a militia weapon."47 6 The court also held that the
right to keep arms was neither unrestricted nor unregulated,
and cited State v. Cartwright477 as precedent for laws
prohibiting firearms possession by felons.4 v8
Because a billy club was within the definition of "arms"
and the clubs in question were in Kessler's home, "the
defendant's possession of a billy club in his home is protected
by Article I, Section 27, of the Oregon Constitution."47 9 The
court reversed Kessler's conviction on the possession
charge. 480 The court found that possession of a weapon in
one's home was not the same as the unrestricted right to
carry it outside one's home. It pointed to Edward III's 1328
Statute of Northampton, which forbade the carrying of
firearms "for the purpose of terrifying the people," and a 1678
Massachusetts law that prohibited shooting "near any house,
barn, garden, or highway in any town" where a person might
be accidentally hit.48 ' Many state courts had upheld carry
regulations if they did not "frustrate the guarantees of the
2
state constitution."4
Before Kessler was decided, Michael Blocker was
convicted of possessing a billy club in his car, in violation of
the same statute that had snared Kessler. 4 ' The Court of
Appeals waited for Kessler to be handed down, then
overturned Blocker's conviction, citing Kessler as precedent.
The State appealed the decision.
Much of the State v. Blocker decision sought to define
what constituted "vague" and "overbroad" laws."
The
Blocker court ruled that the legislature could prohibit the
carrying of a concealed weapon, but had not done so; the

476.
477.
478.
479.
480.
481.
482.
483.
484.
485.

Id. at 99.
State v. Cartwright, 418 P.2d 822 (Or. 1966).
Kessler, 614 P.2d at 99.
Id. at 100.
Id.
Id. at 99.
Id.
State v. Blocker, 630 P.2d 824, 824 (Or. 1981).
Id. at 825.
Id.

2010]

STATE COURT STANDARDS OFREVIEW

1201

statute banned possession of a billy club anywhere.486 The
court emphasized that certain types of regulation of the
bearing of arms were legal, giving some examples of then
current Oregon statutes that were constitutional:
This state has several such regulatory statutes, with
which we are not concerned in this case: ORS 166.220(1)
prohibiting possession of a dangerous weapon with intent
to use such weapon unlawfully against another; ORS
166.240, prohibiting carrying certain weapons concealed
about one's person; ORS 166.250, prohibiting carrying any
firearm concealed upon the person or within any vehicle
without a license to do so.
On the other hand, ORS 166.510, with which we are
here concerned, is not, nor is it apparently intended to be,
a restriction on the manner of possession or use of certain
weapons. The statute is written as a total proscription of
the mere possession of certain weapons, and that mere
possession, insofar as a billy is concerned, is
constitutionally protected.4 v
Carrying arms with criminal intent could be prohibited, as
could concealed carry; the legislature, however, had to allow
carrying for self-defense." 8
Three years later, in State v. Delgado, the Oregon
Supreme Court used similar reasoning in a switchblade case.
Police stopped Joseph Luna Delgado on October 3, 1983
because he "appeared disorderly." 9
During a patdown
search, the officer found a switch-blade knife in the
defendant's back pocket, and Delgado was convicted of
possessing a prohibited weapon.490
On appeal, the conviction was reversed based on Blocker
and Kessler.491 The prosecution asked the Oregon Supreme
Court to review the question of whether switch-blades were
constitutionally protected arms.4 92
Because Kessler
recognized that "hand-carried weapons commonly used by
individuals for personal defense" were constitutionally
protected, the state argued that switch-blades were not
486.
487.
488.
489.
490.
491.
492.

Id. at 826.
Id.
Id.
State v. Delgado, 692 P.2d 610, 611 (Or. 1984).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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commonly used for defense, and were therefore outside the
493
Oregon Constitution.

The court rejected the prosecution's claim that switchblade knives were "almost exclusively the weapon of the thug
and delinquent," calling the evidence "no more than
impressionistic observations on the criminal use of switchblades."49 4 Next the court took up the purported distinction
between "offensive" and "defensive" arms:
More importantly, however, we are unpersuaded by the
distinction which the state urges of "offensive" and
"defensive" weapons. All hand-held weapons necessarily
share both characteristics. A kitchen knife can as easily
be raised in attack as in defense. The spring mechanism
does not, instantly and irrevocably, convert the jackknife
into an "offensive" weapon. Similarly, the clasp feature of
the common jackknife does not mean that it is incapable of
aggressive and violent purposes. It is not the design of the
knife but the use to which it is put
that determines its
"offensive" or "defensive" character. 495
The court explained the test for whether a class of
weapon was constitutionally protected:
The appropriate inquiry in this case at bar is whether a
kind of weapon, as modified by its modern design and
function, is of the sort commonly used by individuals for
personal defense during either the revolutionary and postrevolutionary era, or in 1859 when Oregon's constitution
was adopted.
In particular, it must be determined
whether the drafters would have intended the word
"arms" to include the switch-blade knife as a weapon
commonly used by individuals for self defense.4 96
After studying the history of pocket knives, fighting
knives, sword-canes, and Bowie knives, the court concluded
that prohibiting the mere possession or carrying of such arms
was unconstitutional.
In doing so, it recognized the
important role knives had played in American life, rejecting
the state's argument that the switch-blade was so
substantially different from historical antecedents as not to
have been contemplated by the state's constitutional drafters:

493.
494.
495.
496.

Id.
Id. at 612.
State v. Delgado, 692 P.2d 610, 612 (Or. 1984).
Id.
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It is clear, then, that knives have played an important role
in American life, both as tools and as weapons. The folding
pocket-knife, in particular, since the early 18th century
has been commonly carried by men in America and used
primarily for work, but also for fighting.
If ORS
This brings us to the switch-blade knife ....
166.510(1) proscribed the possession of mere pocketknives, there can be no question but that the statute
would be held to conflict directly with Article I, section 27.
The only difference is the presence of the spring-operated
mechanism that opens the knife. We are unconvinced by
the state's argument that the switch-blade is so
"substantially different from its historical antecedent" (the
jackknife) that it could not have been within the
contemplation of the constitutional drafters. They must
have been aware that technological changes were occurring in weaponry and in tools generally. The format
and efficiency of weaponry was proceeding apace. This
was the period of development of the Gatling gun, breech
loading rifles, metallic cartridges and repeating rifles. The
addition of a spring to open the blade of a jackknife is
hardly a more astonishing innovation than those just
mentioned....
This court recognizes the seriousness with which the
legislature views the possession of certain weapons,
especially switch-blades. The problem here is that ORS
166.510(1) absolutely proscribes the mere possession or
carrying of such arms. This the constitution does not
permit.49 7
Thus, the decision took a categorical view-even with a
category of weapon that legislators believed to be peculiarly
the weapon of criminals.
The next Oregon decision, Barnett v. State, went no
higher than the Oregon Court of Appeals.4 98 Plaintiff Harry
E. Barnett sued for relief from a conviction for carrying a
blackjack.4 99 Apparently he had been convicted before the
Oregon Supreme Court recognized the invalidity of the laws
proscribing various weapons; the Court of Appeals granted
him relief from the disabilities of that prior conviction. 00
497.
498.
499.
500.

Id. at 614.
Barnett v. State, 695 P.2d 991 (Or. Ct. App. 1985).
Id. at 991.
Id.
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The last of this group of Oregon decisions is State v.
Smoot, which answered the questions Delgado had raised
regarding the limits of the right to bear switch-blade
knives.i ° In Lane County, Oregon, Dayne Arthur Smoot was
convicted of carrying a switch-blade knife concealed in a
trouser pocket. 50 2 The Oregon Court of Appeals upheld the
conviction because only the manner of carrying this
constitutionally protected arm was regulated: "A person may
possess and carry a switchblade so long as it is not
concealed."50 3 The Oregon cases are very useful for courts
seeking to apply the Second Amendment. First of all, they
use part of the same test as Heller, holding that arms
commonly possessed by law-abiding citizens for legitimate
purposes such as self-defense are protected.
Heller is
somewhat broader, since Heller's legitimate purposes test
would also include hunting, target shooting, collecting, or
other activities not involving self-defense.
The Oregon courts did not blindly accept a legislative
declaration, based on little more than prejudice and intuition,
that a particular arm was primarily used by criminals. In
this regard, the Oregon courts were far more intellectually
rigorous than the courts of some other states. 50 4 The Oregon
courts engaged in careful historical inquiry about particular
arms to see if they were commonly owned for lawful selfdefense. The Oregon courts also recognized that technological
improvements are expected in American life. Like Heller, the
Oregon decisions recognized that the right to arms does not
include only arms of the type that existed when the
constitution was ratified. 505
N. Illinois (1984)
Kalodimos v. Morton Grove is the perfect case for a postHeller court to study in attempting to apply the Second
Amendment-perfect in the sense that Kalodimos is perfectly
501. State v. Smoot, 775 P.2d 344, 344 (Or. Ct. App. 1989).
502. Id.
503. Id. at 345. As a practical matter, one might wonder how switchblades or
other folding knives are supposed to carried openly. While there are belt
sheaths for fixed-blade knives, folders are usually fairly small (since they fold in
half) and are designed to be carried in a pocket.
504. See, e.g., Rinzler v. Carson, 262 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 1972); see also supra
notes 434-449 and accompanying text.
505. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2814 (2008).
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wrong, and is the platonic ideal of what courts should not do.
Although the Illinois Constitution contains a right to arms
guarantee, the Kalodimos court upheld the handgun ban by a
4-3 vote.5 0
The Heller Court held that a handgun ban is
unconstitutional, so Kalodimos is entirely wrong as applied to
the Second Amendment.
In 1981, the Chicago suburb of Morton Grove banned all
The 1970 Illinois Constitution
operable handguns. °7
guarantees: "Subject only to the police power, the right of the
individual citizen to keep and bear arms shall not be
infringed."5 °8
Much of the majority opinion in Kalodimos focused on the
recent state constitutional convention, which the majority
said had intended to allow handgun bans.5 0 9 The minority
firmly disputed this point, 510 but the specifics of Illinois
history are irrelevant for Second Amendment application.
The more important errors, for Second Amendment
purposes, were the majority's assertion that the police power
included the "prohibition of any class of arms" and that
invocation of the police power allowed a government to do
everything but impose "a ban on all firearms that an
individual citizen might use. . .."-11
The plaintiffs in Kalodimos argued that "handguns are a
form of weapon commonly used for defense of person and
property and, consequently, they fall within the general
protection of section 22. " 512 In Heller, this fact was sufficient
The
for handguns to be constitutionally protected.5 1 3
Kalodimos plaintiffs then reasoned that "there is no principle
which permits the complete abridgment of one form of

1984).
506. Kalodimos v. Vill. of Morton Grove, 470 N.E.2d 266 (Ill.
507. Morton Grove, Ill., Ordinance 81-11 (June 8, 1981). A challenge to the
ordinance under the U.S. Constitution failed. See Quilici v. Vill. of Morton
Grove, 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983). After the
U.S. Supreme Court's announcement of the decision in District of Columbia v.
Heller, the Morton Grove ordinance was repealed. See Robert Channick, Morton
Grove repeals 27-year-old gun ban, CHI. TRIB., July 29, 2008, available at
httpJ/articles.chicagotribune.com/2008-07-29/news/0807280686-lrepealillinois-supreme-court-morton-grove
508. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 22.
509. Kalodimos, 470 N.E.2d at 269-73.
510. Id. at 282-86 (Moran, J., dissenting).
511. Id. at 272-73.
512. Id. at 273.
513. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2818 (2008).
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constitutionally protected behavior whenever other forms of
behavior which enjoy the same form of protection and lead to
a substantially similar end are permitted." 514 Heller reached
precisely the same conclusion; the fact that Washingtonians
could still have rifles or shotguns did not mean that the City
Council could ban handguns. 5
Contrary to Heller, the Kalodimos majority retorted that
all of plaintiffs' cites for the aforesaid point were to First
Amendment cases, and First Amendment principles were
inapplicable to the right to arms.51 6 The refusal to consider
First Amendment principles thus led the Kalodimos court
into a result that is incorrect, at least as Heller construes the
Second Amendment.
The majority also asserted that the right to arms is
subject to "substantial infringement in the exercise of the
police power," and that rational basis was the appropriate
standard of review. 7 This is contrary to Heller.1 It is also
contrary to the text of the Second Amendment and the Illinois
Constitution. Both say that the right "shall not be infringed."
The Kalodimos approach would nullify the text, and convey
the impression that James Madison and his Illinois
counterparts had written that the right "may be substantially
infringed."
A dissent by Chief Justice Ryan pointed out that the
findings of fact in the ordinance's preamble were a sham. 5 9
The city council had conducted no factual inquiry, and the
"findings" may well have been "window dressing" to advance
a political viewpoint. 5 0 "We are not compelled to blindly
follow the incantations of a legislative body inserted in
legislative enactments to lend an aura of validity to the act,"
wrote the Chief Justice.5 2 ' Therefore, he concluded:
If we permit the constitutionally given right to arms
to be nullified by simply inserting a few 'magic words'
in an ordinance which gives the ordinance an
appearance of being a valid exercise of the police
514.
515.
516.
517.
518.
519.
520.
521.

Kalodimos, 470 N.E.2d at 273.
Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2818.
Kalodimos, 470 N.E.2d at 273.
Id. at 278.
See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
Kalodimos, 470 N.E.2d at 279-81 (Ryan, C.J., dissenting).
Id. (Ryan, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 281 (Ryan, C.J., dissenting).
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power, when it is in fact only the assertion of a
political philosophy and a publicizing of that
viewpoint, then we have in effect eliminated this
right that has been granted by the Constitution. 522
0. West Virginia (1988)
Article III, section 22 of the West Virginia Constitution,
approved by the voters on November 4, 1986, reads: "A person
has the right to keep and bear arms for the defense of self,
family, home and state, and for lawful hunting and
recreational use."
Harold L. Buckner was pulled over and arrested for
52
drunk driving in Princeton, Mercer County, West Virginia. 1
The police found a .22 caliber pistol in Buckner's jacket
pocket. 524 He did not have a license to carry, but a judge
refused to allow a charge of "carrying a dangerous and deadly
weapon," under West Virginia Code 61-7-1, on the grounds
that the statute in question violated the recently enacted
constitutional provision.5 25 The prosecutor filed a writ of
mandamus with the Circuit Court of Mercer County, to
compel the judge to allow the criminal charge.5 26 The Circuit
Court agreed that the statute conflicted with the constitution,
and sought an opinion from the West Virginia Supreme Court
527
of Appeals.
The court concluded that the statute prohibiting the
carrying of dangerous or deadly weapons without a license
was unconstitutionally overbroad, for it "sweeps so broadly as
to infringe a right that it cannot permissibly reach, in this
case, the constitutional right of a person to keep and bear
arms in defense of self, family, home and state, guaranteed by
art. III, § 22. " 528 The court accepted that the state had the
authority to regulate the bearing of arms, so long as the
5 29
regulation did not "frustrate" the constitutional guarantees.
522. Id. at 281-82 (Ryan, C.J., dissenting).
523. State ex rel. City of Princeton v. Buckner, 377 S.E.2d 139, 140 (W. Va.
1988).
524. Id.
525. Id. at 141.
526. Id.
527. Id.
528. Id. at 144.
529. The court wrote:
We stress that our holding above in no way means that the right of a
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Closely following the Colorado Supreme Court's language
in Lakewood v. Pillow, the court wrote:
We stress, however, that the legitimate governmental
purpose in regulating the right to bear arms cannot be
pursued by means that broadly stifle the exercise of this
right where the governmental purpose can be more
narrowly achieved....
[A] governmental purpose to control or prohibit certain
activities, which may be constitutionally subject to state
regulation under the police power, may not be achieved by
means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby
invade the realm of protected freedoms, such as the right
to keep and
bear arms guaranteed in our State
530
Constitution.

The court declared that a complete prohibition on carrying a
pistol without a permit was unconstitutional; but laws that
regulated carrying, including licensing of concealed carry,
might be constitutional if they were not "overbroad." Again,
the tools of strict scrutiny were employed.
The West Virginia legislature promptly changed the
concealed carry law to provide for a non-discretionary "Shall
Issue" licensing system for concealed handgun carry.
P. Ohio (1993)
Laws against "assault weapons" apply to a class of arms
distinguished by cosmetics, not by firepower.5 3 ' The guns
may have black plastic stocks rather than brown wooden
stocks; or they may have trivial features such as bayonet
lugs, or features which make them more accurate, such as
threads for a muzzle brakes (an attachment that makes the

person to bear arms is absolute. Other jurisdictions concluding that
state statutes or municipal ordinances have violated constitutional
provisions guaranteeing a right to bear arms for defensive purposes,
though not specific in what ways this is to be done, have recognized
that a government may regulate the exercise of the right, provided the
regulations or restrictions do not frustrate the guarantees of the
constitutional provision.
State ex rel. City of Princeton v. Buckner, 377 S.E.2d 139, 145 (W. Va. 1988)
(citation omitted).
530. Id. at 146, 149.
531. David B. Kopel, Rational Basis Analysis of "Assault Weapon"
Prohibition,20 J. CONTEMP. L. 381, 386-88 (1994). This article was cited in
Kasler v.Lungren, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 260, 265 (Ct. App. 1998).
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firearm steadier on a second shot).532 Most so-called "assault
weapons" are rifles, and like other rifles, they are used less
often in crime than other guns. 533 Accordingly, "assault
weapon" bans should have difficulty passing any meaningful
level of scrutiny. 34
As Justice Clarence Thomas has observed, "assault
weapon" "is a political term, developed by anti-gun publicists
to expand the category of 'assault rifles' so as to allow an
attack on as many additional firearms as possible on the
basis of undefined 'evil' appearance." 535

Adam Winkler

accurately recognized that bans on "assault weapons" could
not possibly pass strict or intermediate scrutiny.5 36 Indeed,
such a law 37could not pass a serious application of the rational
basis test.

The next three cases all used the lowest possible
standard of review in order to uphold "assault weapon"
bans. 531

Post-Heller, these cases are of no value in Second

Amendment analysis. Empirically, a handgun ban is far
easier to justify than an "assault weapon" ban. Handguns are
physically different from other guns; most handguns are
small enough to be relatively easy to conceal. In addition,
handguns, unlike "assault weapons," are often used in crime.
Yet like handguns, so-called "assault weapons" are commonly
used for legitimate purposes by law-abiding people.539 If a
handgun ban is unconstitutional, then a fortiori an "assault
weapon" is unconstitutional.
In a challenge to Cleveland's "assault weapons"
532. Kopel, supra note 531, at 383, 387, 417.
533. Id. at 406-10.
534. Id. at 401.
535. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 1001 n.16 (2000) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Bruce H. Kobayashi & Joseph P. Olson, In re 101
California Street: A Legal and Economic Analysis of Strict Liability for the
Manufacture and Sale of "Assault Weapons," 8 STAN. L. & POLy REV. 41, 43
(1997)).
536. Winkler, supra note 26, at 721.
537. Kopel, supra note 531, at 404.
538. See, e.g., Robertson v. City and County of Denver, 874 P.2d 325 (Colo.
1994); Benjamin v. Bailey, 662 A.2d 1226 (Conn. 1995); Arnold v. City of
Cleveland, 616 N.E.2d 163 (Ohio 1993).
539. See Nicholas J. Johnson, Supply Restrictions at the Margins of Heller
and the Abortion Analogue: Stenberg Principles, Assault Weapons, and the
Attitudinalist Critique, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1285, 1295 (2009); Nicholas J.
Johnson, Imagining Gun Control in America: Understanding the Remainder
Problem, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 837, 890 n.227 (2008).
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ordinance, the Ohio Supreme Court, in Arnold v. City of
Cleveland, first stated that the state constitutional right to
arms for self-defense protected a fundamental right. 540 The
court's test for a fundamental right was derived from the U.S.
Supreme Court's Palko v. Connecticut decision, which sets a
standard for selective incorporation under the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process clause.54 1
The court noted that the right was not absolute, pointing
out that the police power bestowed upon municipalities
through Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution grants
substantial authority to regulate on behalf of public safety
and health.5 42 Based on the grant of authority, the court
concluded that "In reviewing the reasonableness of an
ordinance, we are guided by certain principles. It is not a
court's function to pass judgment on the wisdom of the
legislation, for that is the task of the legislative body which
543
enacted the legislation."
Despite the court's fine language about "ordered liberty,"
the court said that the standard of review for the right to
arms-and for all other rights under the Ohio Constitutionwas merely the rational basis test.5 " As long as a city
ordinance's stated purpose had some plausible connection to
the police powers of government, the court felt obligated to
defer. The result is that the right to arms, and the rest of the
Ohio Bill of Rights, might as well have never been written.
Even without the enumeration of constitutional rights, any
law must at least pass rational basis review, as Justice Scalia
545
observed in Heller.

540. The Ohio Supreme Court wrote:
The right of defense of self, property and family is a fundamental part
of our concept of ordered liberty. To deprive our citizens of the right to
possess any firearm would thwart the right that was so thoughtfully
granted by our forefathers and the drafters of our Constitution. For
many, the mere possession of a firearm in the home offers a source of
security. Furthermore, given the history of our nation and this state,
the right of a person to possess certain firearms has indeed been a
symbol of freedom.
Arnold, 616 N.E.2d at 169-70 (1993). The case is discussed in detail in Kopel et
al., supra note 161, at 1218-40.
541. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
542. Arnold, 616 N.E.2d at 171.
543. Id. at 172.
544. Id. at 169-70.
545. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2818 n. 27 (2008).
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The Ohio court had to adopt a very low standard of
review in order to uphold the law. To accomplish the same
ends, courts in Colorado and Connecticut followed that lead.
Q. Colorado (1994)
Robertson v. City and County of Denver involved a
Denver "assault weapons" ban. 546 Applying Lakewood v.
court
found
the
ordinance
Pillow,
the
district
unconstitutional.5 4 7 Under Colorado law, the appeal went
straight to the Colorado Supreme Court. The court refused to
consider the question of whether the right to keep and bear
arms was fundamental: "Rather, we have consistently
concluded that the state may regulate the exercise of that
right under its inherent police power so long as the exercise of
that power is reasonable." 54' The court found the Denver
ordinance "reasonable" based on the claim that assault
549
weapons were especially likely to be criminally misused.
That the Attorney General of Colorado presented evidence
demonstrating that all of the City Council's "findings of fact"
were incorrect made no difference. 550
The case was decided in the district court on cross
motions for summary judgment. 551 The Attorney General had
claimed that at trial, he could prove that every one of the
"findings of fact" adopted by the Denver City Council was
indisputably false. 2
The Supreme Court denied the
Attorney General even the opportunity to test the evidence,
and treated the City Council's mere assertions as
53
dispositive.
Robertson is contemptuous of the right to arms. It is a
useful precedent for any court that wishes to uphold an antigun ordinance that is based on empirically wrong factual
premises. The case is of no use to a court that takes the right
546. Robertson v. City and County of Denver, 874 P.2d 325 (Colo. 1994).
547. Id. at 327.
548. Id. at 328. The case is discussed in detail in Kopel et al., supra note 161.
Kopel represented the Colorado Attorney General, who intervened in the case in
support of the plaintiffs who urged that the law be declared unconstitutional.
549. Robertson, 874 P.2d at 331.
550. See Brief of Appellee at 5-11, Robertson, 874 P.2d 325 (No. 93SA91),
1993 WL 13038212.
551. Robertson, 874 P.2d at 347.
552. See Brief of Appellee, supra note 550, at 15.
553. Robertson, 874 P.2d at 333.
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to arms seriously. As discussed supra, the D.C. handgun ban
was based on the police power, and would easily pass a
reasonableness test.55 4 Ergo, Robertson v. Denver is not a
legitimate case for applying the post-Heller Second
Amendment.
The Robertson Court purported to follow Pillow, and did
not accept the Denver District Attorney's invitation to modify
the Pillow decision.5 5 5 But the court in Robertson actually
followed only part of Pillow-it merely looked at whether the
ordinance was within the police power and unlike the court in
Pillow, the Robertson court did not look for narrow tailoring,
overbreadth, and less restrictive means. Still, Pillow remains
a valid precedent, albeit one that the Colorado Supreme
Court did not truly obey.
R. Connecticut (1995)
The Connecticut Supreme Court upheld the legislature's
statewide "assault weapon" ban in Benjamin v. Bailey.5" In
contrast to the Ohio court in Arnold, the Connecticut court
emphasized that "reasonable regulation" was a higher
standard than "rational basis":
The constitutional right to bear arms would be illusory, of
course, if it could be abrogated entirely on the basis of a
mere rational reason for restricting legislation.
Accordingly, courts in other states also have recognized
that the right would be infringed if, in the name of
"reasonable regulation," a state were to proscribe the
possession of all firearms that could be used in self-

defense. 557
The court relied upon the analysis of Robertson,
apparently believing that because some of the banned guns
had been used in crimes, and because the law only banned a
small percentage of all guns, there was a sufficient basis to
pass the "reasonableness" test. 558

554. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.

555. Brief of the Denver District Attorney as Amicus Curiae Supporting the
Defendants-Respondents, Robertson, 874 P.2d 325 (No. 93SA91), 1993 WL
13038213.
556. Benjamin v. Bailey, 662 A.2d 1226 (Conn. 1995).
557. Id. at 1234.

558. See id. at 1234-35.
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S. Washington (1996)
In City of Seattle v. Montana, the Washington Supreme
Court upheld Seattle's "dangerous knife" ordinance, 559 which
is among the more restrictive laws in the Northwest. It
prohibits public possession of any fixed blade knife with a
blade more than three-and-a-half inches long, whether
carried openly or concealed. 560 There are exemptions for
knives carried by licensed hunters or fisherman, knives
wrapped and not available for use, and knives contained in
tool boxes. 56 ' Alberto Montana was arrested on a "drug
loitering" charge, and found in possession of a knife that
violated the ordinance.5 62
The court upheld the ordinance, reasoning that while the
Washington Constitution's arms provision certainly protected
weapons ("Only '[i]nstruments made on purpose to fight with
are called arms."'), the ordinance survived because "it is a
reasonable exercise of police power and is not in conflict with
general law."563 The court also specified the standard of
review: "A law is a reasonable regulation if it promotes public
safety, health or welfare and bears a reasonable and
substantial relation to accomplishing the purpose pursued."5"
The "substantial relation" element elevates the
Indeed,
reasonableness test above mere rational basis.
"substantial relation" seems close to the intermediate
But the Seattle Court's extreme
scrutiny standard.5 65
deference to legislative intuitions (basically, that knives are
the
dangerous and so their carrying can be banned) made
566
standard of review ineffective in the particular case.

559. City of Seattle v.Montana, 919 P.2d 1218 (Wash. 1996).
560. Id. at 1221.
561. Id.

562. Id. at 1220.
563. Id. at 1222.
564. Id. at 1222-23.
565. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
566. The Seattle court wrote:
SMC 12A.14.080 furthers a substantial public interest in safety,
addressing the threat posed by knife-wielding individuals and those
disposed to brawls and quarrels, through reducing the number and
It
availability of fixed-blade knives in public places in Seattle.
addresses the reality of life in our state's largest city, where at all

hours residents must step outside their homes and workplaces and
mingle with numerous strangers in public places.
street crime involving knives is a daily risk....

Unfortunately,
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T. Ohio (2003)
The plaintiff in Klein v. Leis challenged Ohio's ban on
concealed carrying of deadly weapons as a violation of the
Ohio Constitution's right to arms.567 The Ohio Supreme
Court held that the regulation was reasonable, in that it was
not "a clear and palpable abuse of power."561 Notably, open
carry, with no need for a permit, was entirely lawful.
Moreover, the concealed carry law allowed an affirmative
69
defense for persons who were carrying for self-defense.
Justice O'Connor's dissent argued for intermediate
scrutiny for carry regulation, while also invoking the
5 70
principles of narrow tailoring and less restrictive means.
Given the reality of modem urban life, Seattle has an interest in
regulating fixed blade knives to promote public safety and good order.
Seattle may decide fixed blade knives are more likely to be carried for
malevolent purposes than for self-defense, and the burden imposed on
innocent people carrying fixed blade knives is far outweighed by the
potential harm of other people carrying such knives concealed or
unconcealed. The harm of carrying concealed knives is even more
manifest.
Montana, 919 P.2d at 1223, 1225.
567. Klein v. Leis, 795 N.E.2d 633 (Ohio 2003).
568. Id. at 638.
569. Id. at 639-40. For the text of the affirmative defense, see text at supra
note 319.
570. Justice O'Connor wrote:
The right to bear arms for defense and security provided by the Ohio
Constitution is a fundamental individual right. Majority opinion, ante
at
7 ....
Generally, infringements upon fundamental rights are
subject to strict scrutiny. Like other fundamental rights, the right to
bear arms for security and defense should normally be protected by
strict scrutiny. To survive strict scrutiny, a restriction must be
necessary to serve a compelling government interest.
A manner restriction on the right to bear arms should be subjected
to the same level of scrutiny as a manner restriction on the right of free
speech. Thus, I would invoke intermediate scrutiny....
Under intermediate scrutiny, a regulation will be upheld only if
the regulation is narrowly tailored to serve an important government
interest and leaves open other means of exercising the right. The state
argues that the carrying of concealed weapons must be banned to
protect public safety.
Ensuring public safety is an important
government interest that would satisfy the first prong of the test, if the
statute were narrowly tailored. Further, the state correctly asserts
that the statute leaves open the ability to bear arms by openly carrying
a firearm, satisfying the third prong of the test.
We next turn to whether R.C. 2923.12 is narrowly tailored to serve
its goal. To promote public safety, the statute prohibits the carrying of
a concealed weapon by anyone unless he establishes that he had
reasonable cause to believe the weapon was needed for defensive
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In particular, the affirmative defense was not the less
restrictive means.5 7 1
U. Wisconsin (2003)
Along with Illinois, Wisconsin is one of only two states
that do not have a procedure to issue licenses for the carrying
of concealed weapons.5 72 Although Illinois law includes some
statutory exceptions allowing for concealed carry (e.g., in
one's home or place of business, or by certain categories of
persons), 573 the Wisconsin statute bans concealed carry under
all circumstances. Open carry, however, is lawful without a
permit.
State v. Cole574 and State v. Hamdan57 5 comprise a pair of
cases, decided on the same day, in which the Wisconsin
Supreme Court determined whether the concealed carry ban
violated the right to arms, which an overwhelming majority of
voters had added to the state constitution in 1998.576
purposes. The appellees argue that the statute is not narrowly tailored
because a citizen is subject to arrest prior to being allowed to
demonstrate that he was engaged in constitutionally protected activity.
I agree that "lesser, more exact restrictions may achieve the
[government's] desired goals."
Id. at 639-40 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
571. She further wrote:
Moreover, the opportunity for the accused to establish that he was
exercising a fundamental right does not justify subjecting him to arrest
each time he exercises the right. This is as offensive as a statute
allowing the arrest of anyone who speaks in public, but permitting the
speaker to prove at trial that the speech was constitutionally protected.
Id. at 641 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
572. To be precise, Vermont is another state with no procedure for concealed
carry licenses. But since the Vermont Supreme Court has ruled that unlicensed
concealed carry is constitutionally protected, there is no need for a license
system. See supra notes 255-57 and accompanying text.
573. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/24-1(a)(1) (2008) (stating a general ban
on carry); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/24-1(a)(4) (stating that the ban does not
apply if the gun is "not immediately accessible"; ban does not apply "on his land
or in his own abode ... or fixed place of business"); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
5/24 2(a) (exceptions for security guards, watchmen, and so on); 720 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/24 2(b) (giving exceptions for sporting purposes).
574. State v. Cole, 665 N.W.2d 328 (Wis. 2003).
575. State v. Hamdan, 665 N.W.2d 785 (Wis. 2003). Cole and Hamdan are
discussed in more detail in David B. Kopel, The Licensing of Concealed
Handguns for Lawful Protection: Support from Five State Supreme Courts, 68
ALB. L. REV 305, 314-24 (2005).
576. Seventy-four percent of the public had voted in favor. See Jeffrey
Monks, Comment, The End of Gun Control or Protection Against Tyranny?,
2001 WIS. L. REV. 249, 250 n.10.
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The court ruled that the concealed carry ban in one's
home or place of business was unconstitutional. 7 '
The
carry
ban
in
automobiles,
however,
was
concealed
constitutional. 57 The court explained that even though open
carry was an option, it was not a sufficient substitute for
concealed carry in some circumstances. 579 For example, in
the home, concealment was better suited to keeping guns
hidden from children. In a place of business, concealment
provided protection without alarming customers or making
the gun easy to steal.58°
While the Attorney General argued for a reasonableness
standard of review, the defense asked for "strict scrutiny, or
at least intermediate scrutiny, in determining the
constitutionality of Wis. Stat. § 941.23, because the right to
bear arms is a fundamental constitutional right."58 '
The court agreed that "the state constitutional right to
bear arms is fundamental."5 8 2 It decided, though, that a
"reasonableness" test was more appropriate: "We are
persuaded that this standard is appropriate because the3
58
interests of public safety involved here are compelling."
This is an odd formulation, because strict scrutiny itself
makes explicit account for compelling state interests.
The Wisconsin court emphasized that reasonableness
"should not be mistaken for a rational basis test. The
explicit grant of a fundamental right to bear arms clearly
requires something more, because the right must not
be allowed to become illusory. " 58 4 As applied in Wisconsin,
"reasonableness" is a balancing test and does not

577. Hamdan, 665 N.W.2d at 812 ("W]e conclude that he had a
constitutional right to keep and bear arms for the lawful purpose of security at
the time he carried his concealed weapon, that his conviction for carrying a
concealed weapon was unconstitutional, and his conviction must be reversed.").
578. Cole, 665 N.W.2d 328.
579. Hamdan, 665 N.W.2d at 809-10 ("Overall, we believe that requiring the
continuous, open carrying of a firearm in one's business would effectively
eviscerate Article I, Section 25 and lead to undesirable consequences. Under
the view of the State and the [dissenting] Chief Justice, a storeowner either
must sacrifice the exercise of his right to use arms for security or must put
himself and others at risk by openly displaying the weapon.").
580. Id. at 804
581. Cole, 665 N.W.2d at 336.
582. Id.
583. Id. at 337.
584. Id. at 338.
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automatically mean deference to the legislature: "Under
circumstances such as those in this case, the reasonableness
test focuses on the balance of the interests at stake, rather
than merely on whether any conceivable rationale exists
under which the legislature may have concluded the law
could promote the public welfare."58 5 In holding that the
concealed carry ban could not be applied in the home or a
place of business, the court reasoned that the government
interests in mandating open carry rather than concealed
carry in such places were weak and unpersuasive.8 6
Although the Wisconsin cases-like Connecticut's
Benjamin 8 1 -used
the
word
"reasonableness," their
application is very different.
In Benjamin, government
assertions were enough to demonstrate reasonableness, and
in Wisconsin they were not. Wisconsin-style "reasonableness"
review could lead to so-called "assault weapons" bans being
declared unconstitutional-if the opponents of prohibition
could support their claim that the banned guns differ only
cosmetically from other firearms.
V. North Carolina(2009)
Britt v. State, another case that took reasonableness
seriously, involved a challenge to North Carolina's 2004
statute banning all firearms possession by anyone ever
convicted of a felony.5"'
Britt had pleaded guilty to a
controlled substance violation in 1979.589 His right to own a
firearm was restored in 1987, and he peacefully owned
firearms from then until 2004.590 After the enactment of the
complete ban in 2004, he voluntarily surrendered his guns.5 91
The North Carolina Supreme Court, in a 5-2 decision,
decided that Britt "affirmatively demonstrated that he is not
among the class of citizens who pose a threat to public peace
and safety."5 92 The court considered his "uncontested lifelong
nonviolence towards other citizens, his thirty years of law585.
586.
587.
588.
(2009).
589.
590.
591.
592.

Id.
Id. at 344.
See supra notes 556-58 and accompanying text.
Britt v. State, 681 S.E.2d 320 (N.C. 2009); N.C. GEN STAT. § 14-415.1
Britt, 681 S.E.2d at 321.
Id. at 323.
Id. at 322.
Id. at 323.
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abiding conduct since his crime, his seventeen years of
responsible, lawful firearm possession between 1987 and
2004, and his assiduous and proactive compliance with the
593
2004 amendment."
Accordingly, the court found that as applied to Britt, the
lifetime ban was "not a reasonable regulation."5 9 4 This was
because a gun regulation must be "reasonable and not
prohibitive, and must bear a fair relation to the preservation
of the public peace and safety."5 95 Having decided the case
under reasonableness, the court said that it did not need to
596
decide whether strict scrutiny was necessary.
In a Second Amendment context, however, the North
Carolina reasonableness inquiry would never be conducted
since Heller states that gun bans for felons are presumptively
constitutional.597 Perhaps at some point the Court will clarify
598
whether there are any exceptions to this general rule.
VI. CONCLUSION

In our survey of many leading state cases on the right to
arms, we find a much more complex situation than has been
described by people who claim that highly deferential
"reasonableness" has been the universal standard. To be
sure, "reasonableness" has played an important role in many
cases. Some courts have taken reasonableness seriously,
while others have turned it into nothing more than a weak
version of the rational basis test.
More importantly, reasonableness has not been the only
device in the judicial toolbox; categoricalism has been an oftused tool. That is, to determine the constitutionality of a
particular arms control law, the court decides whether it fits
within the protected categories of the right to arms. Is a

593. Id.
594. Id. at 322.
595. Britt v. State, 681 S.E.2d 320, 322 (N.C. 2009).
596. Id. at 322 n.2.
597. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 2816-17 (2008).
598. See United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1047-50 (10th Cir. 2009)
(Tymkovich, J., concurring) (pointing out the tension between Heller's core
holding and a lifetime ban for all non-violent felons); see also C. Kevin Marshall,
Why Can't Martha Stewart Have a Gun?, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 695 (2009)
(demonstrating that, unlike some of the other gun controls approved in Heller,
lifetime bans for felons are not well-established in the history of the American
legal tradition).
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particular type of weapon among the "arms" that are included
in the right? Is concealed carry one form of "bearing arms"?
The answers to these questions have been diverse, partly
because of differences in the texts of state constitutions, and
partly because some cases have been influenced by racial
animus or other forms of 6lite panic.
The main point of this article is that categoricalism has
been a long-standing technique of judicial review regarding
the right to arms. If something is within the protection of the
arms right, it cannot be banned, nor can it be regulated so as
to frustrate the exercise of the right. Some cases suggest that
even a licensing system would violate the right--especially if
the licensing system includes discretion which might
frustrate an ordinary person's exercise of the right.
A second venerable judicial tool is narrow construction.
To prevent infringements of the right to arms, a criminal
statute may be construed narrowly. For example, a ban on
carrying guns may be read to include an implicit requirement
that the carrying is illegal only if the carrying is with malign
intent.
Third, some courts have used tools that were first
developed for strict scrutiny review under the First
Amendment: overbreadth, narrow tailoring, and less
restrictive alternative. Even though the courts employing
these techniques have not used the words "strict scrutiny,"
the use of these techniques suggests a standard of review
quite similar to strict scrutiny.
The most plausible methodology for how to interpret the
Second Amendment, however, is the same manner in which
the courts apply the rest of the Bill of Rights. In every case,
the legislature carries the burden to justify denial of an
individual right. A sincere legislative belief that rights
suppression contributes to public health or safety is not
enough.
To treat the Second Amendment as deserving a standard
of review inferior to the rest of the Bill of Rights is
inappropriate. As the Supreme Court has held, there is no
legitimate basis for treating one constitutional right as more
preferred, and another right as less preferred or protected.5 99

599. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ans.United for Separation of Church &
State, 454 U.S. 464, 484 (1982) ("[W~e know of no principled basis on which to
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This does not mean that the results will always be the
same. Many gun control laws-particularly those aiming to
prevent gun acquisition by dangerous criminals-may be
based on a compelling state interest. In contrast, few speech
restrictions could have a compelling state interest.
Thus, the National Instant Check System (NICS) would
almost certainly be upheld against a Second Amendment
challenge. Under current federal law, when a person buys a
gun in a store, the seller must first conduct a telephone or
online check with a state law enforcement agency or the FBI.
The check verifies that the buyer is not prohibited from
buying a firearm because of a criminal conviction or other
disqualifying condition. °° Sometimes the check is completed
in minutes, and sometimes it takes several hours.
As applied to firearms, NICS would likely be considered
constitutional because the burden is relatively small, and can
be seen as narrowly tailored and as the least restrictive
alternative (compared to a more elaborate licensing system
requiring weeks or months). Significantly, NICS aims to
protect a compelling state interest in preventing especially
dangerous people from acquiring guns. In contrast, there is
not a compelling state interest in preventing dangerous
people from acquiring books, so NICS could not
constitutionally be applied to bookstores.
In this article, we do not attempt to resolve the debate
over how much deference courts should give to legislatures.
Whatever standard of deference one picks, the rule should be
applied consistently, with no right, including the right to
arms, being specially favored or disfavored. Two centuries of
state court decisions provide many good examples of courts
that have respected and seriously enforced the right to arms,
doing much more than supinely accepting all anti-gun laws
under a feeble standard of deference.

create a hierarchy of constitutional values.").
600. 18 U.S.C. § 922(t) (2006).

